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This dissertation traces the responses of three canonical political realists—Niccolò Machiavelli, 
Thomas Hobbes, and Hans Morgenthau—to eruptions of apocalyptic rhetoric, imagery, and 
politics.  I treat apocalypticism as a very particular kind of utopianism that is premised on a 
belief in the imminent end of the known world and the arrival of a radically new 
future.  Contemporary realists tend to position their pragmatic approaches to politics against 
‘utopian’ alternatives, which they reject for being at best unrealizable and at worst profoundly 
dangerous.  However, in tracing the historical engagement between political realism and 
apocalypticism, I find a more complex and productive relationship.  Through an historical and 
textual analysis of the work of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau, I argue that much of the 
nuance and texture in these realists’ work, and particularly their evolving conceptions of human 
nature and their commitments to political action, emerge from serious and extended engagements 
with apocalypticism. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
[W]hen we get to May 21 on the calendar in any city or country in the world, and 
the clock says about — this is based on other verses in the Bible — when the 
clock says about 6 p.m., there’s going to be this tremendous earthquake that’s 
going to make the last earthquake in Japan seem like nothing in comparison. And 
the whole world will be alerted that Judgment Day has begun. 
Harold Camping, 
Interview, May 11, 2011 
 
For a half a century, America defended our own freedom by standing watch on 
distant borders.  After the shipwreck of communism came years of relative quiet, 
years of repose, years of sabbatical.  And then there came a day of fire…By our 
efforts we have lit a fire as well—a fire in the minds of men.  It warms those who 
feel its power; it burns those who fight its progress.  And one day this untamed 
fire of freedom will reach the darkest corners of our world. 
President George W. Bush,  
Second Inaugural Address, 2005 
 
[T]he evidence coming in from the watchers around the world brings news of an 
imminent shift in our climate towards one that could easily be described as Hell: 
so hot, so deadly that only a handful of the teeming billions now alive will 
survive. 
James Lovelock,  
The Revenge of Gaia: Earth’s Climate 
Crisis and the Fate of Humanity, 2006 
 
  
In the months and days leading up to May 21, 2011, civil engineer turned radio evangelist 
Harold Camping preached an apocalyptic message of hope and despair.  A cross-country 
billboard campaign urged Americans to “Save the Date!” and announced the “Return of Christ.  
May 21, 2011.”  On this day, the faithful would be taken up to heaven in the rapture.  From the 
safety of their heavenly perches, they would look down as a wave of divine destruction wrapped 
its way around the globe, consuming the world and massacring the unfaithful.   Fires, wars, and 
plagues of the kinds described in the book of Revelation would ravage the earth for five months, 
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killing millions each day.  With these predictions, Camping offered his followers a vision of the 
apocalypse—the imminent end of the known world and the beginning of a radically new future.  
When May 21 came and went without incident, Camping and his followers, some of who had 
quit their jobs and disposed of their assets, were widely ridiculed.1  Behind much of this ridicule 
was a sense that Camping and his followers were exactly what many of us expect an apocalyptic 
group to be—marginal, religious, and ultimately wrong.   
 These preconceptions are often reinforced by media portrayals of apocalyptic groups.  
Many of us imagine a band of vulnerable people who, under the direction of a charismatic false 
prophet, have gathered in a rural bunker to await the imminent end of the known world.  We 
imagine groups who have chosen to cut themselves off from mainstream society and to pursue 
their apocalyptic expectations to a violent consummation.  Some of the most prominent cases of 
apocalyptic belief seem to fit this mold.  For instance, the mass suicide of more than 900 
members of the Peoples Temple at Jonestown, Guyana in 1978 was motivated in part by this 
group’s apocalyptic expectations.  The Branch Davidians, a group of whom were involved in a 
protracted armed standoff with the FBI outside of Waco, Texas in 1993, were similarly 
motivated by expectations of an imminent end.  Four years later, 39 members of Heaven’s Gate, 
a group that combined elements of Christian apocalypticism with beliefs about the salvation of 
the soul through UFO transport, committed mass suicide.  Neither these beliefs nor their 
dangerous consequences are exclusively American or Western.  In 1995, members of Aum 
Shinrikyo, a Japanese group whose beliefs combine elements drawn from yoga, Buddhism, and 
Christian apocalypticism, released Sarin gas on the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 people and 
                                                
1 Jesse McKinley, “Despite Careful Calculations, the World Does Not End,” New York Times, May 21, 2011, 
accessed July 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/22/us/22doomsday.html ; Jesse McKinley, “An Autumn 
Date for the Apocalypse,” New York Times, May 23, 2011, accessed July 7, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/us/24rapture.html. 
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severely injuring many others.  While these movements ultimately caused far more destruction of 
life and property than Camping’s May 21 group, they all serve to reinforce our preconceptions 
about apocalyptic groups.  In each case, followers were motivated by charismatic leaders 
espousing beliefs about the imminent end that are difficult for most outsiders to understand, let 
alone accept as action-guiding principles. 
 Yet, as will become clear in the course of this dissertation, apocalyptic beliefs are not 
exclusively or even primarily held by members of socially marginal groups.  They are regularly 
embraced by those in the highest positions of political power.  Consider George W. Bush’s 
presidential rhetoric in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a sample of 
which appears in the epigram above.  While it is stripped of overt biblical imagery and addresses 
a much broader audience than Camping’s predictions, Bush’s remarks nonetheless offer a 
similarly apocalyptic narrative.   Harold Camping and his followers had expected that May 21 
would be the end of time and the cataclysmic birth of a new world.  In its invocation of a “day of 
fire,” Bush’s statement also marks a rupture in the temporal continuity of history.  The attacks 
herald a new world in which different rules of state practice apply and previously unacceptable 
forms of state violence may be necessary to win a war against “evil.”  Like Camping, Bush 
evinces a certainty about the course of history.  The “untamed fire of freedom” will spread to the 
“darkest corners of the world.”  It will burn “those who fight its progress.”  Camping called upon 
his followers to put their trust in God’s plan for history.  May 21 would mark the beginning of a 
terrifying battle between good and evil that would inaugurate a new and better world.  In his 
2003 State of the Union Address, Bush asked Americans for a similar act of faith: “We 
Americans have faith in ourselves, but not in ourselves alone.  We do not...claim to know all the 
ways of Providence, yet we can trust in them, placing our confidence in the loving God behind 
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all life and all history.”2  While the September 11 attacks might have initially raised questions 
about the progressive direction of history, Bush’s apocalyptic narrative absorbs the attacks, 
casting them as the terrifying birth pangs of a new world.3 
 Bush is not the only American president to situate contemporary events in an apocalyptic 
narrative.  While he was governor of California, Ronald Reagan confided to a political associate 
that the recent coup in Libya was “a sign that the day of Armageddon isn’t far off.”  While 
Reagan downplayed these beliefs when he became President, his Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger was more forthright: “I have read the Book of Revelation and yes, I believe the 
world is going to end—by an act of God, I hope—but every day I think that time is running 
out.”4  Bush’s apocalyptic rhetoric is therefore by no means unique.  Where it differs from 
Reagan and Weinberger’s statements is primarily in its capacity to convey its apocalyptic 
message more selectively.  For Christians familiar with the book of Revelation, or other biblical 
accounts of world-consuming disaster, the images of fire connote both apocalyptic catastrophe 
and the final purification of humanity.  For others, this imagery simply serves as a secular 
metaphor for disaster and renewal.    There is a similar multivocality in Bush’s speech 
announcing the beginning of United States military strikes against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.  Bush admitted that “initially, the terrorists may burrow deeper into caves and other 
entrenched hiding places.”  But American military action would soon “drive them out and bring 
them to justice.”5  To non-Christian audiences, these images might not have carried any special 
                                                
2 George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (January 28, 2003), accessed July 20, 2011, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29645#axzz1UZTKZP00 
3  Antoine Bousquet, “Time Zero: Hiroshima, September 11 and Apocalyptic Revelations in Historical 
Consciousness,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 34, no. 3 (2006): 761.   
4  As quoted in Paul Boyer, When Time Shall be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 142, 141.   
5 George W. Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban 
Military Installations in Afghanistan (October 7, 2001), accessed July 20, 2011,  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/mediaplay.php?id=65088&admin=43 
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meaning, beyond the familiar promise that American military power would be both effective and 
decisive.  To certain Christian audiences, however, the statement might well have evoked the 
culmination of God’s wrath described in the book of Revelation:  
Then the kings of the earth and the magnates and the generals and the rich and the 
powerful, and everyone, slave and free, hid in the caves and among the rocks of 
the mountains, calling to the mountains and rocks, ‘Fall on us and hide us from 
the face of the one seated on the throne and from the wrath of the Lamb [Jesus]; 
for the great day of their wrath has come, and who is able to stand?6 
 
The Christian apocalyptic undertones of Bush’s speeches are there for those able and willing to 
hear them. 
 Even if we admit that apocalyptic beliefs can be held by the marginal and the powerful 
alike, Bush’s rhetoric still seems to confirm the popular perception that these beliefs are 
primarily religious, and perhaps especially Christian, in character.  Yet consider the statement by 
environmentalist James Lovelock quoted in the third epigraph.  Lovelock uses the religious 
imagery of hell to describe an entirely secular apocalypse—an end to the world brought about 
not by divine but by human agency.  He is certainly not alone in characterizing climate change in 
apocalyptic terms.  After showing some particularly devastating images of natural disasters in An 
Inconvenient Truth, former Vice President Al Gore notes that they are “like a nature hike through 
the book of Revelations [sic].”  Lovelock and Gore, no less than Camping and Bush, have 
apocalyptic beliefs about the end of the world.  But, one might object, surely there is a difference 
between religious beliefs about the apocalypse and secular expectations of the end of the world.  
Today’s environmentalists, like the anti-nuclear activists of the Cold War, are not describing 
some fantastical apocalypse outlined in the Bible and transposed into the contemporary world.  
They are talking about the real apocalypse—an impending end supported by hard facts and data.  
The polar ice caps are melting.  Rates of extreme weather events are on the rise. Yet as we shall 
                                                
6 Revelation 6:15-17 (NRSV).   
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see, the terrors that were nourished by the Christian apocalypticism of fifteenth-century Florence 
and seventeenth-century England were real enough for those who experienced them.  Believers 
looked around them and saw signs of an impending end that seemed every bit as incontrovertible 
as evidence of environmental doom is today.7  Whether they are held by the marginal or the 
powerful, whether they are overtly religious or seemingly secular, apocalyptic beliefs share an 
expectation of an imminent end to the known world and the arrival of a radically new future.   
 
Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times 
 This dissertation arose from a suspicion that such beliefs have had a more pervasive and 
important influence on the history of modern political thought than is generally supposed. The 
more I learned about the historical circumstances in which several canonical political thinkers 
wrote, the more I became convinced that apocalypticism was a missing part of the contextual 
stories that we use to make sense of their work.  All three of the thinkers covered in this 
dissertation—Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and Hans 
Morgenthau (1904-1980)—wrote during times in which powerful political, social, and religious 
actors thought that the end of the world was imminent.  Machiavelli wrote in the context of 
Dominican friar Girolamo Savonarola’s disturbing apocalyptic visions about the future of 
Florence.  While Savonarola was executed in 1498, the apocalypticism that he was so influential 
in shaping would continue to haunt Florentine and Italian life well into the sixteenth century.  
Thomas Hobbes developed his political thought against the backdrop of both Puritan and 
Royalist attempts to cast the English Civil War in apocalyptic terms.  This apocalypticism 
persisted during the Protectorate as apocalyptic ideas were deployed both by and against Oliver 
                                                
7 Frank Kermode makes a similar point in a comparison of fears of nuclear annihilation and older forms of 
apocalyptic expectation.  See: Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction with a New 
Epilogue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 182-3.   
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Cromwell.  Working much later, Hans Morgenthau wrote his most influential works on 
international politics in the aftermath of the Holocaust and in the shadow of the atomic bomb and 
the looming threat of nuclear annihilation.   Yet with a few notable exceptions, the importance of 
these apocalyptic contexts has remained profoundly underexplored in the secondary literature on 
these thinkers.8     
The question motivating this project is: How does our understanding of the political 
thought of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau change when we consider the apocalyptic 
contexts in which they wrote?  What I hope to demonstrate is that an attention to the apocalyptic 
contexts in which these three thinkers wrote does two things.  First, it allows us to make sense of 
aspects of their work that have been largely ignored in the history of political thought. For 
instance, the final two books of Hobbes’ Leviathan tend to receive scant attention by scholars of 
the history of political thought.9  These are chapters in which Hobbes engages in detailed 
theological arguments that, at first blush, seem largely unconnected to the political arguments 
outlined in the first two books of the work.  However, as I hope to show in Chapter 4, these 
theological arguments are central to Hobbes’ political project.  In them, he does battle with the 
antinomian apocalypticism of the English Civil War and attempts to make radical Christian 
eschatology safe for sovereign power.  Second, an attention to the apocalyptic context in which 
these thinkers wrote serves to cast some of the most familiar parts of their work in a new light.  
For example, seen alongside the Savonarolan rhetoric that shaped Florentine politics in the late 
                                                
8 J.G.A. Pocock has given apocalyptic beliefs some treatment in his work on Machiavelli and Hobbes.  See: J.G.A. 
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, 2nd edition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 83-113; J.G.A. Pocock, “Time, History and Eschatology in the 
Thought of Thomas Hobbes,” in The Diversity of History: Essays in honour of Sir Herbert Butterfield, eds.  J.H. 
Elliott and H.G. Koenigsberger (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 149-98.      
9 Pocock wryly notes: “The two books in which Hobbes expounds Christian faith and its sacred history are almost 
exactly equal in length to Books I and II [of Leviathan]; yet the attitude of too many scholars towards them has 
traditionally been, first, that they aren’t really there, second, that Hobbes didn’t really mean them.”  See: Pocock, 
“Time, History and Eschatology,” 161-2.   
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fifteenth century, the final chapter of Machiavelli’s Prince begins to look less like a strategic 
ploy to curry favor with the Medici and more like an apocalyptic exhortation of despair and 
hope. 
To find any kind of sustained attention to apocalyptic ideas in the works of Machiavelli, 
Hobbes, and Morgenthau is surprising.  These three thinkers are generally classed as political 
realists.10  That is, they are classed as part of a tradition which stresses a pragmatic approach to a 
political world marked by the competition for material interests and the struggle for power.  
Political realists insist on the profound limits to human and institutional perfectibility and 
therefore position their approaches to politics against utopian alternatives, which they reject for 
being at best unrealizable and at worst profoundly dangerous.  For instance, Hobbes’ conception 
of humans as competitive and fearful creatures seems to provide little hope for perfectionist 
schemes.  The best we can hope for is a kind of terrifying political order under the rule of an 
absolute sovereign capable of holding us in awe.11  For Machiavelli and Morgenthau, however, 
utopian schemes are not just unattainable; they are also unwise.  Machiavelli famously contrasts 
his approach in The Prince to that of those who imagine “republics and principalities that have 
never been seen or known to exist in truth; for it is so far from how one lives to how one should 
                                                
10 While Machiavelli and Hobbes do not self-identify as political realists, contemporary realists and students of 
realism tend to look back on these earlier thinkers as intellectual predecessors.  See, for example: Steven Forde, 
“Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli,” The Journal of Politics 54 (1992): 372-393; David Boucher, 
Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 90-167; Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power 
and Peace (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 125-61; Jack Donnelly, Realism and International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 13-5, 24-6; Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition 
and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 19-51.  Hans Morgenthau 
self-identifies as a political realist.  However, scholars like William Scheuerman and Michael Williams have 
questioned and sought to complicate this identification.  See: Williams, The Realist Tradition, 82-127; William E. 
Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 1-10; William E. Scheuerman, 
“Was Morgenthau a Realist?  Revisiting Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics,” Constellations 14, no. 4 (2007): 506-
30.   
11 However, as I argue in Chapter 4, Hobbes’ account of the transition from the state of nature to the Leviathan state 
rests on a utopian hope that humanity can be transformed such that they can prioritize the fear of bodily death over 
the fear of eternal torment. 
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live that he who lets go of what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than his 
preservation.”12  Morgenthau draws a similar distinction between the possible and the desirable:  
Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action.  It is also 
aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the 
requirements of successful political action.  And it is unwilling to gloss over and 
obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the political issue 
by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics were morally more 
satisfying than they actually are, and the moral law less exacting than it actually 
is.13   
 
For both Machiavelli and Morgenthau, utopian thinking lures us away from the contextual and 
contingent realities of politics, making prudential and effective action impossible. 
 The secondary literature, particularly in International Relations theory, reinforces this 
conception of the tradition by casting political realism as a successor to, a critique of, or even the 
opposite of idealism or utopianism.14  If we treat apocalypticism as a particular kind of 
utopianism premised on a belief in the imminent end of the known world and the arrival of a 
radically new future, the literature outlined above suggests that we should expect that political 
realists would limit themselves to critiquing or even simply dismissing apocalyptic expectations.  
Instead, as I outline below and in more detail in the course of the dissertation, Machiavelli, 
                                                
12 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), ch. 
15, 61.   
13 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd edn. (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1954), 9.   
14 See, respectively: John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 36; Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and 
International Political Economy: The continuing story of a death foretold (London and New York: Routledge, 
1998), 16; Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. 
Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 304.  These kinds of characterizations are a 
testament to the enduring influence of E.H. Carr on International Relations theory.  Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis 
identifies realism as both a successor to utopian idealism in the study of International Relations and as an intellectual 
disposition and political stance that is always a reaction to perfectionist projects.  These two understandings of the 
relationship between realism and utopianism involve different timelines.  In the context of disciplinary history, 
utopianism is an infantile stage in the study of International Relations and consists of a relatively static set of 
commitments—a misguided and inferior understanding of international politics that will eventually be overtaken by 
a more scientific and detached realism.  In the context of the intellectual and political landscape in which 
international politics are practiced, utopianism is a persistent and recurrent human tendency, constantly in need of 
being checked by a skeptical realism.  See: Tim Dunne, “Theories as Weapons: E.H. Carr and International 
Relations,” in E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Michael Cox (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2000), 222.     
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Hobbes, and Morgenthau pursue sustained and troubled engagements with apocalypticism in 
ways that are ultimately transformative of these thinkers’ realism.  In the case of Machiavelli and 
the early Morgenthau, the confrontation with apocalypticism prompts constitutive aspects of 
these thinkers’ realism to take shape.  For example, as I will argue in more detail in Chapter 3, 
several constitutive features of Machiavelli’s realism—its attention to the ease with which virtue 
becomes vice, its emphasis on enduring limits to political action, and its insistence on the 
impossibility of putting a settled end to conflict—only arise after an initial flirtation with 
apocalypticism.  In the case of Hobbes and the later Morgenthau, attempts to co-opt and redeploy 
apocalyptic rhetoric and imagery cause these thinkers to abandon key realist tenets.  In their 
redeployments, both thinkers use frightening apocalyptic scenarios to legitimize dangerously 
utopian schemes.  For Hobbes, it is the submersion of individual wills into the single will of the 
sovereign, while for Morgenthau is the submersion of separate and diverse states into a powerful 
world state.  None of these realist responses merely reject apocalypticism.  Rather, they take 
seriously the dangers and possibilities of apocalyptic rhetoric and imagery. 
The literature on apocalypticism offers similar reasons to be surprised upon finding a 
sustained and ambivalent engagement with fears and hopes about the end of the world in the 
realist tradition.  Histories of apocalypticism tend to divide their subjects into two groups: 
apocalypticists and anti-apocalypticists.  This tendency is on full display in Heaven on Earth 
(2001), the most recent work by Richard Landes, a prominent millennial historian.  Landes 
makes a clear division between apocalyptic “roosters” who announce the imminent end of the 
world and anti-apocalyptic “owls” whose conservative feathers are ruffled by these radical 
proclamations.  As “roosters” await the coming cataclysm, “owls” advise caution “and counsel 
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against hasty enthusiasms.”15  While Landes’ conceptual binary admits some variation within 
categories, it does not allow for any kind of complexity across them. Many other scholars of 
apocalypticism implicitly affirm this binary, which leads to difficulties in classifying thinkers 
who seem neither wholly apocalyptic nor entirely anti-apocalyptic.  For instance, St. Augustine, 
who as we shall see in Chapter 2 attempts to negotiate the dangers of apocalypticism while never 
fully disavowing expectations about the end times, is frequently classed as an anti-apocalyptic 
thinker.16  Given the complexity of Augustine’s response and his commitment to central 
elements of the Christian apocalyptic narrative, such a classification hardly seems to do him 
justice.  The easy binary of apocalypticism vs. anti-apocalypticism subjects us to what Stephen 
Holmes, in another context, calls the “tyranny of false polarities”17—a stylized and misleading 
antithesis that prevents an accurate account of the range of responses to fears and hopes about the 
end of the world.  Given the two mutually exclusive options, one would have to class political 
realists as anti-apocalyptic “owls.”  Their insistence on the limits to human perfectibility and the 
inescapability of conflict would seem to make realists profoundly hostile to expectations of 
radical world transformation.  However, as we shall see in the course of this dissertation, the 
realist response to apocalypticism renders any kind of easy classification impossible.  Like 
Augustine, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau, are drawn to elements of the apocalyptic 
narrative at the same time as they attempt to negotiate its dangers. 
                                                
15 Richard Landes, Heaven on Earth: The Varieties of the Millennial Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 47.   
16 See, for instance: Stephen D. O’Leary, Arguing the Apocalypse: A Theory of Millennial Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 73-6; Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 26.  For more nuanced treatments, see: Paula Fredriksen, 
“Apocalypse and Redemption in Early Christianity: From John of Patmos to Augustine of Hippo,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 45, no. 2 (1991): 160-8; R.A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), esp. 1-71.   
17 Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995), 28.   
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More specifically, I argue that much of the nuance and texture, as well as some of the 
contradictions and inconsistencies in Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau’s work emerge from 
their serious and extended engagements with apocalypticism.  In an analysis of their work and 
the political and religious contexts in which they were writing, I find responses to apocalypticism 
that are far more complex than mere opposition or dismissal.  These responses take two forms.  
The first is a principled turn away from apocalypticism and toward a tragic worldview that (a) 
emphasizes the ease with which virtuous actions can produce terrible consequences, (b) insists 
on the limits to effective political action, and (c) warns of the impossibility of final and enduring 
political settlements.  This is the response adopted by Machiavelli in his later work and by 
Morgenthau in his earlier work.  In Machiavelli’s case, this response encourages the 
development and maturation of his realist thought.  The second approach attempts to redeploy 
apocalypticism by calling on people to imagine the end of the world in order to prevent it.  This 
is the tack taken by Hobbes in order to make his case for the Leviathan state and by Morgenthau 
in his later writings on nuclear weapons.  For both Hobbes and the later Morgenthau, this attempt 
to respond to apocalypticism by redeploying it puts pressure on central aspects of these thinkers’ 
realism and provides them with the imaginative tools necessary to legitimize dangerous utopian 
schemes. 
 
Approach 
 In both its subject and approach, this project sits at the intersection of the history of 
political thought, the history of International Relations thought, and political theology.  The 
advantages of this intersectional approach will, I hope, become clear in the course of the 
dissertation.  For the purposes of this introduction, however, it is worth noting that the approach 
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has two primary benefits.  First, the political theological approach, which I outline in more detail 
below, is attentive to the way in which religious modes of thought underpin seemingly secular 
political discourses.  This project does not begin with the assumption, commonly held in both the 
history of political thought and International Relations theory, that the three thinkers covered 
here are unambiguously “secular.” 18   Once this assumption is relaxed, the richness of 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau’s investigations of theological themes and imagery comes 
into focus.  Second, this intersectional approach makes it possible to trace the intellectual 
trajectories and recurrent dilemmas of a tradition that has its roots in the canonical works in the 
history of Western political thought but whose contemporary proponents tend, with a few notable 
exceptions, to be scholars of international politics.  While contemporary scholars of International 
Relations tend to look back to the works of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau as classic 
articulations of a political realist tradition that continues to exercise considerable influence over 
the field, they are generally content to leave detailed investigations of the first two thinkers to 
political theorists.  For their part, political theorists have largely left the analysis of Morgenthau’s 
thought to their colleagues in International Relations.19  Working across the boundaries between 
these two fields, this project aims to bring these thinkers and their field-specific literatures into 
productive conversation. 
 Beyond pursuing an argument about the importance of apocalypticism to realist thought, 
one of my secondary goals of this project is to make the case to political theorists that Hans 
Morgenthau is a thinker worthy of further attention.  Primarily known as a pre-eminent postwar 
                                                
18 Leo Strauss, for example, points to both Machiavelli and Hobbes as harbingers of a secular and ultimately 
corrosive modernity.  The works of both thinkers stem from “the concern with a right or sound order of society 
whose actualization is probable, if not certain, or does not depend on chance.  Accordingly, they deliberately lower 
the goal of politics.”  See: Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 
191.   
19 For an important and illuminating exception, see: Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau. 
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scholar of International Relations, he left a lasting imprint on this field, particularly in the United 
States, where he is seen as both a forerunner and an intellectual antipode to later and more 
“scientific” realists like Kenneth Waltz.  However, Morgenthau’s intellectual lineage and 
connections are far more complex and interesting than this conventional account suggests.  Like 
University of Chicago colleagues and fellow German Jewish émigré scholars Leo Strauss and 
Hannah Arendt, Morgenthau’s early intellectual development took place in Weimar Germany.  
During these early years, he was profoundly influenced by both Friedrich Nietzsche and Max 
Weber and their work would leave a lasting imprint on his own long after he had established 
himself as a prominent scholar of International Relations in America.20   Like Strauss and 
Arendt, Morgenthau situates his thoroughgoing critique of liberalism within a grand narrative of 
modern decline.  Yet, also like them, he evinces a profound admiration for some of the founding 
values and practices of his adopted country.21  Even if the lines of direct intellectual influence are 
sometimes hard to trace, Morgenthau acknowledges the important impact that both Strauss and 
Arendt had on some of his most well known works.22   
Like his two Chicago colleagues, Morgenthau also had a long-standing and troubled 
intellectual relationship with the Weimar jurist Carl Schmitt.  I outline many of these 
connections in detail in Chapter 5.  For our purposes here, it is simply worth noting that the ties 
                                                
20 On the influence of Nietzsche, see: Christoph Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 93-113. 
21 See, for instance: Hans J. Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics (New York: Vintage, 1964), 3-42; Hans 
J. Morgenthau and David Hein, Essays on Lincoln’s Faith and Politics, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1983), 1-101. 
22 In the preface to the second edition of Politics Among Nations (1960), Morgenthau thanks Strauss for his 
comments on the work’s new first chapter which contains the now-famous “Six Principles of Political Realism.”  
This acknowledgement is especially interesting, given Strauss’ hostility to some of the foundational principles of 
political realism, as well as his dismissive attitude toward theories of international politics.  Robert Myers reports 
that Strauss “commented that he saw no more need for a theory of international relations than for a theory of 
plumbing.”  See: Robert J. Myers, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: The Relevance of Realism 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 11.  When asked to name the ten books that had had the 
greatest intellectual influence on him, Morgenthau included Arendt’s The Human Condition, alongside works by 
Plato, Aristotle, Publius, and Nietzsche.  See: Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, 113. 
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between the two thinkers went in both directions, almost always without any direct attribution.  
Morgenthau’s critique of the first edition of Schmitt’s Concept of the Political (1927) prompted 
important revisions, while Schmitt’s theories of sovereignty and the exception shaped 
Morgenthau’s postwar realism.23  Finally, during the course of his career, Morgenthau struck up 
intellectual connections and correspondences with a surprisingly varied array of thinkers, 
including Reinhold Niebuhr, Karl Jaspers, and Michael Oakeshott.24  While the detailed pursuit 
of these conversations is beyond the scope of this project, my hope is that they at least begin to 
make the case for Morgenthau as an important political thinker in his own right, as well as one 
who is fruitfully considered alongside Machiavelli and Hobbes. 
My approach to the three thinkers covered in this dissertation is broadly contextualist.  
Because contextual research in the history of political thought for the last forty years has been 
dominated by a set of methodological commitments first articulated by Quentin Skinner, it may 
be helpful to explain where my approach differs from his.  Like Skinner, I begin with the 
assumption that “the text itself” is not “the self-sufficient object of inquiry and understanding.”25  
For instance, it beggars the imagination that one could come to a full and complete 
understanding of Hobbes’ detailed theological investigations in the last two books of Leviathan 
without some understanding of the biblical texts to which he is referring as well as to the ways in 
which these texts were taken up in the political and religious debates of seventeenth-century 
England.  I further share Skinner’s assumption that the study of a text requires detailed attention 
                                                
23  See: William E. Scheuerman, “Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and beyond,” in Realism 
Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, ed. Michael C. Williams (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 92; Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau, 32-9, 44-50; Nicolas Guilhot, “American 
Katechon: When Political Theology Became International Relations Theory,” Constellations 17, no. 2 (2010): 224-
53.   
24 On Morgenthau and Niebuhr, see: Daniel Rice, “Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau: A Friendship with 
Contrasting Shades of Realism,” Journal of American Studies 42, no.2 (2008), 255-91.  On Morgenthau and Jaspers, 
see: Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau, 146-52.  On Morgenthau and Oakeshott, see: Nicholas Rengger, “Tragedy of 
Scepticism?  Defending the Anti-Pelagian Mind in World Politics,” International Relations 19, no. 3 (2005): 321-8.   
25 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969): 4.   
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to the historical context in which it was produced, and particularly the range of meanings 
available to the author. Texts should not be treated as the abstract thoughts of politically 
detached philosophers, but as political speech acts designed to generate effects in the reader.   
However, I depart from Skinner and his followers on three counts.  First, Skinner calls on 
historians of political thought to embark on a program of research that is at best very ambitious 
and at worst simply unachievable.  He explains: “the appropriate methodology for the history of 
ideas must be concerned, first of all, to delineate the whole range of communications which 
could have been conventionally performed on the given occasion by the utterance, and, next, to 
trace the relations between the given utterance and this wider linguistic context as a means of 
decoding the actual intention of the given writer.”26  Putting aside questions of feasibility, I think 
there is much to be gained from a more selective and focused account of certain elements of an 
author’s context.  This seems especially true when those elements have been neglected in 
previous contextual scholarship.  This is the kind of more targeted contextualism that I attempt in 
this project.  In its focus on the largely underexplored apocalyptic contexts in which the three 
chosen thinkers wrote, this dissertation provides a way in which to understand those aspects of 
these thinkers’ work that have remained somewhat strange to contemporary readers, like 
Hobbes’ troubled musings on hell and damnation or Machiavelli’s observations about the 
eternity of the world.  However, it also helps to make some of their most familiar passages 
strange once again.  For instance, Machiavelli’s exhortation at the end of The Prince and 
Morgenthau’s critique of liberal internationalism in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics look very 
different when reconsidered in light of the apocalyptic fears and hopes that shaped the politics of 
their respective times.   
                                                
26 Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding,” 49.  Emphasis mine.   
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Second, Skinner adopts a hardline position on the question of whether there are traditions 
of political thought in which authors are engaged in similar and recurrent debates through time.  
He draws upon the work of R.G. Collingwood who argues that philosophers are not concerned 
with a finite set of permanent questions to which thinkers of different eras have given particular 
answers that can easily be compared.  Rather, “what is thought to be a permanent problem P is 
really a number of transitory problems p1, p2, p3…whose individual peculiarities are blurred by 
the historical myopia of the person who lumps them together under the one name P.”27  
Following Collingwood, Skinner argues that the questions with which thinkers are concerned 
transform themselves in subtle ways over time.  While there is a valuable warning here about the 
dangers of building artificial intellectual “traditions” around seemingly perennial questions, I 
think that both the concern and its methodological implications are overstated.  In writing of a 
realist “tradition,” I do not intend to reify the “tradition” by claiming an intellectual unity that 
does not actually exist.  Drawing on the work of Michael Williams, the position underlying my 
approach is that traditions are necessarily constructed “both internally by those who see 
themselves engaged in a common project, or working through and against a common intellectual 
background; and externally by those who seek to provide insights via a synthetic representation 
of individual positions.”28  I do not intend to claim that there are no substantial differences across 
or within the thought of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau.  Nor do I intend to suggest that 
the three thinkers are always engaged with the same issues and problems or that they frame those 
issues and problems in the same way through time.  However, I do think that three thinkers share 
certain fundamental similarities—like an attention to the inescapable role of power in politics, a 
                                                
27 R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978 [1939]), 69.  See also: Quentin 
Skinner, “The rise of, challenge to and prospects for a Collingwoodian approach to the history of political thought,” 
in Dario Castiglione and Iain Hampsher-Monk (eds.) The History of Political Thought in National Context 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 175-188. 
28 Williams, The Realist Tradition, 16.   
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concern with the limits of human perfectibility, and a resistance to abstract or utopian political 
schemes—that provide sufficient resonances across their respective works to plausibly group 
them together as political realists.    
Finally, Skinner’s approach is almost exclusively focused on the textual context in which 
a given author wrote.  To be fair, he interprets the concept of a “text” far more broadly than 
many historians of political thought, whose analyses tend to center on canonical works.  Skinner 
and his followers frequently engage in painstaking and detailed research of pamphlets, 
newspapers, letters, and manuscripts from the eras in which their chosen thinkers wrote.  
However, if we take seriously the possibility that authors are political actors trying not only to 
persuade their readers but also to capture their imaginations, we cannot limit our contextual 
research to texts.  The images circulating in a given time would have also provided a means 
through which political thinkers and audiences made sense of their world.   For instance, when 
Morgenthau attempts to describe the effects of nuclear annihilation, he evokes the images of 
German concentration camps that circulated after the Second World War.  A narrowly textual 
approach to context would miss this.  At several places in the dissertation, I draw on images in 
addition to texts in offering a contextual picture.  In sum, the contextual approach that I adopt 
here is strategically selective, open to the resonances between thinkers through time, and not 
strictly textual.  
In addition to its broad contextualism, the approach taken in this dissertation is also 
informed by political theology.  Carl Schmitt offers the classic articulation of the political 
theological argument:  
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts not only because of their historical development—in which they were 
transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the 
omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but also because of their 
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systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological 
consideration of these concepts.  The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the 
miracle in theology.29     
 
Schmitt’s argument poses a fundamental challenge to established narratives of the history of 
political thought, which characterize “modernity” (whose origin is generally traced to the 
Renaissance or the Enlightenment) as a wholly secular period in which religion has been 
successfully contained by its relocation to the private sphere.30  For Schmitt, this means that a 
political-theological approach is necessarily genealogical.  It is aimed at exposing “the remnants 
of belief that are attached to our political concepts and maintained in our political practices.  The 
only way to do that is by tracing the theological origins of these beliefs.”31   Part of the work of 
this dissertation is also genealogical in this sense.  The project traces the theological origins of 
apocalyptic contexts, narratives, and images that remain central to the work of two thinkers 
commonly seen as harbingers of secular modernity—Machiavelli and Hobbes.  Furthermore, in 
examining the work of Hans Morgenthau, it explores the ways in which seemingly secular 
ideologies like liberalism may be underpinned by an eschatological faith.   
                                                
29 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), 36.  This intertwining of the political and theological is central to Schmitt’s 
intellectual and political project.  For Schmitt, there is an affinity between the theological and the political that 
emerges from their common expression as law and their shared alienation from liberalism.  See: Carl Schmitt, The 
Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 39-50; Carl Schmitt 
Schmitt, The Concept of the Apolitical, trans. George Schwab (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1976), 69-79; Michael 
Hollerich, “Carl Schmitt,” in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, eds. Peter Scott and William T. 
Cavanaugh (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), 112. 
30 Charles Taylor offers such a conception of modernity when he argues that modern science overtook the religious 
worldview that had prevailed before the “modern” era.  Taylor is right that after the Reformation the legitimate 
foundation of government was stripped of much of its (overt) religious content.  However, as a critical review of 
Taylor’s work has noted, he “hasn’t grasped the extent to which religious—and, more specifically, Christian—ideas 
underpin the secular era he describes.  The European Enlightenment may have been hostile to Christianity, but a 
Christian framework still informed the view of history adopted by those Enlightenment thinkers campaigning for 
universal human emancipation.”  For the review, see: John Gray, “Faith in Reason: Secular Fantasies of a Godless 
Age,” Harper’s 316, no. 1892 (2008): 86.  For Taylor’s work, see: Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2007). 
31 Paul W. Kahn, Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 
106.   
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However, Schmitt’s political-theological argument also suggests another related 
methodological approach.  He argues that with secularization, the ways in which divine authority 
was understood and negotiated were transferred to the confrontation with political sovereignty.  
What remains constant, however, is the “systemic structure” of the theological concept—the way 
in which it orders and imagines authority.  The “omnipotent God” is translated into “the 
omnipotent lawgiver,” but the structure of the concept remains the same.   The connection 
between theology and secular political ideologies is therefore analogical.  The sovereign’s 
relationship to his subjects is like God’s relationship to humanity.32  Whether or not one accepts 
Schmitt’s argument about the precise circumstances of secularization, his methodological 
suggestion remains useful insofar as it points to a way of recognizing the persistence of 
theological concepts in secular thought and ideology.  When tracing the trajectories of 
apocalyptic ideas in the work of modern secular thinkers, for instance, one should not limit 
oneself to the overtly theological expressions of these ideas.  As I suggest in the following 
chapter, such limits would fail to do justice to the enduring flexibility of apocalyptic beliefs, their 
capacity to adapt to and endure in contexts radically different from those in which they were first 
developed.  Rather, one must look for the generic structural features of apocalypticism—the way 
in which it organizes the relationships between time and space, earth and cosmos, and humanity 
and the supernatural.   These structural features are outlined in greater detail in the concluding 
pages of the following chapter, which offers an analysis of the theological roots of 
apocalypticism in the Judeo-Christian tradition before abstracting from this account the basic 
structural features of these beliefs.  This move allows us to recognize the powerful secular 
versions of apocalypticism at play in the work of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau and 
                                                
32 I am indebted to Lucas Thompson’s (yet) unpublished work for helping me to think through Schmitt’s political 
theology as method.  My remarks here draw on his analysis.    
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thereby trace an element of their thinking that has remained profoundly underexplored in the 
history of political and International Relations thought.         
 
Plan 
 The argument of this dissertation unfolds in five parts.  Chapter 2 reviews the outlines of 
the Judeo-Christian accounts of the apocalypse, with a particular focus how on they responded to 
concrete political contexts.  Seen in this light, it is clear that these texts offer a radical critique of 
sovereign power, provide a powerful historical narrative in which seemingly contingent political 
events could be rendered meaningful, and hold out the hope for a world without conflict or 
difference.  The chapter then considers how Paul of Tarsus and Augustine of Hippo, two early 
Christian thinkers who would come to be seen as the intellectual kin of later political realists, 
negotiate the dangers and possibilities of apocalypticism.  I find in their work prototypical 
examples of the kinds of responses that will later be used by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and 
Morgenthau.   I conclude with an effort to conceptualize apocalypticism not as a text or a 
worldview, but as an imaginary that permeates not only aesthetic and rhetorical practices but also 
shapes the way in which people envision their political existence.  I outline the generic structural 
features of the apocalyptic imaginary and provide examples of how that imaginary has 
instantiated itself at different historical moments.   
 Chapter 3 situates Niccolò Machiavelli’s work in the context of the apocalyptic 
excitement that gripped Florence in the late fifteenth century.  The Dominican friar Girolamo 
Savonarola was at the center of this enthusiastic movement.  I argue that Machiavelli’s work 
bears the mark of this context.  The final chapter of The Prince, I suggest, is an apocalyptic 
exhortation that resonates strongly with the Savonarolan message.  Machiavelli gravitates toward 
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this apocalyptic solution in The Prince because he has failed to grapple adequately with the 
contingency of the political world and with the particular crises that plague 
Florence.  Recognizing the dangers inherent in such a solution, he later turns away from an 
apocalyptic mode and embraces a robustly tragic sensibility characterized by openness to the 
variability and struggle of the political world.  Yet even Machiavelli’s tragic turn is haunted by 
an eschatological hope for a perpetual republic that would offer a final escape from politics.  
 In Chapter 4, I locate Thomas Hobbes’ political thought in the explosion of apocalyptic 
prophecy in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and particularly during the English Civil 
War.  I argue that the radical apocalyptic imaginary let loose during the civil war was a central 
concern in Hobbes’ political thought.  While Christian eschatology had initially been deployed as 
a legitimating tool by kings and church authorities, the apocalyptic imaginary escaped this effort 
at sovereign control and was suddenly abroad in the land.  Hobbes responds to this threat not by 
condemning the apocalyptic imaginary, but by trying to put it back in the service of sovereign 
power.  He fights apocalypse with apocalypse.  I argue that Hobbes pursues two paths in his 
project—one that is overtly Christian and another that is seemingly secular.  His theological 
argument offers a de-radicalized Christian eschatology in which the sovereign is the only 
authority capable of announcing the apocalypse.  Hobbes’ political argument stages a secular 
apocalypse, in which the terror and chaos of the state of nature are the preconditions for a 
kingdom ruled by a mortal God.  In pursuing these two paths, Hobbes does not escape the 
apocalyptic imaginary, but rather redeploys it and tries to return it safely into sovereign hands.   
 Chapter 5 sets Hans Morgenthau’s work in the context of the apocalyptic imaginary that 
developed in postwar America.  The development of nuclear weapons and the possibility of 
large-scale human annihilation fueled both overtly religious and seemingly secular forms of the 
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apocalyptic imaginary, both of which saw an opportunity for salvation in the prospect of nuclear 
war.  Concerned primarily with the secular apocalypticism that underpins strains of liberalism 
and rationalism, Morgenthau initially offers a tragic response that, like Machiavelli’s turn to 
tragedy, emphasizes the ongoing and undecided struggle that shapes political life.  However, I 
argue that Morgenthau later rejects this tragic response, turning instead to the Hobbesian strategy 
of fighting apocalypse with apocalypse.  Through a close reading of his remarkable essay on 
“Death in the Nuclear Age,” I map Morgenthau’s attempt to fight the possibility of nuclear 
annihilation by staging an imagined apocalypse of his own.  A tragic worldview, Morgenthau 
concludes, is not enough.  One must constantly imagine the apocalypse in order to prevent it. 
 In the concluding chapter of the dissertation, I revisit these responses to the apocalyptic 
imaginary and offer an evaluation of them on normative and imaginative grounds. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORIZING APOCALYPSE: CONTEXT TO CONCEPT 
After describing the catastrophic upheavals and divine judgment that will mark the end of 
the world, the book of Revelation concludes with a warning to anyone who would alter the final 
book of the Christian bible.  This warning has not been heeded.  For, as philosopher and 
theologian Jacques Ellul wonders, how is it possible to “write or preach on its subject without 
changing this Revelation?” 1   The book of Revelation has inspired sermons, theological 
investigations, and scholarly interpretations since the controversial decision to canonize it.  If 
Ellul’s intuition is right, then the book itself has been transformed by these efforts.  The idea of 
“apocalypse” has undergone a similar process of transformation. While its literal meaning is 
simply “revelation,” it has come to describe anything from the cataclysmic end of the world 
prophesied in the bible to the effects of nuclear war or global climate change to the more 
mundane inconveniences of severe winter storms.2  The idea of apocalypse is thus flexible, 
migratory, and unstable.  It resists the kind of conceptualization that would render its content 
narrowly specifiable and its behavioral effects easily predictable.  This chapter attempts no such 
endeavor.  Instead, it aims to theorize apocalypse in a way that attends both to its contextually 
specific roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition and to its ability to transcend these origins and 
occupy a central place in the modern Western imagination.3  This kind of theorization involves 
treating apocalyptic texts as political works that make visible existing power relations at the 
same time as they offer the radical hope of overcoming them.  However, it also means going 
                                                
1 Jacques Ellul, Apocalypse: The Book of Revelation, trans. George W. Schreiner (New York: The Seabury Press, 
1997), 9. 
2 The severe winter storm that hit the mid-Atlantic states in early February 2010 was widely dubbed the 
“Snowpocalypse.” 
3 While this chapter, and indeed the dissertation, focuses on a Western tradition of apocalypticism, the phenomenon 
itself is not exclusively Western.  In addition, the label “Western” is used with some caution.  What most scholars 
class as “Jewish,” “Christian,” or “Western” apocalypticism traces its roots back to “non-Western” sources like 
Persian and Near Eastern mythology. 
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beyond the textual sources of apocalypticism in the Judeo-Christian tradition and offering a 
structural conception of the apocalypse that allows us to recognize it even when it persists in 
forms that are very different from these original articulations.  This contextual and conceptual 
theorization provides the necessary groundwork for understanding both the overtly theological 
outbursts of apocalypticism in Machiavelli and Hobbes’ historical periods and the more secular 
manifestations of apocalyptic rhetoric and imagery to which Morgenthau was responding.   
The chapter proceeds in three parts.  First, it offers a contextual and political reading of 
the two canonical apocalyptic texts of the Judeo-Christian tradition—the books of Daniel and 
Revelation.  I begin here because, taken together, these works are the textual locus of Western 
apocalypticism and the origin of themes and images that have endured in contexts far different 
from those in which they were originally conceived.  In examining Daniel and Revelation, I draw 
heavily on historical and critical biblical scholarship.  However, the general approach taken is 
similar to that in the rest of the dissertation.  It locates these works within their historical contexts 
and highlights the ways in which they imagine and respond to concrete political developments.  
Second, the chapter examines two early Christian attempts by Paul of Tarsus and Augustine of 
Hippo to contain the antinomian potential of these apocalyptic texts.  While they are interesting 
in themselves, these containment attempts have a larger significance for this dissertation, as Paul 
and Augustine are the two foundational figures of a Christian strand of political realism.  This 
section identifies responses to apocalypticism that will later be deployed by Niccolò Machiavelli, 
Thomas Hobbes, and Hans Morgenthau in their respective times.  Finally, the third section of the 
chapter expands on a latent intuition in Paul and Augustine’s work—that the power and potential 
danger of apocalypticism lie in its capacity to captivate the imagination.  This section explores 
what it might mean to theorize the apocalypse not as a genre of literature, or even a worldview, 
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but as an imaginary.  This final section moves beyond the historical source material covered 
earlier to construct a theoretical account of the apocalypse that attends both to its enduring 
structural features and the way it in which its narrative and images provide a shared away of 
envisioning our common world. 
 
The Judeo-Christian Apocalypse 
 Let us begin conservatively in the safe ground of etymology.  The word “apocalypse” 
comes from the Greek apokalypsis, meaning “revelation,” “disclosure,” or “uncovering.”  The 
book of Revelation identifies itself as “the apokalypsis of Jesus Christ,” marking the first known 
use of the term to denote a literary genre.4  In this sense, an apocalypse is a species of 
eschatology, a teaching about the “last things.”  In its concern with the end of history, 
eschatology is primarily focused on the communal and cosmic fate of the world, rather than on 
the ultimate fate of the individual.5  While apocalypses partake of this communal and cosmic 
orientation, they bring a sense of urgency and imminence to the end of history that is not a 
necessary feature of eschatology.6  Thus, while all apocalypses are eschatological, not all 
eschatology is apocalyptic. Biblical scholars also typically draw another distinction between 
apocalypticism, a worldview or “symbolic universe,” and apocalypse, a literary genre.7  In what 
                                                
4 Paul D. Hanson, “Apocalypses and Apocalypticism: The Genre,” in The Anchor Bible Dictionary, vol. 1, ed. David 
Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 279. 
5 David L. Petersen, “Eschatology,” in The Anchor Bible Dictionary, vol. 2, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: 
Doubleday, 1992), 576.  Some theologians and biblical scholars refer to a personal or individual eschatology.  
However, the dominant usage refers to a communal fate and I will adhere to this usage in the dissertation.   
6 As Bernard McGinn notes: “Every Christian view of history is in some sense eschatological insofar as it sees 
history as a teleological process and believes that Scripture reveals truths about its End…But there is still an 
important difference between a general consciousness of living in the last age of history and a conviction that the 
last age itself is about to end.”  See: Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 4.   
7  John J. Collins, “Apocalypses and Apocalypticism: Early Jewish Apocalypticism,” in The Anchor Bible 
Dictionary, vol. 1, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 283.  There is some debate among 
Biblical scholars regarding the content of “apocalypticism”, much of which hinges on how we understand the 
concept of a worldview.  John Collins understands apocalypticism as a “symbolic universe,” while Paul Hanson 
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follows, I outline the origins and features of an apocalyptic worldview, as conceptualized in the 
biblical studies scholarship, before embarking on a more detailed consideration of the genre of 
apocalyptic literature and the political contexts to which it responds. 
 The apocalyptic worldview took shape gradually in response to the political crises that 
plagued ancient Palestine.  This is worth stressing.  The origins of the apocalyptic worldview do 
not lie “outside” of politics in the realms of revelation and theology.  Rather, they are 
inescapably political.  At the dawn of the Christian era, Palestine had suffered eight centuries of 
conflict and almost perpetual foreign domination.  The inhabitants of the northern Kingdom of 
Israel and the southern Kingdom of Judah endured conquest, exile, foreign rule, and pressures 
for cultural assimilation.  Perhaps the worst blows came when the Assyrians destroyed the 
northern kingdom in 722 BCE and the Babylonians captured the southern kingdom in 586 BCE.  
Along with the loss of political sovereignty, both conquests led to substantial deportations of 
Jews from their homeland.  Only in the case of the Babylonian exile was return to this land 
allowed at all.  These political circumstances raised difficult questions among ancient Jews, who 
believed that they had entered into a covenant with God in which he would offer them protection 
in exchange for their adherence to his law.  Why had God not leapt to Israel’s defense?  Why 
was he failing to uphold his side of the covenant?  Ancient prophets like Amos, Hosea, and 
Isaiah in the eighth century BCE and Jeremiah and Ezekiel in the sixth century BCE argued that 
Israel’s sufferings were of her own making.  The people had fallen away from God and were no 
                                                                                                                                                       
argues for a more detailed definition of apocalypticism as “the symbolic universe in which an apocalyptic movement 
codifies its identity and interpretation of reality.”  Collins rightly notes that the problem with this more precise 
conceptualization is that “there is no automatic connection between apocalypticism and social movements.  In many 
cases we know very little of the social matrix in which apocalyptic literature was produced.”  See: Paul D. Hanson, 
“Apocalypticism,” in Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, Supplementary Volume, eds. Keith Crim, et al. 
(Nashville: Abington Press, 1976), 30; Collins, “Early Jewish Apocalypticism,” 284.   
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longer devoted to keeping his law.  If they returned to him, their sufferings would end and their 
political sovereignty would be restored.8   
Over time, this position proved difficult to maintain.  Suffering seemed to befall those 
who obeyed God’s law just as much as it did those who had strayed.  Furthermore, during the 
reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes (175-164 BCE), those Jews who were most pious and 
observant were the special targets of political persecution.  The rise of the phenomenon of Jewish 
martyrdom raised new questions.  Why would God punish those who had kept his law in the face 
of overwhelming political and cultural pressure to abandon it?  The apocalyptic worldview 
developed, in part, as an answer to this question.9  Bart Ehrman summarizes the outlines of this 
answer as follows:  
God was still in control of this world in some ultimate sense, but for unknown and 
mysterious reasons he had temporarily relinquished his control to the forces of 
evil that opposed him.  This state of affairs, however, was not to last forever.  
Quite soon, God would reassert himself and bring this world back to himself, 
destroying the forces of evil and establishing his people as rulers over the earth.  
When this new Kingdom came, God would fulfill his promises to his people.10 
   
The apocalyptic worldview is thus a form of political theodicy—an attempt to understand the 
oppression and loss of sovereignty that plagued the Israelites without delegitimizing the authority 
                                                
8 Bart D. Ehrman, Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of the New Millennium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
120.  The relationship between prophetic and apocalyptic worldviews is more complex and contested than the 
simple narrative I have presented in this paragraph and the following one suggests.  For more detailed studies that 
capture some of the scholarly debate on this issue, see: Paul D. Hanson, The Dawn of Apocalyptic: The Historical 
and Sociological Roots of Jewish Apocalyptic Eschatology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975); John J. Collins, The 
Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature, 2nd edn. (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1998); John J. Collins, “From Prophecy to Apocalypticism: The Expectation of the End,” in The 
Continuum History of Apocalypticism, eds. Bernard J. McGinn, John J. Collins, and Stephen J. Stein (New York: 
Continuum, 2003), 64-88.  
9 While the political circumstances outlined here go some way to explaining why we see the rise of a fully 
developed apocalyptic worldview by the second century BCE, the ideational and mythological roots of this 
worldview can be traced, in part, to ancient Near Eastern myth and Persian eschatology.  The extent and nature of 
these influences are contested among biblical scholars.  See: Richard J. Clifford, “The Roots of Apocalypticism in 
Near Eastern Myth,” in The Continuum History of Apocalypticism, eds. Bernard J. McGinn, John J. Collins, and 
Stephen J. Stein (New York: Continuum, 2003), 3-29; Anders Hultgård, “Persian Apocalypticism,” in Continuum 
History of Apocalypticism, 30-63. 
10 Ehrman, Jesus, 120-1.   
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of God.  More broadly, it is an attempt to situate contemporary political circumstances within a 
sacred worldview, thereby endowing them with religious significance.    We find evidence for 
this worldview in the book of Daniel, discussed below, the Dead Sea Scrolls from the Essenes in 
Qumran, various non-canonical Jewish writings from the second century BCE through the end of 
the first century CE.   
 While there is some disagreement among biblical scholars about the content of the 
apocalyptic worldview, most agree that it has the following features.  First, it embraces a cosmic 
dualism.  Worldly reality is defined by the conflict between good and evil forces.  The former are 
a small minority, while the latter are an overwhelming majority.  God and his angels are aligned 
on the side of good, light, and life.  His cosmic adversary, Satan or the Devil, and his demons are 
aligned on the side of evil, darkness, and death.  For those on earth, neutrality is impossible.  One 
stands either with the divine forces of good or with the demonic forces of evil.11  Second, this 
cosmic dualism corresponds to an historical dualism.  Time is divided into two eras—the present 
age and the promised future.12  The present era is dominated by the forces of evil, which cause 
the good to suffer through war, famine, and death.  For mysterious reasons of his own, God has 
ceded control over history to evil powers.  However, he will soon irrupt into the world, bringing 
time to a close, annihilating the forces of evil, and reestablishing his sovereignty over the earth.13  
Third, the apocalyptic worldview is marked by a pessimistic historical determinism.  
Supernatural agents control the direction of human affairs.14 The prophesied end will happen 
                                                
11 Ehrman, Jesus, 121. 
12 This historical dualism becomes more complicated in the Christian tradition.  Some early Christians saw the 
resurrection of Jesus as the beginning of the prophesied end of the world.  However, the Kingdom of God had 
clearly not yet been established.  It would come only with the parousia, or Jesus’ return to earth, which many saw as 
imminent.  Thus, some early Christians saw themselves as living in a kind of “middle time” between the resurrection 
and the parousia.  Through the resurrection of Jesus, the future eschatological age had already begun to impinge 
upon the present.  This is clearest in Paul’s writings.  See: 1 Cor. 15:23-4; 1 Thess. 1:10.      
13 Ehrman, Jesus, 121. 
14 Collins, “From Prophecy to Apocalypticism,” 85. 
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independent of human agency.15  Even worse, the forces of good will continue to be the 
particular targets of persecution and oppression until God intervenes to decisively reassert his 
sovereignty over the world.16  Fourth, this “denouement of history” will culminate in a final act 
of divine redemption and universal vindication.17  God will annihilate the forces of evil and 
effect a cosmic transformation, resulting in a new heaven and new earth.  He will then preside 
over a day of universal judgment, rewarding the faithful with membership in his kingdom and 
condemning the wicked to eternal damnation. 18   Finally, the apocalyptic worldview is 
characterized by a sense of urgency and imminence.  The “triple drama of crisis-judgment-
vindication” will happen very soon.19  Those with an apocalyptic worldview see themselves as 
living at the edge of time.  Any day now, they will witness the closure of history and the dawn of 
a new world order.  
 Not all apocalypticists wrote apocalypses.  For instance, there is a strong case to be made 
that Jesus shared the apocalyptic worldview outlined above, even though he did not write any 
apocalyptic works.20  Nevertheless, this worldview finds its strongest voice in the genre of 
                                                
15 It is worth emphasizing the crucial distinction between classical Jewish prophecy and apocalypticism.  Despite 
their disturbing predictions of divine wrath, prophets like Jeremiah do not see the future as closed or determined.  
They urge Israel to return to God precisely because they think that human choices affect the direction of history.  
The apocalyptic worldview, on the other hand, assumes that the future is written.  Human actions cannot change the 
course of history.  An individual may repent, return to God, and join the forces of good.  But, in so doing, he is only 
taking steps to ensure his own salvation.  He cannot, either acting individually or in concert with others, prevent or 
avoid the coming crisis, judgment, and vindication.          
16 Ehrman, Jesus, 121-2.   
17 Collins, “From Prophecy to Apocalypticism,” 85.   
18 Ehrman, Jesus, 122. 
19 The quoted phrase is from: Bernard McGinn, “Revelation,” in The Literary Guide to the Bible, eds. Robert Alter 
and Frank Kermode (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990), 526. 
20 For instance, Mark reports the following statement: “But in those days, after the suffering, the sun will be 
darkened, and the moon will not give its light, and the stars will be falling from heaven, and the powers in the 
heavens will be shaken.  Then they will see the Son of Man coming in clouds with great power and glory.  Then he 
will send out the angels, and gather his elect from the four winds, from the ends of the earth to the ends of 
heaven…So, when you see these things taking place, you know that he is near, at the very gates.  Truly I tell you, 
this generation will not pass away until all these things have taken place” (Mark: 13:24-30, NRSV).  See also: Mark 
8:38-9:1; Matt. 13:40-43.  The apocalyptic interpretation of Jesus’ teachings was popularized in academic circles by 
Albert Schweitzer’s The Quest of the Historical Jesus (1906).  More recently, a version of this reading has been 
taken up by Bart Ehrman in Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of the New Millennium (1999).  John Dominic Crossan 
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apocalyptic literature.  While biblical scholars disagree on the generic features of an apocalypse, 
the following abstract definition is often taken as a solid starting point: “‘Apocalypse’ is a genre 
of revelatory literature with a narrative framework, in which a revelation is mediated by an 
otherworldly being to a human recipient, disclosing a transcendent reality which is both 
temporal, insofar as it envisages eschatological salvation, and spatial insofar as it involves 
another, supernatural world.”21  This definition draws attention to both the form of apocalyptic 
literature (e.g. its narrative structure) and its content (e.g. otherworldly mediator).  John J. 
Collins, the chair of the group of scholars that crafted the definition, has since offered an 
important clarification.  While the definition implies that all apocalypses have both a temporal 
and a spatial dimension, Collins has since suggested that most apocalyptic literature emphasizes 
one over the other.  We can therefore divide apocalypses into at least two fairly distinct groups.  
Otherworldly journeys are vertical and spatial.  They explore the relationship between the earthly 
and heavenly realms.  An angelic being gives a human protagonist a tour of heaven, illuminating 
the supernatural sources of earthly reality.  The first portion of the non-canonical book of Enoch, 
for example, is an otherworldly journey.  This form is also central to various strains of mysticism 
and some well-known works of literature, like Dante’s Divine Comedy.  Historical apocalypses, 
on the other hand, are horizontal and temporal.  They sketch the direction of history. A human 
protagonist receives a highly symbolic revelation about the future course of events, the meaning 
of which is often explained by some kind of supernatural interpreter.  The second half of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
offers a forceful argument that Jesus did not have a Jewish apocalyptic worldview.  This argument rests on an 
assertion that the sources in the gospels are not the earliest writings on the life of Jesus and that a more accurate 
picture of his life can be found in even earlier extra-testamentary materials.  This argument runs into problems 
because its dating of these non-canonical gospels is highly speculative.  See: John Dominic Crossan, Jesus: A 
Revolutionary Biography (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1994).   
21 John J. Collins, “Apocalypse: Towards the Morphology of a Genre,” Semeia 14 (1979), 9.  This definition 
incorporates input from a group of scholars in the Apocalypse Group of the Society of Biblical Literature’s Genres 
Project.     
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book of Daniel and the entirety of the book of Revelation are historical apocalypses. 22  
Apocalypses of this type are the primary textual source for the religious apocalyptic movements 
to which Machiavelli and Hobbes are responding. 
The two most developed and historically influential biblical apocalypses are in the books 
of Daniel and Revelation, which display most of the features of the apocalyptic genre and all of 
the elements of the apocalyptic worldview outlined above. In what follows, I offer brief 
summaries of the context, structure, and contents of each book, followed by some observations 
about their political relevance.  Any account of works of this kind of complexity and symbolic 
density necessarily resorts to some simplification.  The discussion I offer below imposes some 
artificial coherence on texts that are often frustratingly elaborate and obscure.  Furthermore, it 
does not aim to be exhaustive, but rather to draw out some of the structural characteristics, 
images, and political themes that persist in later manifestations of apocalyptic expectation, and 
particularly during the historical periods in which Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau wrote.   
The book of Daniel contains the only fully developed apocalypse in the Hebrew bible.  
The nature and status of the book are subject to some debate in the Judeo-Christian tradition.  In 
the Hebrew bible, Daniel is placed among the Kethuvim (Writings), reflecting the late date of its 
composition and perhaps also a sense that it should not be accorded the status given to the 
Prophets.23  Christians, on the other hand, have been eager to assign the book a more prominent 
place, situating it among the Prophets in their bible.  The reason for this enhanced status is that 
                                                
22  Collins, “Early Jewish Apocalypticism,” 283; Collins, “From Prophecy to Apocalypticism,” 77.  The 
vertical/horizontal distinction is from: McGinn, “Revelation,” 526.   
23 This may have been a determination based purely on considerations of genre.  Daniel is not identified as a prophet 
anywhere in the book.  However, it may also have reflected a discomfort within the rabbinic tradition of the place 
that Daniel occupied in the Christian tradition, particularly the early church’s tendency to see “prefigurations of 
Christ and Christian resurrection” in the book.  Also, as Lawrence M. Wills explains, “Jewish tradition was 
sometimes critical of what appeared to be a positive relationship between Daniel and Nebuchadnezzar.”  See: 
Lawrence M. Wills, “Daniel Introduction and Annotations,” in The Jewish Study Bible, Tanakh Translation, eds. 
Adele Berlin and Mark Zvi Brettler (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1642. 
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the book of Daniel has had an important impact on the development of several elements of 
Christian doctrine.  First, it is the only text in the Hebrew bible that offers an unambiguous 
reference to bodily resurrection and judgment after death, a belief that is central to the Christian 
tradition.24  Second, it is the source of the figure identified as “one like the son of man,” a cosmic 
judge who descends to earth on the clouds.25  Early christologies see Jesus himself in this role.  
Finally, as we shall see below, several of the other images and symbols in Daniel, and 
particularly those that describe earthly kingdoms as beasts, are further developed in the book of 
Revelation. 
The book of Daniel is pseudonymous and recounts the heroic exploits and revelatory 
visions of its eponymous protagonist.  The text includes two distinct genres.  Chapters 1-6 are 
“court legends” narrated in the third person and recount Daniel’s heroic exploits in the courts of 
foreign rulers.  In this portion of the book, Daniel is an interpreter of the dreams and visions of 
others.  Chapters 7-12, which are narrated in the first person, describe a series of symbolic 
visions and are fully apocalyptic.26  Here, Daniel is himself a visionary, the recipient of 
revelations about the end times.  While the reader is told that Daniel lived during the time of the 
Babylonian Exile, critical biblical scholars agree that the book was composed and compiled 
much later.  There is substantial agreement that the apocalyptic part of Daniel was written 
sometime between 167 and 164 BCE.27   This dating suggests a very particular historical context.  
                                                
24 Isa. 26:19 (“Your dead shall live, their corpses shall rise”) and Hos. 6:2 (“After two days he will revive us; on the 
third day he will raise us up, that we may live before him”) seem to suggest a resurrection.  However, as John J. 
Collins notes, they “are more probably speaking metaphorically of the restoration of the Israelite people.”  See: John 
J. Collins, “Daniel, Book of,” in The Anchor Bible Dictionary, vol. 2, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: 
Doubleday, 1992), 35. 
25 Dan. 13:7.   
26 The interpretive difficulties posed by the change of genre are compounded by the fact that Daniel 1:1-2:4a, 8-12 
are in Hebrew, while Daniel 2:4b-7:28 are in Aramaic.  These linguistic shifts do not coincide with the genre 
division.   For a summary of scholarly attempts to deal with bilingual nature of the text, see: Collins, “Daniel,” 31. 
27 This dating is unusually precise.  Contemporary critical scholars tend to accept the case that was first made by the 
third-century philosopher Porphyry, whose argument (which survives only in the form of a citation in Jerome), was 
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In 175 BCE, Antiochus IV Epiphanes succeeded his brother as ruler of the Seleucid Empire.  In 
two military campaigns financed through taxes levied on Judea and the pillage of the Temple at 
Jerusalem, Antiochus attempted to wrest control of Egypt from the Ptolemies before threats from 
Rome forced his withdrawal.  Upon his return, he strengthened an existing program of cultural 
and religious assimilation.  With the support of some Hellenized Jews, Antiochus systematically 
outlawed Jewish religious practices and began a campaign of violent persecution aimed at 
ensuring the hegemony of Greek culture and institutions.  For many faithful Jews, the final straw 
came in 167 BCE when Antiochus installed a statue of Zeus in the Temple in Jerusalem.  The 
stage had been set for a guerrilla campaign that would later become known as the Maccabean 
Revolt.28  It is within the context of these policies of cultural assimilation and persecution that 
the apocalyptic message of Daniel took shape.   
While the summary provided here focuses on the apocalyptic half of Daniel (chapters 7-
12), there is a story in the early portion of the book that is essential for understanding this later 
material.  Chapter 2 recounts an incident during Daniel’s time in the court of the Babylonian 
king Nebuchadnezzar.  The king has had a troubling dream and summons his interpreters, 
commanding them to tell him both the content of the dream and its meaning, on pain of violent 
death.  Unsurprisingly, the interpreters find this task impossible.  Facing the threat of imminent 
execution, Daniel prays to God and the mystery of the dream is revealed.  Daniel recounts the 
dream to the king: “there was a great statue…its brilliance extraordinary; it was standing before 
you and its appearance was frightening.  The head…was of fine gold, its chest and arms of silver, 
                                                                                                                                                       
that the book of Daniel was accurate in its predictions up to but not beyond the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes (r. 
175-164 BCE).  The book is also especially detailed in its descriptions of the persecution of Jews between 167 and 
164 BCE, which suggests that this was a matter of particular (and likely contemporary) concern.  See: Collins, The 
Apocalyptic Imagination, 87-8.   
28 Much of the summary given here comes from the (admittedly one-sided) account in 1 and 2 Macc.  For an attempt 
to evaluate existing arguments about Antiochus’ motives and to develop a new position on the issue, see: Erich S. 
Gruen, “Hellenism and Persecution: Antiochus IV and the Jews,” in Hellenistic History and Culture, ed. Peter Green 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 238-264.    
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its middle and thighs of bronze, its legs of iron, its feet partly of iron and partly of clay.”29  A 
stone cut “not by human hands” struck the statue, breaking it in pieces and leaving it “like chaff 
of the summer threshing floors.”30  In its place, the stone grew into “a great mountain and filled 
the whole earth.”31  Daniel explains that the head of gold represents the Babylonian kingdom, 
while the other materials are three consecutive kingdoms of decreasing strength.  The stone is the 
eternal kingdom of God that “shall crush all these kingdoms and bring them to an end.”32  
Untroubled by the coming destruction of his kingdom, the grateful Nebuchadnezzar rewards the 
interpreter and acknowledges the sovereignty of Daniel’s God.  Here, the destruction of earthly 
kingdoms and the establishment of the kingdom of God is an event that will occur in the distant 
future.  There are still three kingdoms to come after Babylon’s demise. 
In contrast, the second half of the book is marked by an unmistakable sense of 
apocalyptic urgency.  Chapters 7 through 12 describe Daniel’s visions of a future that would 
have been imminent for those living under Antiochus IV Epiphanes in the second century BCE.  
Chapter 7 revisits the theme of the four kingdoms in a vision that Daniel is reported to have had 
during the reign of “King Belshazzar.”33  This time, the kingdoms are portrayed symbolically as 
a series of beasts rising out of the sea, each more frightening than the last.  The fourth beast 
emerges with ten horns, three of which are then uprooted to make room for a smaller, arrogant 
horn.  Then God appears in the form of an “Ancient One,” takes his seat on a fiery throne, and 
passes judgment on the four beasts.34  Finally, “one like a son of man” descends on “the clouds 
of heaven” and is granted “dominion and glory and kingship” over “all peoples, nations, and 
                                                
29 Dan. 2:32-33. 
30 Dan. 2:34-35. 
31 Dan. 2:35. 
32 Dan. 2:44. 
33 This is one of several places in which the book of Daniel is historically inaccurate.  Belshazzar was not a king.  He 
reigned as a kind of prince regent when his father, Nabonidus, was absent.   
34 Dan. 7:9.   
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languages” by the Ancient One.35  This kingdom will endure forever.  An angelic figure then 
interprets the dream for Daniel.  The four beasts represent four kingdoms.  However, their power 
will not last and “the holy ones of the Most High shall receive the kingdom and possess the 
kingdom forever.”36  He then explains that the small, arrogant horn will persecute “the holy ones 
of the Most High.”37  This persecution will endure for three and half years, after which the horn 
will be subject to divine judgment and stripped of his dominion.38  To an audience living during 
the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, the meaning of this angelic interpretation would have been 
clear.  The four beasts are the kingdoms of Babylon, Media, Persia, and Greece, while the ten 
horns represent Alexander the Great’s successors.39  The small, arrogant horn is Antiochus IV 
Epiphanes, whose persecution will usher in a day of judgment and the establishment of the 
kingdom of God. 
Subsequent chapters develop the themes introduced in this vision.  Chapter 8 offers a 
similar vision in which the four kingdoms are represented as animals and provides an angelic 
interpretation that confirms the identification of these kingdoms outlined above.  Chapter 9 deals 
with a problem of apocalyptic chronology, reinterpreting Jeremiah’s prophecy that Jerusalem 
would remain devastated for seventy years.  Given that Jeremiah prophesied in the early sixth 
                                                
35 Dan. 7:13-4.  The NRSV translates the Aramaic “one like a son of man” as “one like a human being.” The figure 
of the ‘Son of Man’ is the subject of some debate.  Here, it refers to an angelic figure that descends from heaven on 
clouds and presides over the eternal kingdom on earth.  Non-canonical first century BCE Jewish apocalyptic works 
also sometimes use the designation “Son of Man” to refer to a cosmic judge who will deliver Israel.  See, for 
example: 1 Enoch 69.  However, Jesus also refers to a figure he calls “the Son of Man,” who will “gather his elect 
from the four winds” to admit them into the kingdom of God and condemn evildoers to “the furnace of fire” (Matt. 
13:40-43).  Some Christians believe that Jesus is referring to himself and that the figure mentioned in Daniel 
actually anticipates the Second Coming of Jesus.         
36 Dan. 7:18.   
37 Dan. 7:25.   
38 The period of the little horn’s reign is literally described as “a time, two times, and a half time.”  Interpreters take 
this to mean three and a half years, which was roughly the duration of Antiochus’ persecution of the Jews.  Also, as 
exactly half of seven (which was seen as a perfect number), three and half denoted radical incompleteness.  See: 
Amy-Jill Levine, “Daniel Introduction and Notes,” in The New Oxford Annotated Bible, New Revised Standard 
Version with Apocrypha, 4th edn., ed. Michael D. Coogan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1249.   
39 This reading is confirmed by the angelic interpretation of a similar vision in the following chapter.  Dan. 8:18-25.   
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century and the later chapters of Daniel were written in the mid-second century BCE, in a time 
when Jerusalem remained under foreign control, some interpretive solution had to be reached.  
The angel Gabriel explains to Daniel that Jeremiah’s message was a code intended to indicate 
not seventy years, but seventy weeks of years, or 490 years.40  The description of the last week of 
this period is a thinly veiled account of Antiochus’ persecutions and his profanation of the 
Temple. 
The vision that spans the final three chapters of the book offers an extended and detailed 
account of the final events of worldly history.  Daniel is visited by an angelic being, with “eyes 
like flaming torches” and arms and legs “like the gleam of burnished bronze.”41  Speaking to 
Daniel with a voice “like the roar of a multitude,” he explains that the worldly events of the 
Hellenistic wars are but a reflection of a battle in heaven between angelic ‘princes.’42  With the 
help of Michael, he is currently battling the prince of Persia and will soon confront the prince of 
Greece.  Having explained the heavenly source of the Hellenistic wars, he then offers a brief 
summary of political history from the end of the Babylonian kingdom through to reign of 
Antiochus IV Epiphanes, which is the subject of a more detailed set of predictions.  The angel 
outlines Antiochus’ rise to power, his military campaigns in Egypt, and his eventual withdrawal 
under Roman pressure before detailing the ruler’s program of persecution.  Daniel is told that the 
ruler will abolish religious ceremonies and set up an “abomination that makes desolate,” a 
reference to Antiochus’ installation of a statue of Zeus in the Temple at Jerusalem.  During these 
                                                
40 Other portions of Daniel also give precise date calculations of the period between Antiochus’ persecutions and the 
end of time.  In Dan. 8: 14, we are told that the Temple will remain desolate for 2300 “evenings and mornings,” 
which amount to 1150 days.  In Dan. 12:11-12, we are given two different numbers of days: “From the time that the 
regular burnt offering is taken away and the abomination that desolates is set up, there shall be one thousand two 
hundred ninety days.  Happy are those who persevere and attain the thousand three hundred thirty-five days.”  Of the 
latter passage, Collins notes that “the fact that two different figures are given strongly suggests that the second 
calculation was added after the first number of days had passed,” a phenomenon that would become quite prevalent 
in later apocalyptic movements.  See: Collins, “From Prophecy to Apocalypticism,” 76.   
41 Dan. 10:6. 
42 Dan. 10:6, 13-20. 
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events, “the wise among the people shall give understanding to many” but will also be the 
particular targets of violent persecution.43  The angel then reveals (inaccurately, as it turns out) 
the circumstances of Antiochus’ demise.  The vision concludes with an account of the end of 
days.  After the death of Antiochus, “there shall be a time of anguish, such as has never occurred 
since nations first came into existence.”44  There will be a bodily resurrection and “many of those 
who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and 
everlasting contempt.”45  All of Daniel’s people whose names are “found written in the book” 
will be delivered.46  The angel then advises Daniel to keep the contents of this vision secret and 
“the book sealed until the time of the end,” warning that in the meantime “evil shall increase.”47 
 The book of Daniel is an “imaginative construction” of the historical crisis facing second 
century BCE Judeans.  That is, it does not simply reflect or respond to the political events of its 
time but also renders these events metaphorically and locates them within a sacred worldview 
that endows them with transcendent significance.48  For these reasons, the symbols and images 
that the text brings together would prove almost endlessly flexible and migratory.  Less than two 
centuries later, they would provide some of the central imagery in the book of Revelation.   
The author of this book identifies himself as “John” and tells us that he “was on the 
island of Patmos because of the word of God and the testimony of Jesus.”49 Most scholars agree 
that the author of Revelation is not John, son of Zebedee, one of Jesus’ disciples.50  Internal 
textual evidence suggests that he was an itinerant prophet in Asia Minor.  He may also have been 
                                                
43 Dan. 11:33. 
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46 Dan. 12:1. 
47 Dan. 12:4. 
48 The notion of an “imaginative construction” is from Collins, Apocalyptic Imagination, 114.   
49 Rev. 1:9. 
50 John, son of Zebedee is reported to have been killed sometime before 70 CE and most scholars think that 
Revelation was written or compiled in the 90s CE.  In addition, the author of Revelation never identifies himself as a 
disciple of Jesus.  
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of Jewish birth, perhaps even a refugee from the first Roman-Jewish War (66-73 CE).51  Most 
critical biblical scholars agree that the book of Revelation was written or compiled during the 
later part of the reign of the Roman emperor Domitian (r. 81-96 CE) and there is good internal 
textual evidence to support this claim.52  In contrast to the case of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, there 
is little evidence that Domitian made any kind of systematic effort to persecute Christians for 
their faith.  Nevertheless, there were other political circumstances that may well have made both 
Jews and Christians profoundly uneasy.  Barely a few decades had passed since the first Jewish-
Roman war, which ended with the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE.53  Only six 
years before this, Nero had embarked on a campaign of violent persecution against Christians in 
order to deflect blame for the great fire in Rome.54  Given the brutality and significance of both 
of these events, it would hardly be surprising if they continued to traumatize Christians in the 
mid 90s CE.  A more subtle, though no less important, source of distress may have come from 
the imperial cult, which cast emperors and their families as gods and called upon those under 
Roman authority to worship them.55  The imperial cult had helped to secure the loyalties of 
                                                
51 John’s knowledge of the Hebrew Bible and the similarities between Revelation and earlier Jewish apocalypses, 
like Daniel, suggest that John may well have been Jewish.  The fact that he seems to have known Greek, Hebrew, 
and possibly Aramaic suggests that we was a native of Palestine, as there is little reason to think Jews in the 
Diaspora would have learned Hebrew or Aramaic.  For a review of debates about authorship, see: Adela Yarbro 
Collins, Crisis and Catharsis: The Power of Apocalypse (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984), 24-53. 
52 Rome is equated with Babylon in Revelation.  We find this equation in various non-canonical Jewish apocalypses 
from the same period, all of which indicate that the reason for this association is that Rome, like Babylon previously, 
destroyed the Temple and waged war on Jerusalem.  This evidence suggests that Revelation was written sometime 
after 70 CE.  See: Yarbro Collins, Crisis and Catharsis, 57-8.   
53 The first Roman-Jewish war began under Nero (r. 54-68) and continued under Vespasian (r. 69-79). 
54 Yarbro Collins, Crisis and Catharsis, 99-100.  The persecution of Christians under Nero took place between 64 
and 68 A.D.     
55 There is a lively scholarly debate about the extent to which Christians in Asia Minor should be seen as oppressed 
and/or persecuted.  Adela Yarbro Collins, whose work I have drawn upon here, argues that some Christians were 
very likely still traumatized by Nero’s persecutions and the first Roman-Jewish War.  This trauma was compounded 
by the pressure to participate in the imperial cult.  Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza argues that the oppression and 
colonial exploitation of Christians in Asia Minor were even more serious than Yarbro Collins suggests.  Leonard 
Thompson, on the other hand, argues that there is little evidence of this kind of pervasive oppression and cautions 
that Revelation should be seen not as a reflection of the social reality in Asia Minor, but as John of Patmos’ attempt 
to alienate his audience from their social context.  See: Yarbro Collins, Crisis and Catharsis, 99-104; Elisabeth 
Schüssler Fiorenza, The Book of Revelation: Justice and Judgment (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 126-7; Leonard 
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provinces far from the center of the empire and was enthusiastically embraced by many people 
living in Asia Minor.56  Tied as it was to polytheism and the worship of political sovereigns, the 
imperial cult was likely very troubling to devout Christians and Jews.  Even worse, one of the 
deified emperors who some would have been called upon to worship was Titus who, as a 
military commander, had laid siege to Jerusalem and destroyed the Temple.57  It is in this context 
that John of Patmos wrote the book of Revelation. 
 The text begins with John’s overpowering encounter with the risen Jesus, who is 
identified as “one like the Son of Man.”58  In terms that echo the description of the angelic being 
that mediates Daniel’s apocalyptic vision, Jesus is described as having eyes “like a flame of 
fire,” feet “like burnished bronze,” and a voice that is “like the sound of many waters.”59  He 
tells John to “write what you have seen, what is, and what is to take place after this.”60  The book 
of Revelation accomplishes each of these tasks in turn.  It begins with an account of John’s 
vision of the risen Jesus (“what you have seen”).  It then continues with a record of Jesus’ 
messages to the seven churches of Asia Minor, assessing their current situation, praising the 
faithful, and admonishing those who have strayed (“what is”).  The bulk of Revelation is devoted 
to the third task and describes a series of visions of the end times (“what is to take place after 
this”).61   
                                                                                                                                                       
Thompson, The Book of Revelation: Apocalypse and Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 164-7, 
171-85. 
56 Yarbro Collins, Crisis and Catharsis, 101. 
57 See: Steven J. Friesen, Imperial Cults and the Apocalypse of John: Reading Revelation in the Ruins (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 46, 53.  Friesen’s argument here is based on archeological evidence.  There was a 
statue of Titus at the temple of the Sabastoi at Ephesus.     
58 Rev. 1:13.   
59 Rev. 1:14-15. 
60 Rev. 1:19. 
61 I am borrowing this convenient approach to the summary from: Bart D. Ehrman, The New Testament: A 
Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 471.   
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The literary structure of the work poses interpretive difficulties, chief among which are 
the repetitive sequences of visions that make a literal interpretation of the narrative extremely 
difficult.  The world is repeatedly beset by several series of plagues—let loose first by the 
opening of seven seals, then by the sounding of seven trumpets, and subsequently by the pouring 
out of seven bowls—and at the end of each the world is completely destroyed only then to be 
found back intact and ready to be beset anew by even more terrible tribulations.  Given these 
repetitive visions of the world’s destruction, it would be impossible to chart the narrative on a 
linear chronological timeline.  These interpretive difficulties are alleviated, however, if we 
assume that the book has a recapitulative structure that repeats the core elements of Revelation’s 
message: “(a) persecution, (b) punishment of persecutors, and (c) salvation of the persecuted.”62  
The bulk of the narrative proceeds in cycles, each of which brings the reader’s focus back to the 
edge between the precarious present and the imminent end.  The summary of these visions 
offered below is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to give the reader a sense of the 
“imaginative construction” that John of Patmos puts upon the events of his time, the critique of 
sovereign and imperial power that runs through the text, and the captivating nature of some of its 
most enduring images.      
 After Jesus dictates his letters to the seven churches of Asia Minor, John is taken up to 
heaven, where he sees God seated on a throne.  Gleaming as if he were made of gemstones, God 
is surrounded by four heavenly beings in animal form and twenty-four enthroned elders, who fall 
at his feet and “cast their crowns before the throne” in a gesture of worship and an 
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acknowledgment of his complete sovereignty.63  He holds a scroll with seven seals on which is 
written the future history of the world.  When no one worthy to open the scroll can be found in 
heaven or on earth, John begins to weep.  However, he soon sees Jesus, figured as a “Lamb 
standing as if it had been slaughtered.”64  The worthy Lamb takes the scroll from God, opening it 
one seal at a time.  As each seal breaks, new terrors are unleashed upon the world.  The iconic 
four horsemen bring war, conquest, famine, and death.  With the opening of the sixth seal, a 
great earthquake turns the sun black and the moon to the color of blood.  The stars fall to earth 
and the sky vanishes “like a scroll rolling itself up.”65  The opening of the seventh seal brings a 
period of complete silence.  It then inaugurates a violent narrative recapitulation, as another 
sequence of terrifying catastrophes begins.  This time, John sees seven trumpeting angels, who 
inflict a series of disasters that recall the plagues let loose on Egypt in Exodus: hail and fire 
destroy the land and trees, the sea turns to blood, the waters are poisoned, the light from the sun 
and the moon is darkened, an army of locusts with scorpion tails torture the unfaithful “who will 
seek death but will not find it,”66 and finally a massive cavalry of fire- and sulfur-spewing horses 
lay waste to a third of mankind.  The sounding of the seventh trumpet signals an end to these 
terrors and the beginning of the Kingdom of God.   
 However, it also inaugurates another terrifying vision.  Satan, in the form of a dragon, 
wages a war against Michael and his angels in heaven, but is defeated.  He is then thrown to 
earth and makes war on God’s children.  Standing at the edge of the sea, he looks on as a seven-
headed beast emerges from the water and assumes the power and the throne of the dragon.  The 
beast will be worshipped by the entire world, “given authority over every tribe and people and 
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language and nation.”67  Yet the duration of his rule will be limited to a (symbolic) period of 
three and a half years, as we are told in Daniel.  To John’s audience, the identity of this beast 
would have been clear.  It is Rome.  Its seven heads on which are inscribed “blasphemous 
names” are those emperors who were worshipped as gods.68  A second beast then rises out of the 
earth, exercising “all the authority of the first beast on its behalf” and commanding all peoples to 
worship its predecessor, perhaps a reference to the Roman imperial cults.69  The second beast 
also requires that all people wanting to participate in the economy bear a mark signifying the 
numerical equivalent of the beast’s name—666.70  After this terrifying vision, John once again 
offers the faithful some reassurance, as he describes Jesus swinging his sharp sickle over the 
earth, reaping an eschatological harvest, trampling the grapes of wrath, and producing a flow of 
blood “as high as a horse’s bridle, for a distance of about two hundred miles.”71  
 Seven more angels then appear before John and each pours out a bowl of God’s wrath, 
plunging the earth into new a series of terrors: painful bodily sores, bloody water, scorching heat, 
darkness, drought, a plague of frogs, and an earthquake so violent that it destroys Babylon and 
all other cities.  John then relates a more detailed vision of the destruction of Babylon.  The city 
is figured now as a “great whore…with whom the kings of the earth have committed fornication, 
and with the wine of whose fornication the inhabitants of the earth have drunk.”72 The whore 
                                                
67 Rev. 13:7.   
68 Rev. 13:1.   
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 44 
herself is also “drunk on the blood of the saints and the blood of the witnesses of Jesus.”73  The 
angel translates the vision for John, telling him that the seven heads of the beast are the seven 
mountains on which the whore is seated.  This leaves no doubt as to her identity.  She is Rome, 
the city of seven hills.  John then witnesses the divine destruction of Babylon, which is followed 
by a gruesome heavenly feast in which all are invited “to eat the flesh of kings, the flesh of 
captains, the flesh of the mighty, the flesh of horses and their riders, the flesh of all, both free and 
slave, both small and great.”74  Strengthened by this feast, Jesus and his forces then decisively 
defeat “the beast and the kings of the earth” in a cosmic battle.  Satan is imprisoned in a 
bottomless pit for a thousand years and the martyrs and saints are resurrected to rule with Jesus 
on earth.  At the end of this millennium, Satan is released and gathers his forces for war.  But 
they are quickly consumed by heavenly flames and thrown into a lake of fire to be tortured for 
eternity. 
 With the forces of evil vanquished, John once again sees Jesus enthroned.  There is a 
second bodily resurrection, this time of the dead who are not among the ranks of the martyrs and 
saints.   They stand before Jesus and await judgment.  All are rewarded or punished for their 
deeds, according to the list of the redeemed contained in the book of life.  The damned are 
thrown into the lake of fire, while the elect remain to rule with Jesus on earth for eternity.  There 
is now “a new heaven and a new earth; for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, 
and the sea was no more.”75  A gleaming New Jerusalem descends from heaven, providing a 
home in which God may dwell with this people.  In this eternal kingdom, he “will wipe every 
tear from their eyes.  Death will be no more; mourning and crying and pain will be no more, for 
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the first things have passed away.”76  God’s people will be forever secure, the gates of the city 
“will never be shut…and there will be no night there.”77  John then concludes his revelation with 
a warning from Jesus that the contents of this book should not be sealed, “for the time is 
near…Surely I am coming soon.”78  Thus concludes the book of Revelation and the Christian 
bible.   
 Daniel and Revelation are both books pregnant with interpretive possibilities.  For the 
purposes of this chapter, however, I will limit my analysis to three broad themes, all of which 
help account for the power of these works as political theodicies that situate historical and 
contemporary events within a sacred worldview.  These three themes are also central to the 
contexts and the works of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau.  First, both biblical texts 
present us with a critique of sovereign and imperial power.  In both, sovereign power is imagined 
as a beast.  Daniel sees four beasts emerge from the sea, each representing one of the empires 
that conquered and occupied the eastern Mediterranean between the eighth and second centuries 
BCE.  John collapses these four sea beasts into one—a seven-headed monster crawling out of the 
sea, ready to be vested with the power and authority of Satan.  In Revelation, Rome becomes 
“the ultimate empire, combining all the destructive characteristics of its predecessors.”79  To 
their ancient authors and audiences, however, these beastly images would have carried additional 
meaning.  Ancient Near Eastern mythology describes a primordial struggle between a rightful 
God and the beasts of the sea.  It is a battle between divine order and primeval chaos.80  These 
mythological images are taken up in a new form in the Hebrew bible.  God crushes a great multi-
headed sea beast called “Leviathan” at the beginning of creation, overcoming the dark forces of 
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chaos and providing the conditions for order on earth.  His followers remind God of this feat 
when they plead with him for deliverance: “You divided the sea by your might; you broke the 
heads of dragons in the waters.  You crushed the heads of Leviathan; you have him as food for 
the creatures of the wilderness.”81  In Isaiah, we are told that God will once again battle the great 
sea monster as a preliminary to the restoration of Zion: “On that day the Lord with his cruel and 
great and strong sword will punish Leviathan the fleeing serpent, Leviathan the twisting serpent, 
and he will kill the dragon that is in the sea.”82  The slaying of this chaos monster is necessary 
for the establishment and renewal of divine order on earth.   
Thus, when Daniel and John of Patmos cast sovereign power as a sea beast, they are 
presenting a more thoroughgoing critique than we might initially assume.  Sovereign power is 
allied with the forces of primeval chaos.  The promise of order offered by Hellenic institutions or 
the Pax Romana is illusory.  Worldly empires are antithetical to divine order.  Despite any 
appearances to the contrary, the world is radically out of joint and it will not be righted until God 
eliminates the forces of chaos and makes his sovereignty manifest on earth.  With the 
establishment of the Kingdom of God, not only does John see “a new heaven and a new earth” 
but also that “the sea was no more.”83  The source of primeval chaos and the home of Leviathan 
are forever banished.      
 Second, both Daniel and Revelation suggest that God’s sovereignty is, at least in part, 
sovereignty over history.  Those suffering the persecutions of Antiochus IV Epiphanes or the 
traumas of Roman rule may well have seen themselves as the victims of radically contingent and 
inexplicable events.  Yet, for both Daniel and John of Patmos, these events are rendered 
meaningful by their location in an eschatological drama that culminates in the cataclysmic 
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reassertion of divine power.  Both books offer a vertical and a horizontal meaning for earthly 
events.  On a vertical level, they cast the events on earth as the product of actions in heaven.  
Daniel sees the Hellenic wars as earthly shadows of heavenly battles between angelic princes, 
while John of Patmos reveals that Satan’s reign of oppression on earth is the product of the 
dragon’s conflict with angelic forces in heaven.  On a horizontal level, both books bring 
narrative coherence to history.  The sequence of empires and the apocalyptic timetables offered 
in Daniel suddenly render over 500 years of conquest and persecution of Jews meaningful.  They 
allow his audience to locate its present predicament in apocalyptic time, to recognize that 
Antiochus’ reign will be short and that the violent persecution of Jews will soon end.  While God 
may have temporarily ceded his control over worldly history, he has revealed its outlines to his 
followers so that they may make narrative sense of their place in time.  Revelation collapses the 
longer historical vision of Daniel, a feat achieved metaphorically by combining the latter’s four 
sea beasts into one absolutely terrifying creature.  The result, as Adela Yarbro Collins explains, 
“is a reduction of attention to history and a focus on the terrors of the recent past and the 
present.”84  John of Patmos locates his audience in the last great crisis before the end times, 
allowing them to see Roman oppression as a causal and meaningful prerequisite to the kingdom 
of God.85  In spite of these temporal differences, both Daniel and Revelation achieve the same 
narrative goal.  They offer a vision of the end that brings retrospective coherence to political 
events that seem threatening, inexplicable, and radically contingent. 
 Finally, both works demonstrate that one of the ultimate aims of this historical 
denouement is an overcoming of difference and conflict.  In Daniel, the borders and distinctions 
between groups melt away.  The son of man will rule over “all peoples, nations, and languages,” 
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his total dominion guaranteed by the complete servitude and obedience of all his people.86  The 
differences of race, nationality, and language will be obliterated as God gathers his people back 
from the corners of the earth to be ruled as one.  This theme is even more pronounced in 
Revelation.  With the restoration of divine order on earth, not only is evil abolished, but so too 
are all of the previous markers of difference.  Jesus promises his faithful followers “a new name” 
and new clothes—the white garments that befit those who are glorious and exalted.87  Only once 
the elect have completely surrendered to his transformative omnipotence will they be fit to be 
pillars in God’s temple and to share the throne of Jesus.88  With evil vanquished and worldly 
differences eliminated, the New Jerusalem will descend from heaven “prepared as a bride 
adorned for her husband” and there shall be no more death, no more tears, and no more pain.89  
Without fear of conflict, the gates of the city will remain forever open. God’s definitive and final 
establishment of his sovereignty on earth destroys all of the boundaries, differences, and 
conflicts that define the political condition.  Revelation and Daniel thus offer their audiences not 
only the promise of a world without persecution but also a seductive vision of a world without 
politics.      
 
Containing the Apocalypse 
 These apocalyptic texts and the broader worldview that they both reflect and cultivate 
occupy a troubled place within the Judeo-Christian tradition.  While they may well have offered 
hope and consolation to those struggling to make sense of persecution and oppression in a world 
that seemed radically out of joint, they also generated antinomian enthusiasms that proved 
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difficult to control.  As I discuss below, the difficulty of controlling these enthusiasms is a 
central preoccupation for Paul and especially for Augustine, two of the founding thinkers in the 
Christian realist tradition.  The kinds of responses that these two thinkers develop to 
apocalypticism will then be used and adapted by later political realists, like Machiavelli, Hobbes, 
and Morgenthau.   Yet the antinomian potential of Daniel and Revelation is not immediately 
obvious.  Neither Daniel nor Revelation explicitly encourages active agency on the part of its 
audiences.  Daniel’s politics are overtly quietist.  While the text was written and compiled during 
the period of the Maccabean revolt, its author offers little support for this outright challenge to 
sovereign and imperial power.  Instead, he celebrates “the wise,” who “shall give understanding 
to many” but also “fall by sword and flame, and suffer captivity and plunder.”90  By promising a 
bodily resurrection, Daniel consoles potential martyrs and frees them from a fear of violent 
death.91  But the author certainly does not urge them to political action.  He distinguishes the 
wise from those who rely on military force and are of “little help,” likely a thinly veiled 
reference to the Maccabees.92  Similarly, John of Patmos does not encourage active revolt against 
Rome.  The battle of the end times will be fought by Jesus and his angels against Satan and his 
demons.  Babylon will be destroyed by God “in a single day,” rather than by the plodding and 
precarious efforts of mere men.93  Believers will exercise agency through prayer, prophecy, and 
martyrdom.94 
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 However, despite their explicit quietism, the texts contain immense antinomian potential.  
First, any discouragement of active political agency has to overcome the force of a set of 
terrifying images that cast sovereign power as the primeval force of chaos.  The success of the 
message of quietism assumes an audience capable of accepting that they are living through a 
period of profound crisis and that their political sovereign is the chaotic antithesis to divine 
order.  It further assumes that, faced with this interpretation of the facts, this audience will be 
willing to limit their role in the eschatological drama to patient endurance and martyrdom.  
While Daniel and Revolution have certainly inspired some quietist movements, history suggests 
these competing demands are just as easily resolved in favor of antinomian enthusiasm.95  
Second, as we have seen, both texts deploy a dense network of symbols, which may ultimately 
prove difficult to control.    Especially as part of a public performance or reading, the use of 
imagery and symbolism allows the audience to experience for themselves the revelation that is 
being “‘re-presented’ or re-actualized for them.”96  Like the author of the apocalypse, the 
audience can attempt to decode the cryptic symbolism and imagery, thereby reliving the 
experience of the author and appropriating the revelation for themselves.  Yet, because it invites 
interpretation, this dense symbolism guarantees that the apocalyptic text is almost infinitely 
flexible.97  It can be, and indeed it has been, appropriated for both quiet sic and activist ends.  
Third, the violent imagery in both texts is ambiguous.  Those who remain on earth for the final 
tribulations are subjected to terrors and tortures that are so unbearable that they cause their 
victims to envy the dead.  The wicked are afflicted, consumed, and trampled until the earth is 
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flooded with their blood.  A quietist interpretation suggests that this “violent imagery was 
apparently intended to release aggressive feelings in a harmless way,” providing a catharsis for 
the faithful and the powerless.98  Yet the symbolic flexibility of apocalyptic works offers no 
interpretive guarantees.  These works’ ambiguous treatment of violence treads a fine line 
between the cathartic and the inflammatory.99 
 Among early Christians, the thinkers most attuned to the potential dangers of apocalyptic 
rhetoric and imagery are Paul and Augustine—the two foundational figures of a Christian strand 
of political realism.100  Both share with later realists a pessimistic view of human nature and a 
concern with the imperative of political order.  Paul saw in human nature a tragic conflict 
between our intentions and our actions: “For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not 
want is what I do…So then, with my mind I am a slave to the law of God, but with my flesh I am 
a slave to the law of sin.”101  For Augustine, humanity has been condemned by original sin to 
both suffer and commit great evils.  Our love of “futile and harmful satisfactions” dooms us to a 
life of sheer misery.102  For both thinkers, this evil is the root cause of human conflict.  The 
                                                
98 Yarbro Collins, Crisis and Catharsis, 171.   
99 Yarbro Collins acknowledges this.  See: Crisis and Catharsis, 171.   
100 More than anyone else, Reinhold Niebuhr is responsible for making visible and shaping a Christian realist 
tradition that looks back to Paul and Augustine as foundational thinkers.  Niebuhr is particularly interested in Paul’s 
conception of human nature, which centers on the persistence of sin even in the face of sincerely held moral and 
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community.”  See: Reinhold Niebuhr, “Augustine’s Political Realism,” in The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected 
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Religion, and Christian Faith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 41-58.  On Niebuhr’s Christian realism, see: 
Robin W. Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), esp. 1-
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imperative of political order in the work of both Paul and Augustine means that there are some “family 
resemblances” between their thought and that of later (self-identified) realists, Christian or otherwise.            
101 Rom. 7:19, 25.   
102 Augustine, Concerning The City of God Against the Pagans, trans. Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1972), Bk. XXII, Ch. 22, 1065.  All subsequent citations to this volume will be in the following format: XXII.22, 
1065.  
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purpose of political order is to contain this conflict and punish this evil.103  Paul calls on 
everyone to “be subject to the governing authorities,” which are “instituted by God.”  Political 
resistance will incur divine judgment, “for rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad.”104  
Similarly, Augustine points to the existence of sovereign power as evidence that God has not 
wholly abandoned his people.  Just as parents and educators cane stubborn children, secular 
sovereigns exist to punish sin, “overcome ignorance and to bridle corrupt desire.”105  So much do 
we desire an escape from evil and chaos that we prefer “subjugation at the hands of victors to 
total destruction by the devastation of war.”106 
 This commitment to the problem of political order sits uneasily with an apocalyptic 
worldview.  While he wrote before the composition of Revelation, Paul nonetheless had to 
contend with the apocalypticism that captivated many early Christians.  According to some of 
the accounts in the gospels, Jesus had told his followers that the end times were imminent.  Some 
among them would “not taste death until they see that the kingdom of God has come with 
power.”107  Paul himself accepted the imminence of the end times, whilst refusing to engage in 
precise chronological speculation.108  Alongside his despair about human nature sits a radical 
hope about the Second Coming of Jesus (the parousia).  His earliest epistle, the first of his letters 
to the Thessalonians, attests to this belief.  The letter suggests that some of those whom Paul had 
converted during an earlier visit to Thessalonica had died, leading to questions among the living 
about the status of their deceased brethren at the parousia.  Paul comforts his readers by telling 
                                                
103 While this position is elaborated in far more detail in Augustine’s work, it is also present in Paul’s epistle to the 
Romans: “for [the ruler] is God’s servant for your good.  But if you do what is wrong, you should be afraid, for the 
authority does not bear the sword in vain!  It is the servant of God to execute wrath on the wrongdoer” (13:4).   
104 Rom. 13:1, 3.  Biblical scholars are quick to point out that this famous passage may not be representative of 
Paul’s views on sovereign power.  See, for instance: 1 Cor. 2:6-8; 15:24-26.  However, for our purposes, Rom. 13 is 
an accurate summary of what many take to be Paul’s contribution to a particular kind of “theology of the state.”   
105 Augustine, City of God, XXII.22, 1066. 
106 Augustine, City of God, XVIII.2, 762. 
107 Mark 9:1.   
108 He wisely refuses to set a precise date.  See: 1 Thess. 5:1-11.   
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them that “through Jesus, God will bring with him those who have died.”109  He reaffirms the 
imminence of the end times, suggesting that  “we who are alive” will witness them.110  Yet, 
while the parousia is imminent, it will nevertheless “come like a thief in the night.”111  At one 
moment, there will be “peace and security,” while in the next “sudden destruction will come 
upon [the wicked], as labor pains come upon a pregnant woman, and there will be no escape!”112  
The faithful of Thessalonica will be armed and ready for this surprise, for they are “children of 
light and children of the day.”  In preparation for the parousia, they will “put on the breastplate 
of faith and love, and for a helmet the hope of salvation.”113  Thus prepared, the Thessalonians 
could look forward to the imminent end as the time at which their faith would be rewarded and 
their suffering redeemed. 
 However, these words of apocalyptic consolation and hope seem to have encouraged 
enthusiasm and disorder in Thessalonica.  A second letter suggests that some Thessalonians 
thought that the end times had begun.114  On this assumption, some appear to have quit their jobs 
and become a burden on others.115   Paul condemns this “disorderly” and “undisciplined” 
behavior, reminding his audience that while he and his fellow missionaries were in the 
community, they worked for their meals and were a burden on no one.116  His theological 
argument in the letter defers the apocalypse by providing a list of events that must happen before 
the end times.  A “lawless one” is currently restrained but will be revealed.  He will exalt himself 
“above every so called god or object of worship” and take “his seat in the temple of God, 
                                                
109 1 Thess. 4:14. 
110 1 Thess. 4:15.   
111 1 Thess. 5:2.   
112 1 Thess. 5:3.   
113 1 Thess. 5:8. 
114 Biblical scholars debate whether Paul wrote 2 Thessalonians.  For our purposes here, the debate over authorship 
is not particularly important.  The letter forms part of a Pauline tradition of political thought/political theology.     
115 2 Thess. 3:6-15.   
116 2 Thess. 3:8.  The word that is translated as “idle” in the NRSV is ataktos, which means “disorderly” or 
“undisciplined.”  I have therefore opted for those words here.   
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declaring himself to be God.”117  This figure, whose coming “is apparent in the workings of 
Satan,” is already operating covertly.118  Once the agent of restraint (the katechon) is removed, 
the lawless one will be revealed and Jesus will annihilate “him by the manifestation of his 
coming,” thereby initiating the cosmic battle of the end times.119  The “lawless one” is often 
taken to be some kind of Antichrist figure, an agent of Satan analogous to the false prophet of 
Revelation.  The identity of the katechon is less clear.  Paul tells the Thessalonians that they 
“know what is now restraining” the lawless one.  Interpreters have suggested that Paul is 
referring to a false prophet, an emperor, or the Roman Empire itself.  As we shall see in chapter 
4, the identity of this figure is matter of debate both historically and among contemporary 
political theologians. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to stress that when faced with the 
social disorder and enthusiasm generated by a captivating account of an imminent end, Paul 
sought to temporally displace the apocalypse and return his audience to “normal time.” 
 In the centuries that followed, Christianity was transformed from a messianic sect of 
Judaism into a powerful religious and political institution in its own right.  In 312 CE, 
Constantine converted to Christianity and, in the following year, issued an edict of religious 
toleration.  Christianity’s allegiance with imperial power meant that it urgently “had to come to 
terms with its foundational prophecy (‘The kingdom of God is at hand!’), especially as it was 
embodied in the Book of the [Revelation].”120  Early attempts to neutralize the political threat of 
apocalypticism tended to adopt one of three strategies: to acknowledge that the end was 
imminent while explaining its postponement, to divest the relevant texts of any literal meaning 
                                                
117 2 Thess. 2:4.   
118 2 Thess. 2:9. 
119 2 Thess. 2:8.   
120 Paula Fredriksen, “Apocalypse and Redemption in Early Christianity: From John of Patmos to Augustine of 
Hippo,” Vigilae Christianae 45, no. 2 (1991): 151. 
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and embed them in the neutral ground of allegory, or to reject them altogether.121  Among these 
attempts at neutralization, the work of Augustine of Hippo stands as the most theologically 
sophisticated and historically significant.122  Two aspects of Augustine’s historical context made 
this work especially urgent.  First, the area of North Africa in which Augustine preached and 
wrote was full of enthusiastic Christians with apocalyptic expectations.123  For many of these 
apocalypticists, the world was nearing its close.  Based on a peculiar but persistent interpretation 
of Jewish and Christian scripture, these apocalypticists estimated that the end of days would 
occur when the world was 6,000 years old.  Estimating that Christ had been born in the world’s 
5,500th year, they expected the apocalypse in 500 CE.  It was less than a century away.124   
Had they not been activated by a political crisis, these beliefs might have remained fairly 
innocuous.  After all, the apocalypse was looming but not imminent.  However, a second 
development in the early fifth century gave these hopes and fears an acute sense of urgency.  In 
410 CE, Alaric and the Visigoths sacked Rome.  They pillaged the city, sending refugees to 
calmer regions like North Africa, burdened with terrifying memories of violence and destruction.  
The apocalyptic significance of this event cannot be overstated.  After Constantine’s conversion, 
Christians had come to see the Church and the Empire as “chronologically and geographically 
                                                
121 Fredriksen, “Apocalypse and Redemption,” 152-5.  I am using the word “strategy” here to refer to a rhetorical 
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122 Augustine’s work drew heavily on that of the Donatist theologian Tyconius, who reinterpreted Revelation and 
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123 Fredriksen, “Apocalypse and Redemption,” 151.   
124 For a thorough analysis of the connection between apocalyptic predictions and Christian chronology, see: 
Richard Landes, “Lest the Millennium be Fulfilled: Apocalyptic Expectations and the Pattern of Western 
Chronography 100-800 CE,” in The Use and Abuse of Eschatology in the Middle Ages, eds. Werner Verbeke, Daniel 
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 56 
coextensive.”125  The Pax Romana was widely understood as the world’s final age.  Thus, if one 
wanted to calculate when the world would end, one simply had to figure out when Rome would 
fall.  Among pagans, Rome was seen as the “eternal city” that enjoyed divine protection.  As 
long as the city endured, “then, the Empire (meaning the world) must survive.”126  The fall of 
Rome therefore carried apocalyptic significance for both Christians and pagans.  Among many 
Christians, particularly in North Africa, it was taken to be the beginning of the terrifying 
sequence of events described in Revelation. For pagans, who had been the victims of repressive 
Christian persecution in the closing decades of the fourth century, the destruction was Rome’s 
punishment for abandoning its ancient gods.  Some Christians were even tempted to accept this 
pagan interpretation.  If the pagan gods could wreak this kind of destruction, perhaps they should 
be heeded.127  The combination of religious enthusiasm and political crisis thus created a climate 
of rampant apocalypticism in North Africa and it fell to Augustine, among others, to try to defuse 
it. 
Augustine uses a three-part strategy in his response to this apocalyptic enthusiasm.  First, 
he espouses a tragic view of worldly history.  While the world will eventually end at some point 
in the distant future, the saeculum is marked by inescapable conflicts whose recurrence is 
guaranteed by human vice.  The fall of Rome is simply another terrible misfortune of the sort 
that plagues any earthly city.  And Rome had seen its fair share of misery before.  In 388 BCE, 
the Gauls had invaded and “butchered the senators or as many of them as they could find in all 
the rest of the city, apart from the Capitol—the citadel which alone was defended by some means 
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of the World,” Florilegium 9 (1987): 4. 
126 Coyle, “Augustine and Apocalyptic,” 3. 
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or other.”128  In this respect, the Visigoths had been less severe, sparing “so many of the senators 
that the real surprise is that they wiped out any of them.”129  Rome had also been torn apart by 
internal strife in Sulla’s civil wars (88-87, 83-82 BCE), which had resulted in widespread death 
and destruction of property.  Augustine’s list of Roman woes, which is by no means historically 
exhaustive, places the latest destruction in tragic perspective.  The sack of Rome is simply an 
isolated and contingent event, devoid of any kind of apocalyptic or cosmic significance.  It is 
precisely the kind of recurrent crisis one should expect in a world mired in sin and misery.130  
Augustine’s conclusion, as J. Kevin Coyle neatly summarizes it, is that “far from being the 
ultimate catastrophe, the fall of Rome in 410 was simply another sad event in human history—a 
position that panders to neither total defeatism nor reverent fantasy.”131  By occupying a tragic 
middle ground between defeatism and fantasy, Augustine evinces a disposition toward the world 
that will be cultivated by other political realists like Niccolò Machiavelli and Hans Morgenthau.   
Second, Augustine transforms expectations about the end times into an account of the 
current struggles of the Church.  Toward the end of City of God, he considers the portion of 
Revelation that describes the millennial reign that is initiated by the binding of Satan and the 
resurrection of the saints and martyrs.  He notes:  
[Some people] have been particularly excited…by the actual number of a 
thousand years, taking it as appropriate that there should be a kind of Sabbath for 
the saints for all that time, a holy rest, that is, after the labours of the six thousand 
years since man’s creation…Scripture says, ‘With the Lord, one day is like a 
thousand years and a thousand years is like one day’ [2 Pet. 3:8], and, on this 
assumption, there follows, after the completion of six thousand years—six of 
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129 Augustine, City of God, III.29, 130. 
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these ‘days’—a kind of seventh day of Sabbath rest for the final thousand 
years…132  
  
With some exegetical maneuvering, Augustine concludes that the span of one thousand years is 
symbolic, standing “for the whole period of this world’s history, signifying the entirety of time 
by a perfect number.”133  He also applies an allegorical interpretation to the first resurrection, 
concluding that it is the rebirth of the individual soul “which comes here and now through 
baptism.”134  In contrast, the second resurrection is corporeal and will come at the end of days, as 
outlined in Revelation.  The interval between the two resurrections is the millennium, the 
indefinite worldly period of the current Church.  While this Church is a mixed body, housing 
both sinners and saints, for the righteous it is “even now…the kingdom of Christ and the 
kingdom of heaven.”135  With a rapid interpretive sleight of hand, Augustine then asserts that the 
terrifying Beast of Revelation, previously identified with Rome, is better understood as the 
hostile world in which Christians find themselves, surrounded by “the people of the 
unbelievers.”136  This spiritual and allegorical interpretation transforms expectations of the 
imminent end into an account of the immanent reality of the present Church.137  In so doing, it 
divests the apocalypse of its urgent appeal to the enthusiastic imagination and tames ones of its 
most terrifying images.     
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Third, Augustine combines this allegorical interpretation of the millennium with a 
reassertion of God’s ultimate sovereignty over history, effectively deferring the end times by 
locating them in a distant and unknowable future.  In an argument with distinctly Pauline echoes, 
he reasons that while Revelation may provide us with a general outline of the events of the end 
times, the specific chronology is known only to God.  In his correspondence with an 
apocalyptically inclined bishop in Dalmatia, he finds himself consistently returning to Jesus’ 
admonition to his eager followers: “It is not for you to know the times or periods that the Father 
has set by his own authority.”138  The date of the apocalypse is not something that may be 
subjected to any useful speculation.  Augustine therefore calls upon all those obsessed with 
chronological speculation to “relax your fingers, and give them a rest.”139  Yet, while we cannot 
know the date of the End, we do know the sequence of events that will occur at the end of time.  
With the exception of his reinterpretation of the millennial rule of Christ and his saints, 
Augustine literally affirms the general outline of the apocalypse given in Revelation, including 
the persecution of believers, the return of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and the Day of 
Judgment.140  Turning away from the dense symbolism of Revelation to the comparatively lucid 
ground of the gospels, he also considers what we can reasonably know about the apocalypse 
from Jesus himself.  As reported in Matthew, Jesus is perfectly clear about the prerequisite for 
the end of days: “And this good news of the kingdom will be proclaimed throughout the world, 
as a testimony to all the nations; and then the end will come.”141  While we cannot be sure when 
                                                
138 Acts 1:7.  Augustine and his correspondent disagree about the interpretation of the passage.  The Bishop of Hippo 
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the end will come, we certainly can be sure that it will not come until the gospel has been 
preached throughout the world.   
This provides Augustine with vast chronological leeway, especially as the number of 
“inaccessible and inhospitable places” on earth means that the gospel will be slow to spread and 
credible accounts of its progress seem unlikely.142  Even if we did have reliable reports that the 
gospel was in fact spreading to the farthest reaches of the world, all we could conclude is that the 
end is closer.  We could not name a time or a period.143  While we may know the general outlines 
of the apocalyptic sequence, the fundamental obscurity of God’s chronology means that we 
cannot “impose a plot on time.”144  Thus, Augustine attempts to affirm much of the account given 
in Revelation and the gospels, whilst divesting it of its subversive potential in the here and now.  
In so doing, he offers a strategy that will later be deployed in Thomas Hobbes’ political 
theological arguments. 
 In sum, beginning with Pauline worries about the dangers of apocalyptic enthusiasm, 
Augustine offers a series of sustained exegetical attacks on predictions of the imminent End.  
While it certainly did not prevent continued apocalyptic outbursts throughout the Middle Ages, 
this approach became the orthodox interpretation of Revelation and “virtually defined the content 
of all future Catholic commentaries.”145  Politically, it provided an exegetical response to the 
antinomian potential of apocalyptic expectations and contributed to the ambitious project of 
                                                
142 Augustine, Works, 197.4, 321.   
143 Augustine, Works, 197.4, 321.  
144 Fredriksen, “Apocalypse and Redemption,” 166.   
145 Fredriksen, “Apocalypse and Redemption,” 166.  There had been a powerful consensus among twentieth-century 
Medieval historians that Augustine’s exegetical efforts had been so successful that not only was apocalyptic 
expectation banished from official theology, but also that its popular enthusiasms were effectively controlled until 
Joachim of Fiore produced a radically new eschatological account in the twelfth century.  Richard Landes, among 
others, have challenged this consensus by pointing to numerous medieval apocalyptic movements, particularly those 
that coalesced around 1000 CE.  Landes’ work is an important reminder of the need to separate official church 
doctrine from local beliefs.  He notes: “millennium was indeed local, but universally so; official doctrine was indeed 
“universal,” but barely penetrated local culture.”  See: Richard Landes, “The Fear of an Apocalyptic Year 1000: 
Augustinian Historiography, Medieval and Modern Author(s),” Speculum 75, no. 1 (2000), 106: n. 33.      
 61 
reconciling Christianity’s foundational prophecy with sovereign and imperial power.  Along with 
the thought of Paul, Augustine’s response also offers us a first taste of the strategies that would 
be used by later political realists like Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau in negotiating the 
apocalyptic enthusiasms of their respective times. 
 
The Apocalyptic Imaginary 
 For both Paul and Augustine, the danger of the apocalypse is not just one of theological 
misunderstanding.  Both thinkers are responding to the effects that apocalyptic ideas and visions 
have in the world.  In Paul’s time, some Thessalonians were so captivated by the expectation of 
an imminent end that they had stopped working and had become a burden on others.  They were 
“disorderly” and “undisciplined.”  In fifth-century North Africa, accounts of the sack of Rome 
lent a worldly specificity and imminence to existing apocalyptic speculations.  For Augustine, 
the effects of these expectations could be devastating.  Invoking Paul’s second letter to the 
Thessalonians, he reasons that apocalyptic enthusiasm breeds disappointment.  Inevitably, the 
time of the expected end would pass without incident and believers “would think that other false 
promises had been made to them, and they would give up hope about the reward of faith.”146  In 
short, the prophetic basis of Christian belief could unravel.  Augustine therefore calls upon the 
faithful to await the end not with captivated enthusiasm but with a comparatively sober “sincerity 
of faith, firmness of hope, and…ardor of love.”147  His counter-apocalyptic response is aimed at 
undermining the most enthralling elements of the Judeo-Christian apocalypse—its sense of 
urgency and imminence, its beastly imagery, and its seemingly infinite ability to anticipate the 
crises of the present.  Both Paul and Augustine are thus centrally concerned with the capacity of 
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the apocalypse to capture the imagination and spur the faithful to potentially dangerous 
enthusiasms and disappointments. 
 What might it mean to take this intuition seriously and to theorize the apocalypse not 
simply as a genre of literature or a worldview, but as an imaginary?  Given the visual and 
imagistic dimensions of apocalyptic works, treating the apocalypse solely as a text or narrative is 
insufficient.  Furthermore, a textual or narrative understanding of apocalypse would be unable to 
account for the ways in which many of the images from Daniel and Revelation resonate for 
people and groups who are unaware of their textual origins and have only a vague sense of the 
Judeo-Christian apocalyptic narrative.  Theorizing the apocalypse as an imaginary helps to 
respond to these facts.   Within the biblical and religious studies literature, the “apocalyptic 
imaginary” and the “apocalyptic imagination” are regularly invoked but rarely the target of 
conceptual specification.148  However, we may be able to make some conceptual progress if we 
set aside the “apocalyptic” for a moment and begin with the “imaginary.”  In contemporary 
social and political theory, an “imaginary” is taken to be a “set of meanings, symbols, values, 
narratives, and representations of the world through which people imagine their existence.”149  
While the “imagination” is commonly understood as a faculty that inheres in the individual, an 
“imaginary” is shared and contextual.  It exists at a “more or less subconscious level” and shapes 
the way in which people imagine their common world.150  Charles Taylor captures all of these 
dimensions in his description of a “social imaginary.”151  For Taylor, an imaginary encompasses 
                                                
148 See, for example: Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination, 1-42; Richard K. Emmerson and Ronald B. Herzman, 
The Apocalyptic Imagination in Medieval Literature (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 1-35.  
For an important exception, see: Catherine Keller, Apocalypse Now and Then: A Feminist Guide to the End of the 
World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 1-35.   
149 Chiara Bottici, “Imaginary, The” in Encyclopedia of Political Theory, vol. 1, ed. Mark Bevir (Thousand Oaks: 
2010), 685.   
150 Bottici, “Imaginary,” 686.   
151 There are other conceptualizations of the imaginary in psychoanalytic theory (Lacan) and social theory 
(Castoriadis).  I focus on Taylor here for the accessibility of his approach and because, as we shall see below, his 
 63 
“the ways people imagine their existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on 
between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative 
notions and images that underlie these expectations.”152  These interpersonal and normative 
expectations are shaped by “wider perspectives on where we stand in space and time: our 
relation to other nations and peoples…and also where we stand in our history, in the narrative of 
our becoming.”153  An imaginary is not primarily the textual, theoretical, or self-consciously 
reasoned ways in which people think about the world. Rather, it involves the “way ordinary 
people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings, and this is not often expressed in theoretical terms, 
but is carried in images, stories, and legends.”154  While the imaginary may be carried in these 
forms, it necessarily exceeds any concrete representation.  It exists as a “largely unstructured and 
inarticulate understanding of our whole situation, within which particular features of our world 
show up for us in the sense they have.”155     
 Taylor’s description of an imaginary offers a useful conceptual starting point for 
theorizing the place of the apocalypse in the social and political world.  In particular, it provides 
a way of thinking about the relationships between texts and theories, on the one hand, and social 
imaginaries and their attendant practices, on the other.  While Taylor distinguishes the official 
doctrines of social institutions from imaginaries, he is attuned to the ways in which the doctrines 
sometimes transform imaginaries when “taken up and associated with social practices.”156  As we 
have seen in the case of Augustine’s immediate context, it is possible to trace a similar transition 
between the textual and theological basis of apocalypticism in the Christian tradition and the 
                                                                                                                                                       
theorization falls victim to a similar to a similar pitfall—the tendency to reduce the concept of an imaginary to “the 
logic of a discourse, or worldview.”  See: Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass 
Utopia in East and West (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 11-12.   
152 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 23.   
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expansion of these ideas into a social imaginary that encompasses shared ways of imagining a 
temporal, spatial, and moral order.  Furthermore, theorizing the apocalypse as an imaginary 
offers room to think about the manner in which apocalypticism transcends and thereafter alters 
the understanding of these textual roots when taken up in the collective imagination.  As Taylor 
explains, the social imaginary and the textual, theoretical, and doctrinal ideas with which it is 
infused are mutually inflecting.157  The same is true of the link between the textual basis of 
apocalypticism and the lived belief and enactment of apocalypse in the social world.  The 
apocalyptic texts give birth to an apocalyptic imaginary, while the lived practice and enactment 
of that imaginary changes the way in which the meaning of those texts is understood across 
space and time.  This ongoing negotiation between text and imaginary may help to explain the 
continued power of works that were intended to address situations very different from our own. 
 However, in spite of his conceptual references to images, symbols, and iconography, 
Taylor’s examples (drawn primarily from the history of the modern West) are almost exclusively 
focused on texts and narratives.  While his conceptualization of an imaginary is suggestive, its 
potential is far from fully realized in the course of his analysis.158  He also has remarkably little to 
say about the metaphorical and semiotic dimensions of imaginaries. Yet understanding these 
aspects more clearly is necessary if we are to see precisely why the apocalyptic imaginary is so 
resilient and why some of its elements are socially and politically explosive. Susan Buck-Morss 
suggests that this is a broader problem in the theorization of imaginaries in contemporary 
Western political thought, which tends to reduce them to “little more than the logic of a 
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discourse, or worldview.”159  While Taylor’s conceptualization is useful, as far is it goes, it needs 
to be supplemented with an appreciation for the ways in which imaginaries metaphorically order 
the world.  Often these cannot be reduced to coherent logical statements.  We see relatively 
simple examples of this metaphorical and semiotic capacity in the familiar images of sovereign 
power within the history of political thought – the divine father, the body politic, the Leviathan, 
or the machine.  These images are prior to more specific forms of articulation or understanding.  
As Michael Walzer explains, “the image does not so much reinforce existing political ideas 
(though it may later be used for that purpose) as underlie them…Thus the image provides a 
starting point for political thinking, and so long as it is effective, no other starting point is 
possible.” 160   At the heart of what Taylor calls the “largely unstructured and inarticulate 
understanding of our whole situation” is therefore a store of images and associations that 
captivate our collective imagination.  While they may remain unacknowledged, they nevertheless 
serve to order the social and political landscape.  When deployed overtly in the service of 
political ends, they may further serve to secure belief and provoke adherence.  Any account of a 
social or political imaginary must therefore attend explicitly to the complex of metaphors and 
signifiers through which power is organized and belief is elicited.     
This more imagistic conceptualization of an imaginary helps us to recognize the ways in 
which apocalypticism is something more than simply a genre of revelatory literature or a 
worldview.  It allows us to attend to the effects of the extraordinarily rich semiotic qualities of 
apocalyptic texts.  An illuminator of tenth-century commentary on Revelation characterizes the 
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visions of the apocalypse as “picture-making words.”161  Given the density of symbolic imagery 
in Revelation, it is hardly surprising that it is one of the most illustrated books of the Bible and 
assumes a consistently central place in the history of Western art.162  Yet the words of the text 
have an imaginative power that exceeds any attempt to specify their concrete meaning in a 
logical statement or a particular visual representation.  Edmund Burke captures this power of 
“picture-making words” when he compares the effect of a drawing to that of an affecting verbal 
description in the context of a broader discussion of the aesthetic experience of the sublime.  He 
explains: 
If I make a drawing of a palace or a temple, or a landscape, I present a very clear 
idea of those objects; but then…my picture can at most affect only as the palace, 
temple, or landscape would have affected in reality.  On the other hand, the most 
lively and spirited verbal description I can give raises a very obscure and 
imperfect idea of such objects; but then it is in my power to raise a stronger 
emotion by the description than I could do by the best painting.163 
 
Similarly, the imagery of apocalypse always seems to lose something of its power when rendered 
into any determinate visual form.  The rolling up of the sky like a scroll, the seven-headed beast 
emerging from the sea, or the trampling of the grapes of wrath are most powerful as “obscure 
and imperfect” ideas that can be inflected with the more particular terrors or hopes of one’s own 
context.  The overflowing semiotic resources of the imaginary seem to guarantee the apocalypse 
a remarkable resilience.  While particular expectations of the end might be disconfirmed, the 
apocalypse itself is never discredited because there are always further events in the world that 
find resonance within these semiotic resources.164  The plagues of locusts, which for early 
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Christians would have recalled God’s punishment of Egypt in Exodus, today become the 
allegory for the effects of global climate change. 
 With these further specifications to the concept of an imaginary, it becomes easier to 
recognize the ways in which apocalypticism might become unmoored from its theological 
beginnings.  As the example of locusts and global climate change suggests, elements of the 
apocalyptic imaginary continue to recur today in locations far from their original theological 
roots, often in purportedly secular interpretations of the world.  The apocalyptic imaginary has 
been able to travel beyond conditions in which its core features are believed to be literally true, 
or even recognized as conceptions originally developing from Biblical sources.  Because the 
apocalyptic imaginary, even in its fully religious form, rarely rises into complete awareness by 
those who draw upon its resources to make sense of the world, it can come to shape the 
understandings of those who do not even recognize the ways in which its individual elements 
were originally seen to be linked.  For those who lived within explicitly Christian eras, where 
apocalyptic belief in at least some form was necessary to the coherence of the entire religious 
world, the semiotic potential of these resources was often extraordinarily powerful.  For those 
who have followed them in time, these resources remain nonetheless; once loosed upon the 
world, their semiotic richness makes them extraordinarily difficult to contain. 
 In this dissertation, I will not assume that apocalyptic thinking must necessarily be 
grounded in a Judeo-Christian theology.  Rather, I will show instances in which elements of this 
imaginary have shaped the thinking of self-consciously secular political actors as well as those 
motivated by profound Christian enthusiasm.  I thus seek to offer a general conception of the 
apocalyptic imaginary here which draws out its central structural elements, without presuming 
that these elements must continue to take their original theological form.  In either its theological 
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or secular form, I conceptualize an apocalypse as an imminent and cataclysmic end to the known 
world, along with its attendant “evils.”  It is a rupture in the apparent temporal continuity of 
history, a revelatory moment around which the past is given meaning and a radically new future 
is announced.  This conceptualization focuses on elements of apocalypse that are present in, but 
ultimately transcend, the Christian tradition. 
 The constituent elements of the “apocalyptic” component of the apocalyptic imaginary 
require further explanation.  First, the end of the world is always imminent.165  It will come soon, 
generally within the lifetime of the conveyer or audience of the apocalyptic message.  This sense 
of imminence is clearly present in the early Christian tradition.  As we have seen above, some of 
the accounts in the gospels indicate that Jesus himself expected the world to end within his own 
generation.  The books of Daniel and Revelation possess a similar sense of imminence.  Daniel 
anticipates that Antiochus’ reign is drawing to a cosmic close, while Revelation concludes with 
the warning and hope that “the time is near.”  Contemporary secular apocalyptic movements also 
share a sense of imminence.  For instance, those who expect that the world will end in 
environmental devastation tend to insist that such an end will come ‘soon’, or at least ‘sooner 
than we think.’166  As we shall see in Chapter 5, the nuclear apocalypticism of the 1950s and 
1960s was centered on the expectation of imminent annihilation.  
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 Second, an apocalypse is cataclysmic.167  In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the earth is 
consumed by plagues and fire, effecting a radical transformation that clears the way for a New 
Jerusalem.  In Revelation, the spiraling narratives of destruction are rife with images of 
catastrophic natural disasters, rotting flesh, excruciating torture, and ravenous beasts, which 
serve to present “the unrepresentable”—the divine consumption of the world and most of 
humanity.168  This cataclysm is a form of creative destruction, the necessary preparatory work for 
the building of a new world.  On a secular level, political and economic ideologies with 
apocalyptic dimensions similarly emphasize the creative power of absolute destruction.  For 
instance, the destructive and cleansing power of revolution in certain strains of Marxist thought 
shares much with the focus of the apocalyptic imaginary on the pregnant potential of 
cataclysm.169  In contrast, most (though certainly not all) environmental or nuclear scenarios of 
apocalyptic annihilation treat their cataclysms as purely world destroying, rather than also 
potentially world-renewing. 
 Third, an apocalypse brings an end to some real or perceived “evil.”  For Christians, the 
apocalypse marks the end of sin and suffering and the arrival of an era in which the elect will 
live with God on earth, where “death will be no more; mourning and crying and pain will be no 
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more, for the first things have passed away.”  Given the symbolic flexibility of the images of evil 
in both Daniel and Revelation, religious enthusiasts have rarely suffered from a shortage of 
historical allegories for the dragons, beasts, and whores that populate the apocalyptic landscape.  
In secular accounts of the apocalypse, the content of the “evil” that is to be purged is similarly 
variable.  It may include human abuse of the natural environment, particular political or 
economic arrangements, or dangerous weapons and technologies.170   
 Fourth, an apocalypse is a moment of rupture in the apparent temporal continuity of 
history.  The accounts of the apocalypse in Daniel and Revelation describe the irruption of God 
into human time.  This marks a radical break that dissolves the distinction between secular and 
divine history.  After this, God will dwell among humans on earth, and time, as such, will no 
longer exist.  Even when separated from these theological roots, an apocalypse ruptures “our 
sense of continuity in time, thus forming a temporal break and omnipresent point of reference 
around which we subsequently reinscribe our historical and political narratives both leading to 
the event and flowing from it.”171  An apocalypse therefore differs from other events that might 
be collectively or individually devastating, like death.  These events are given meaning by sacred 
and social “rituals that symbolically affirm social continuity.”172  In contrast, an apocalypse 
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simply cannot be imagined into ritualized or calendric understandings of time.  It always exists 
as both a rupture in and an end to time.   
 Finally, an apocalypse is revelatory.  In an instant, it discloses both the meaning of the 
past and “the shape of things to come.”173  In Daniel and Revelation, the apocalypse is revelatory 
in another sense—it is a transcendent reality conveyed to Daniel and John of Patmos through a 
vision mediated by an angelic figure.  Once this vision has been communicated and interpreted, 
the upheavals, conflicts, and persecutions of the past and present cease to be the unaccountable 
contingencies of history and become instead the birth pangs of a new world.  Similarly, secular 
apocalypses reveal a present filled with signs of the imminent end—rising temperatures, species 
extinction, economic crisis, or conflicts between nuclear powers.  An apocalyptic interpretation 
reveals these events to be signs of an inevitable and imminent world transformation.   
 Conceptualizing apocalypse as an imaginary allows us to recognize the possibility of 
many potential “apocalypses.”  The apocalyptic imaginary includes the overtly theological 
apocalypses in which God irrupts into history, initiating a bodily resurrection in which the saved 
are granted immortality and the damned are condemned for eternity.  However, it also includes 
secular apocalypses in which humans alone bring about the end of the world.  Furthermore, as I 
have outlined it here, the apocalyptic imaginary is not committed to a particular vision of the 
post-apocalyptic world.  Christian accounts of the apocalypse envision a millennial kingdom and, 
eventually, a world in which the elect dwell with God.  However, there is disagreement within 
the Christian tradition about whether the post-apocalyptic world would be hierarchical or 
radically egalitarian.174  There are similar debates among secular apocalypticists, whose post-
apocalyptic scenarios range from the totalitarian to the anarchic.  However, with secularization 
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comes another option—that the entire physical world, or at least all human life, will be 
completely destroyed.  The apocalyptic imaginary, as I have outlined it here, includes such 
scenarios.   
 At this point, the apocalyptic imaginary may well seem overly capacious.  Yet it is 
important to stress that it does not encompass all possible forms of eschatological expectation.  
The centrality of imminence, cataclysm, and rupture to the apocalyptic imaginary means that it 
necessarily excludes the beliefs of progressive millennialists.  Progressive millennialism 
encompasses a variety of narratives about the future, all of which are linked by the expectation of 
a coming better age on earth that will be achieved through gradual human transformation, rather 
than an imminent and destructive cataclysm.175  The various agrarian utopian communities that 
developed in Europe and the United States in the nineteenth century were the products of such 
beliefs.  Similarly, the narratives of progress that lie at the heart of liberal political thought often 
have a progressive millennialist bent, particularly when they take the form of arguments about 
“the end of history.”176  Here, the expected transformation is not achieved through ruptural 
catastrophe or violence and it is rarely cast as imminent.  This means that while there are 
elements of progressive millennialism that partake of the apocalyptic imaginary, particularly its 
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revelatory qualities and the emphasis on the purging of ‘evil,’ expectations of gradual 
transformation involve separate categories of belief and very different visions of the future. 
 Yet this distinction should not blind us to the dynamism of beliefs, narratives, and images 
of the end of the world.  There are several historical cases in which progressive millennialism 
has transformed into full-throated apocalypticism.  The case of the Anabaptists at Münster 
between 1533 and 1535 is a canonical example.  This group’s beliefs, along with the narratives 
and imagery that gave them form, shifted from transformational and pacifist to violent and 
cataclysmic when the expected new world failed to arrive.177  There was a similar shift for large 
groups of Western Franks when hopes for the arrival of Jesus were dashed at the turn of the first 
millennium. 178   While these groups did not originally draw on the full resources of the 
apocalyptic imaginary to make sense of their world, they turned to this imaginary when their 
prophecies failed.  As we shall see in Chapter 5, this is precisely the kind of transformation that 
Hans Morgenthau worried about.  The beliefs and narratives of interwar idealists like Woodrow 
Wilson may begin as a kind of secular progressive millennialism centered on the hope for a 
world without war.  However, these expectations become apocalyptic when they begin to focus 
on the need for a final and decisive battle for a singular ‘humanity.’  Because the apocalyptic 
imaginary shares narrative and symbolic resources with progressive millennialism, this shift 
often faces limited resistance. 
 Even when progressive millennialist beliefs become apocalyptic, they need not erupt in 
violence.  In fact, overt public eruptions of apocalyptic hostility are relatively rare.  This does not 
mean, however, that the imaginary is not at work.  In any historical period, there are groups that 
accept the current political, economic, or moral order “‘under protest’ even if that protest is, 
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provisionally, silent.  They await eagerly the moment when the rules will change, and change 
dramatically.”179  The apocalyptic imaginary provides these groups with a way to understand 
their current circumstances and envision a new world.  They can legitimize their expectation of 
an imminent cosmic transformation by appealing the “signs of the times.”  For those captivated 
by the apocalyptic imaginary, the world is “overflowing with meaning and purpose.”180  History 
ceases to be a space of unaccountable contingency and becomes a determined process subject to 
eschatological interpretation.  The apocalyptic imagination rescues suffering, oppression, and 
cultural discontents from the threat of meaninglessness and makes time reliable.181  It allows 
believers to take everything—political events, cultural shifts, economic downturns, changes in 
the weather, particular dates—to be signs of an imminent transformation.  In short, they become 
semiotically aroused.  As Landes summarizes:  
From the people they meet, to the texts they read, to events that happen around 
them, everything coheres as part of a huge apocalyptic plan, crystalline in its 
clarity and glorious in its implications.  Sometimes the plan is nefarious—an 
international conspiracy by the forces of evil to enslave mankind; sometimes 
benevolent—the dawn of a new age.  In any case, whereas it once existed only in 
the shadows, scarcely discernable, the signs of its advent are now legible, visible, 
clear to anyone with discernment.182 
 
As we have seen in the case of Judeo-Christian apocalypticism, the symbolic flexibility of texts 
like Daniel and Revelation guarantees believers a continued source of cosmic analogs that can be 
made to correspond to almost any contemporary figure or event.  For secular apocalyptic 
believers, this semiotic arousal may work at the level of an unconscious habit or subliminal 
practice.  While they may “not perceive any possible connection between an old text and the 
current reality…they may be inclined to expect the burning of rainforests, for instance.  And they 
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may feel some mix of foreboding and inevitability about ‘the environment.’”183  Whether they are 
sacred or secular, all apocalyptic believers exist in a world charged with meaning and about to 
undergo a cosmic transformation. The shape of this transformation remains fundamentally 
unimaginable at the same time as it haunts the collective imagination.   
 
Conclusion 
 In sum, the Judeo-Christian apocalypse emerged in response to specific political 
circumstances in the Eastern Mediterranean and Asia Minor.  The books of Daniel and 
Revelation offered their audiences thoroughgoing critiques of sovereign and imperial power, a 
historical narrative through which persecution and trauma could be made meaningful, and the 
seductive promise of a new world purged of suffering.  Yet the dense and flexible symbolic 
resources in these works have allowed them to capture the imaginations of audiences in 
circumstances that are radically different from those of antiquity.  Within the early Christian 
tradition, the two thinkers most concerned with the antinomian potential of apocalypticism are 
Paul and Augustine—two thinkers who would later come to be seen as the foundational voices of 
a Christian strand of political realism.  Both Paul and Augustine take seriously the effects that 
apocalypticism has in the world, its capacity to captivate the imagination and impel people to 
potentially subversive forms of enthusiasm.  Together, they deploy three strategies of which later 
political realists will also avail themselves: acknowledging the reality of the apocalypse while 
deferring its arrival, divesting the apocalypse of its most captivating and terrifying images, and 
embracing a tragic view of history that eschews the apocalypse’s perfectionist impulses. 
Following an intuition in Paul and Augustine’s work, I have argued that the apocalypse is best 
conceptualized as an imaginary.  It is part of the stock of narratives, myths, and images through 
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which people make sense of their world together.  As I have suggested here, and as will become 
clear in the following chapters of the dissertation, the apocalyptic imaginary persists not only for 
those who believe in the literal truth of Jewish and Christian scriptures, but also for purportedly 
secular political thinkers.  The chapters that follow trace the extended and often troubled 
engagements of three political realists with the apocalyptic imaginary.  As we shall see, these 
engagements are not primarily undertaken at the level of texts, doctrines, or policies, but rather 
through the images, symbols, and narratives with which we make sense of our political 
landscape. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI’S SAVONAROLAN MOMENT 
 
 
 In his controversial book on Machiavelli, Leo Strauss urges us to take an imaginative 
leap to find a “surprising Machiavelli who is new and strange, rather than…old and our own.”1  
Whatever one may think about Strauss or the degree to which he succeeds in his own interpretive 
task, his insistent invitation to find a Machiavelli who is “new and strange” is a valuable one.  
Perhaps paradoxically, I attempt to draw out an unexpected Machiavelli by locating him within 
his contemporary context.  But the contextual picture I want to sketch is one that has been largely 
neglected by scholars of the history of political thought.  In Machiavelli’s time, Florence was 
gripped by enthusiastic and rampant apocalypticism, or fears of the imminent end of the known 
world and a hope for the beginning of an unprecedented future.  While the Dominican friar 
Girolamo Savonarola was at the center of this enthusiastic movement, the apocalypticism that 
captured the Florentine imagination was broader and deeper than the preaching of a single man.  
The “Savonarolan moment,” as I refer to it here, was a time at which a divine scourge and the 
remaking of Florence seemed possible and even inevitable.  Political upheaval and prophecy 
combined to transform a hope for a better world into a widespread expectation that God would 
violently irrupt into secular history and create a heavenly kingdom on earth.  For Florentine 
enthusiasts, the apocalyptic imaginary functioned as a political theology, assigning meaning to 
struggles of the present by locating them within a sacred narrative that offered the enticing 
promise of ultimate vindication.   
 I argue here that Machiavelli’s work bears the mark of this context.  The final chapter of 
The Prince, I suggest, is an apocalyptic exhortation that in its rhetoric and imagery amounts to a 
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secular political reiteration of the Savonarolan message.  Machiavelli gravitates toward this 
apocalyptic solution in The Prince because he has failed to adequately grapple with the 
contingency of the political world and with the particular crises that plagued contemporary 
Florence.  Yet Machiavelli later turns away from an apocalyptic mode, embracing instead a 
robustly tragic sensibility characterized by an openness toward and even a celebration of the 
variability and struggle that characterize politics.  However, while Machiavelli turns away from a 
desire to transform apocalyptic hopes into a worldly project, he never fully abandons these 
hopes, which continue to haunt his later works.  
 This chapter proceeds in three parts.  First, I sketch the context of the Savonarolan 
moment in Renaissance Florence, focusing initially on the preaching of the Dominican friar and 
then broadening the analysis to the ways in which the apocalyptic imaginary transcended 
Savonarola himself.  Second, I offer a close textual reading of the final chapter of The Prince, 
drawing out resonances between Machiavelli’s exhortation and the Savonarolan moment.  I also 
consider why it is that a work that begins with apparently empirical and anti-utopian goals 
culminates in an apocalyptic exhortation.  Third, I trace the way in which Machiavelli turns away 
from the apocalyptic imaginary in his later work, and particularly in The Discourses, by 
embracing a tragic sensibility.   
 
 
The Savonarolan Moment in Florence 
 
 Girolamo Savonarola’s (1452-1498) early life made him an unlikely candidate for the 
role of apocalyptic prophet of a Florentine millennium.  He was born in Ferrara, the son of a 
businessman and the grandson of a learned physician and medical writer.  With the help of his 
grandfather, Savonarola received a humanist education and earned a Master of Arts degree at the 
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University of Ferrara.  Yet, in the spring of 1475, the young Savonarola surprised his family by 
running away to join the Observant Dominican friary in Bologna.  He offered his reasons for this 
decision in a letter to his father, explaining that he could no longer stand “the great wickedness 
of the blind people of Italy, especially when [he] saw that virtue had been completely cast down 
and vice raised up.”2  In a world rife with sin, Savonarola was called to become a “knight 
militant” for Christ.3  He first came to Florence in 1482-1487 as a lecturer in theology.  At this 
time, his preaching brought him few followers, “only some simpletons and a few little women,” 
as he later recalled.4  In 1490, Savonarola returned to Florence, assigned by his superiors to the 
convent of San Marco at the request of Lorenzo de’ Medici and under the recommendation of the 
young philosopher Pico della Mirandola.  Savonarola’s sense of his mission had now changed.  
He saw himself as a prophet5 who had been called to preach the imminent apocalypse, to urge 
penitence, and to seek the renewal of the Church.  His election to the position of prior of San 
Marco in 1491 allowed him to reform his community of friars, while his fiery apocalyptic 
preaching helped him attract a substantial following among Florentines.  The swelling crowds at 
his sermons meant that Savonarola “was soon obliged to move his pulpit from the convent 
church of San Marco to the Medicean basilica of San Lorenzo and eventually to the immense 
                                                
2 Girolamo Savonarola, Letter to his Father, Niccolò Savonarola, in Ferrara, 25 April 1475, in A Guide to Righteous 
Living and Other Works, trans. Konrad Eisenbichler (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 
2003), 36. 
3 Savonarola, Letter to his Father, 36. 
4 Girolamo Savonarola, Ruth Micah, Sermon IV, 18 May 1496, as quoted in: Alison Brown, “Introduction,” in 
Selected Writings of Girolamo Savonarola: Religion and Politics, 1490-1498, eds. and trans.  Anne Borelli and 
Maria Pastore Passaro (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), xv.   
5 The earliest evidence of this self-perception is in a letter Savonarola wrote to his mother in 1490.  In explaining 
why he must continuously travel, he references Luke 4:24 and writes “no-one is a prophet in one’s own country, so 
much so that even He was not accepted in His own country.”  See: Girolamo Savonarola, Letter to his Mother, Elena 
Savonarola, from Pavia, 25 January 1490, in Guide to Righteous Living, 39.  It is not altogether clear how or why 
Savonarola came to see himself as an apocalyptic prophet.  A contextual political explanation might stress the sense 
of political malaise he encountered upon his return to Florence in 1490.  His concern with the decadence and 
corruption of the Church may have served to reinforce a conviction that the world was somehow out of joint.  
Savonarola was also not the only apocalyptic prophet in Florence or in Italy at this time.  He may have been 
influenced by the message or the fame of other apocalyptic preachers.       
 80 
cathedral church of Santa Maria del Fiore.”6  Florence was receiving Savonarola’s apocalyptic 
message with rapt attention.7   
 Florentine receptiveness to the Savonarolan message was not merely the product of the 
friar’s rhetorical or prophetic skill.  The political situation in which the city found itself at the 
end of the fifteenth century had left Florentines particularly receptive to apocalypticism.  In April 
1492, Lorenzo de’ Medici died, leaving behind  a gathering political storm fueled by a brittle 
regime and an increasingly vocal and dissatisfied elite.  Lorenzo’s son Piero took over his 
father’s leadership role.  Yet despite an apparently smooth transition, many of the city’s powerful 
citizens worried that Piero’s power would eventually become tyrannical.  Piero’s inner circle was 
very tight, excluding members of the city’s elite on whose support rested the future viability of 
the regime.  This domestic unrest was compounded by a foreign threat.  In 1493, rumors of a 
French invasion were spreading through Italy.  Charles VIII was coming to make good his 
inherited claim on the Neapolitan kingdom, with a force whose size and strength was 
unimaginable to Italians.8  In 1494, the French were en route and sought Florentine assistance in 
easing their way through Tuscany.  But Piero chose to maintain the Florentine alliance with 
Naples.  As the French approached, the young Medici leader attempted to maintain a difficult 
balance between keeping the Neapolitan alliance, on the one hand, and trying to avoid overtly 
antagonizing the French, on the other.  As internal dissatisfaction with the Medici regime grew 
and Charles’ forces marched from Milan to Tuscany, Piero realized that it was time to negotiate 
with the French.  On October 26th, he met with Charles and made substantial concessions on 
behalf of Florence, surrendering the city’s fortresses in Pisa, Livorno, Pietrasanta, and Sarzana.   
                                                
6 Konrad Eisenbichler, “Introduction,” Guide to Righteous Living, 7. 
7 This biographical information was compiled from Brown, “Introduction” and Eisenbichler, “Introduction.” 
8 Donald Weinstein cites a figure, taken from a late nineteenth century French source, of forty thousand effectives 
armed with one hundred siege guns.  See: Donald Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence: Prophecy and Patriotism in 
the Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 114. 
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 Florence was at a breaking point.  Its citizens were outraged at Piero’s surrender of the 
fortresses and worried about the impending arrival of an army that had already laid waste to a 
nearby town.  The city’s executive body, the Signoria, called an emergency meeting of the 
regime’s senior officials.  Most of the inner circle was now prepared to abandon Piero.  But the 
French threat still loomed and they decided to dispatch a delegation headed by Savonarola to 
persuade Charles to either avoid coming through Florence or to restrict the size and movements 
of his force if he insisted on entering the city.9  No firm arrangement was reached.  However, 
during Savonarola’s absence, Piero was successfully ousted from power.  Sixty years of Medici 
dominance had ended and a politically disorganized Florence awaited a frightening French army. 
 This is the political context in which Savonarola’s apocalyptic message took shape.  
Savonarola began his Florentine preaching on Revelation in August 1490.10  At this time, his 
prophecy offered a vivid picture of an apocalypse without worldly redemption.  God’s wrath 
would be let loose on everyone.  While the friar envisioned the reform of the Church and a 
universal conversion to Christianity, these changes merely heralded the Last Judgment.  They did 
not suggest the imminent creation of a better world on earth.11  This deep pessimism put 
Savonarola at odds with other apocalyptic prophets in Florence, who also predicted tribulations 
but saw them as a precursor to world renewal.12  Reflecting back, Savonarola recalled the mood 
of these early apocalyptic sermons with a single evocative line: “I am the hailstorm that shall 
                                                
9 The reasons why Savonarola was chosen for this mission are not entirely clear.  By this time, he was a prominent 
figure in Florence and he had gained substantial public credibility by seeming to have predicted the city’s political 
calamities in his apocalyptic sermons.   
10 While this was the first time that Savonarola preached on apocalypse in Florence, he may have previously done so 
elsewhere.  After he left Florence for the first time in 1487, Savonarola preached in several cities in the north of 
Italy.  In Brescia, he likely used the Book of Revelation as the textual basis for a prediction that God would soon 
punish all of Italy.  See: Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, 75. 
11 Donald Weinstein, “Millenarianism in a Civic Setting: The Savonarola Movement in Florence,” in Millennial 
Dreams in Action: Essays in Comparative Study, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Supplement 2 (The 
Hague: Mouton and Co., 1962), 188; Donald Weinstein, “The Myth of Florence,” in Florentine Studies: Politics and 
Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 40. 
12 Weinstein, “Myth of Florence,” 40. 
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break the heads of those who do not take shelter.”13  The friar’s focus in these sermons was on 
the corruption of the Church, which he took to be a sign of an imminent apocalypse.14  Like 
many of his contemporaries, he pointed to the Turks as alternately the Antichrist or a divine 
apocalyptic scourge.15  Yet as his sermons evolved, the friar’s targets became much more local.  
During Lent in 1491, Savonarola offered what he later called his “terrifying sermon,” in which 
he singled Florence out for the worst of God’s apocalyptic wrath.  The city would no longer be 
known as Florentia, but “turpitude and blood and a den of robbers.”16  This would be an 
apocalypse without worldly redemption and Florence would be God’s primary target.   
 As rumors of a French invasion spread, Savonarola no longer had to look to the Turks as 
the agents of God’s scourge.  Charles VIII, Savonarola explained as the French approached 
Tuscany, was the apocalyptic scourge the friar had predicted.  The French invasion was but the 
beginning of a terrifying sequence of apocalyptic events that the friar had been rehearsing for the 
last several years.  With a tone of reproach, he told his listeners: “long before anyone had heard 
the noise or smelled any of today’s wars, moved by people from beyond the Alps, great 
tribulations were announced to you.  You also know that not two years have passed since I told 
you: ‘Behold the sword of the Lord falling on the earth quickly and swiftly.’  Not I, but God 
predicted it to you.  And, look, it has come to pass and it is here.”17  Florence had not listened to 
the warnings offered by God’s messenger.  Again, Savonarola reproached his audience: “God 
has spoken and you did not want to listen to Him.  If the Turks had heard what you have heard, 
                                                
13 As quoted in Roberto Ridolfi, The Life of Girolamo Savonarola, trans. Cecil Grayson (New York: Knopf, 1959), 
32. 
14 There are other recurring themes of social injustice and the moral corruption of the wealthy.  See: Weinstein, 
Savonarola and Florence, 98-9. 
15 Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, 94. 
16 As quoted in Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, 98. 
17 Girolamo Savonarola, Haggai, Sermon I (November 1, 1494), in Guide to Righteous Living, 89.  Emphasis in 
original.  The translator has translated the italicized portion from the Latin that appears in the original: Ecce gladius 
Domini super terram cito et velociter.   
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they would have done penance for their sins.”18  Repentance and moral reform, the friar warned, 
would not stop the apocalyptic onslaught, but they would offer some protection, even if only in 
the form of martyrdom.  If Florentines did not change their ways, he warned, they should not be 
surprised “afterwards, when the slaughter will come and everything will be in danger.”19  Thus 
prepared, the looming invasion of the French took on immense prophetic significance. Faced 
with an imminent Apocalypse, Florentines drew closer to Savonarola during these tense 
November days.  
 Charles entered Florence on November 17, met by a city that had awaited him with “a 
mixture of fear and wonder.”20  His stay in Florence was tense and the city’s inhabitants had 
prophetic but also practical reasons to fear the king’s wrath.  Florence had opposed his Italian 
campaign and had very recently ousted his new Medici ally.21  Charles himself exacerbated an 
already tense situation by demanding that the government allow Piero’s return and by playing the 
role of the conqueror and insisting on installing himself in the Medici palace.  Politically, the 
situation was defused with the drafting of an alliance between Florence and France and a 
promise on behalf of the city’s officials that they would consider allowing Piero to return.22  Yet, 
when Charles still seemed reluctant to leave, Savonarola was sent to persuade him to move on.  
According to a contemporary chronicler, the friar entered the meeting wielding a crucifix.  He 
explained to Charles that the king was the chosen minister of God and, as such, should be kind to 
Florence and continue his mission to Naples as quickly as possible.23  In conceiving of Charles’ 
mission in this way, Savonarola was drawing on a well-established prophetic tradition, centered 
                                                
18 Savonarola, Haggai, Sermon I, 88. 
19 Savonarola, Haggai, Sermon I, 94. 
20 Bartolommeo Cerretani, a contemporary chronicler, as quoted in: Weinstein, “Millenarianism in a Civic Setting,” 
191. 
21 Weinstein, “Millenarianism in a Civic Setting,” 191.   
22 Najemy, History of Florence, 379-80. 
23 Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, 115.  Weinstein is citing Bartolommeo Cerretani here.   
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on the hope for a second Charlemagne who would prepare the way for the apocalypse by taking 
Italy, renewing the Church, and finally moving East to conquer and convert the infidel, thereby 
reducing “the world to a single sheepfold under one shepherd.”24  For his part, Charles was 
prepared to be persuaded by such an argument.  A major spur for his Italian campaign had been 
apocalyptic fantasies of his role as a Second Charlemagne, recalled to him by exiles from Naples 
in the French court, as well as envoys from Milan.25  Charles and his army promptly left and 
their departure was widely seen as a miracle.26  Savonarola was celebrated by many as the savior 
of the city.   
 Florence had been spared the divine scourge that Savonarola had promised, yet his 
apocalyptic preaching continued.  Now, the dominant theme was earthly renewal, rather than 
worldly annihilation.27  No longer singled out for the worst of the tribulations, Florence would 
now be the site of an apocalyptic rebirth.  Because Florence was “the navel of Italy,”28 this 
spiritual renewal would soon flow outward.  In Christian terms, Florentines were God’s elect, a 
chosen people who would be shielded from the worst of the divine violence.  However, this 
status was not unconditional.  Once again, Savonarola urged Florentines to purify themselves of 
their sins and to “attend to the common good of the city.”29  If Florence heeded Savonarola’s 
apocalyptic plea, its rewards would be temporal, as well as spiritual.  He predicted “Florence will 
                                                
24 Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, 113.  The origins of the myth of a second Charlemagne lie in the preaching 
of the French Franciscan Jean de Roquetaillade.  Writing in the aftermath of the terrible French defeat at Poitiers in 
1356, Roquetaillade predicted an outpouring of divine wrath, as a combination of plagues and popular revolutions 
swept over the earth, stripping the Church of its wealth and paving the way for the rule of Antichrist in Rome and 
Jerusalem.  These terrors would end by 1367, with the rise of a reforming Pope and the election of the King of 
France as Holy Roman Emperor.  The king would be a second Charlemagne, conquering the world and presiding 
over a period of unprecedented peace.  See: Richard Landes, “Millennialism,” in Merriam-Webster’s Encyclopedia 
of World Religions, ed. Wendy Doniger (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 1999), 733. 
25 Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, 112. 
26 Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, 137. 
27 Savonarola scholarship owes much to Donald Weinstein for recognizing this important shift in the friar’s 
preaching.  Savonarola himself obscures this shift in his Compendium Revelationum, in which he offers a 
retrospective account of his apocalyptic preaching.  
28 Girolamo Savonarola, Psalms, Sermon III (January 13, 1495), in Selected Writings, 62. 
29 Girolamo Savonarola, Aggeus, Sermon XIII (December 12, 1494), in Selected Writings, 153. 
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become richer and more powerful than she has ever been, and her empire will expand into many 
places.”30 Yet Savonarola did not abandon the apocalyptic themes of scourge and tribulation.  
Divine violence was a necessary prerequisite for the friar’s promised renewal.  Savonarola 
warned: “God wants to renew His Church—do not doubt this at all—and He will renew it, and 
He will do so with the sword of tribulations—and soon!”31  At best, Florence’s elect status would 
protect the penitent from the worst of the tribulations.  The unrepentant and the unconverted 
would be the primary targets of God’s sword.32  Only after this apocalyptic purge would 
Florence fully realize its chosen status as a New Jerusalem.33       
 The renewal of Florence would be political, as well as spiritual.  As the constitutional 
crisis caused by the forced departure of Piero de’ Medici worsened, Savonarola propelled 
himself into the political arena, marrying prophetic yearning with republican traditions.  The friar 
laid the foundation for this marriage in a series of principles: “that you fear God and seek the 
light of His grace…that no citizen should seek to be first or superior to the others but [all] should 
be content, each within his own degree and limit, as I have said…that the angels and the blessed 
are in Paradise, each within the limits God has given him, without seeking more beyond; in this 
                                                
30 Savonarola, Aggeus, Sermon XIII, 153. 
31 Savonarola, Aggeus, Sermon XIII, p. 153. 
32 Savonarola, Psalms, Sermon III, pp. 69-70 
33 While his historical work on Savonarola is superb, I think that Donald Weinstein confuses matters by classifying 
Savonarola’s “post-Charles” apocalypticism as “postmillenarian.”  Weinstein does this because he sees Savonarola 
as placing “the age of regeneration within historical time, before the Second Coming and the Last Judgment.”  
Based on my review of Savonarola’s sermons, it is not at all clear to me that he can be so easily classified.  First, as 
Weinstein himself notes, while Savonarola urges Florentines toward spiritual reform, he does not think that human 
action alone can bring about the millennium.  Divine intervention is still necessary.  This intervention will come in 
the form of apocalyptic tribulations and violence.  This narrative already separates Savonarola’s message from those 
commonly classified as postmillennial or postmillenarian.  Second, in the sermon from which I quote at the end of 
the paragraph, it seems clear that the spiritual reform Savonarola is urging on Florence is not meant to establish the 
city as a millennial kingdom right away.  Rather, it is to guarantee penitent Florentines some protection from 
imminent apocalyptic violence.  A fully realized millennial kingdom may only be achieved, Savonarola seems to be 
suggesting, after a period of tribulation.  See: Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, 165-6; Savonarola, Psalms, 
Sermon III, 69-70. 
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way you would be an ordered city like the celestial one.”34  He urged Florentines to adopt a holy 
republic, modeled on the Venetian constitution35 and with the Great Council at its heart.36  While 
Savonarola was not the only voice that gave form to the constitution of 1494, he was responsible 
for imbuing with it sacred importance and for locating it within a divine history.37  Yet, while 
Florence was to be a temporal republic, it would also be spiritual monarchy, with Christ as its 
King.38  In practical terms, this meant that Savonarola envisioned a republican government 
imbued with the Christian moral purpose of stamping out sin and initiating social reform.  The 
practice of sodomy was the first target of these reforms, as the councils eliminated fines in favor 
of corporal punishment or death as the price to be paid for this crime.39  This agenda of moral 
reform brought Savonarola support both within the council, and among Florentines more 
broadly.40  The legislative process was not the only way in which Savonarola and his supporters 
instituted their reforms.  When the Great Council found itself unable to initiate the total renewal 
for which Savonarola had hoped, he turned to roving gangs of boys, which targeted prostitutes, 
                                                
34 Girolamo Savonarola, Aggeus, Sermon XXIII (December 28, 1494) in Selected, 167. 
35 On the strange power that the idealized image of Venice exercised on the Florentine political imagination, see: 
J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, 2nd 
edn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 99-103.  As Pocock points out, part of the appeal of the Venetian 
constitutional model might have been its very ambiguity.  To some, it was the paradigmatic mixed government, 
while to others it was an unapologetic aristocracy.   
36 The Great Council was a sovereign legislature comprised of approximately 3,500 citizens whose membership was 
determined based on whether a citizen himself, or his father, grandfather, or great-grandfather had held, or had been 
drawn for, a seat in one of the three main executive offices of the government.   This body had power over elections, 
taxes, and city finances.  For a more detailed account of the political reforms of this period, see: Najemy, History of 
Florence, 381-90. 
37 Najemy, History of Florence, 394. 
38 Savonarola, Aggeus, Sermon XXIII, 171. 
39 Najemy, History of Florence, 395. 
40 It is difficult to estimate the extent of this support.  As Lorenzo Polizzotto rightly points out, contemporary 
estimates of the size of the crowds at Savonarola’s sermons cannot be taken as indicators of the extent of the friar’s 
support.  One cannot assume that attendance at a sermon is necessarily an indicator of support for the religious and 
political ideas advanced by the friar.  We do have an idea of the support that Savonarola had within the Great 
Council.  In December 1494, there were approximately 400 Savonarolans in the Council, accounting for about one-
ninth of total members.  Yet, these estimates may understate the influence Savonarola’s supporters had over 
legislation.  As Polizzotto explains, Savonarola had built up a lot of good will when his prophecies were seen to 
have been fulfilled and when he helped shape the new government.  He also had the support of some Medicean 
factions, whom he had intervened to protect after Piero was ousted.  Finally, there were numerous gifted politicians 
in the Savonarolan ranks who garnered substantial support from different groups.  See: Lorenzo Polizzotto, The 
Elect Nation: The Savonarolan Movement in Florence 1494-1545 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 12-17.     
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homosexuals and the wealthy, urging them toward spiritual reform.41  These very effective 
groups ritually enacted the spiritual purification that Savonarola had promised would ready the 
city for apocalyptic tribulations.  Through political and moral reform, Savonarola and his 
supporters were determined that Florence be transformed into a holy republic, the New 
Jerusalem required for the fulfillment of God’s apocalyptic plans.  
 This agenda of political transformation reveals an interesting ambiguity around the 
question of agency in Savonarola’s apocalyptic thought.  In keeping with Christian doctrine, 
Savonarola casts God as the primary agent of apocalyptic transformation.  The friar is often at 
pains to stress that he is merely God’s messenger.  Referring to his early prophecies of 
apocalyptic tribulation, he stresses, “Not I, but God predicted it to you.”42    Yet this role of 
mediator is more central to the apocalyptic drama than Savonarola sometimes suggests.  He 
explains, “if God had not enlightened me, you would not have been enlightened through my 
many sermons, and you have been enlightened more exclusively than any other place.”43  Just as 
Florentines have been singled out for a special role in the Apocalypse, Savonarola is the chosen 
agent of God, capable of enlightenment so that he in his turn may enlighten.   While the primary 
apocalyptic agent may be God, Savonarola is hardly a mere messenger.  He sees himself as a 
father and a shepherd to a penitent and redeemed Florence.44  But it is in Savonarola’s maternal 
metaphors that one gets the fullest and most interesting glimpse of the friar’s conception of his 
own role in a renewed and politically transformed Florence.  He asks: “Florence, am I also not to 
                                                
41 Violence seems to have been rare in these encounters.  Shaming and the threat of public exposure appear to have 
been the main weapons deployed by these groups of boys.  Richard Trexler suggests: “Though the friar recognized 
the boys’ very potential for violence deterred immorality, he counted on less violent inducements: the threat of 
official action, the shame perpetrators felt when they behaved immorally in the presence of children, and most 
significant, the example that the boys showed adults.  In perfect marching order, small bands of innocents moved 
from place to place with saintly manners and dress, impressing their own innocence upon their elders.”  See: 
Richard C. Trexler, Public Life in Renaissance Florence (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 475. 
42 Savonarola, Haggai, Sermon I, 89. 
43 Savonarola, Haggai, Sermon I, 89. 
44 Savonarola, Haggai, Sermon I, 91-2. 
 88 
you like a mother to her little child?  I have suffered and suffer many pains and many afflictions 
to give you birth and to lead you to Christ.  I have also been like your wet-nurse in raising you 
and counseling you about what is good for you and about your health.”45  Thus, while he could 
never abandon a commitment to God as an omnipotent agent in the apocalyptic drama, 
Savonarola nonetheless carves out a central role for himself in the tribulations and renewal of 
Florence.         
 In conceptualizing this as a “Savonarolan moment,”46 I do not mean to suggest that the 
apocalyptic enthusiasm that captured the Florentine imagination was completely defined by the 
spiritual and political aspirations of a single man or bounded by the very brief period between the 
beginning of Savonarola’s apocalyptic preaching in 1490 and his execution eight years later.  
Rather, I am drawing on J.G.A. Pocock’s theorization of a “moment” in general and “the 
Machiavellian moment” of republican founding in particular.  Pocock asks us to interpret the 
Machiavellian moment in two ways.  The first is rhetorical and experiential: 
It is asserted that certain enduring patterns in the temporal consciousness of 
medieval and early modern Europeans led to the presentation of the republic, and 
the citizen’s participation in it, as constituting a problem in historical self-
understanding, with which Machiavelli and his contemporaries can be seen both 
explicitly and implicitly contending.  It became crucial in their times and 
remained so, largely as a result of what they did with it, for two or three centuries 
afterwards.  Their struggle with this problem is presented as historically real, 
though as one selected aspect of the complex historical reality of their thought; 
and their ‘moment’ is defined as that in which they confronted the problem grown 
crucial.47 
 
                                                
45 Savonarola, Haggai, Sermon I, 92-3. 
46 I am borrowing the term from Marcia L. Colish, who is of course playing on J.G.A. Pocock’s “Machiavellian 
moment.”  See: Marcia L. Colish, “Republicanism, Religion, and Machiavelli’s Savonarolan Moment,” Journal of 
the History of Ideas 60, no. 4 (1999): 597-616. 
47 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, vii-viii.   
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Here, a “moment” refers to the manner in which the problem of the republic’s instability within 
time “made its appearance.”48 The relationship between the republic and its citizens is presented 
“as constituting a problem in historical self-understanding.”  However, the manner in which the 
these problems make their appearance is not simply a reflection of “historical reality”; rather, it 
is in itself “historically real.”   
 Nevertheless, Pocock seems at pains to distinguish between the rhetorical and 
experiential qualities of the Machiavellian moment and “the problem itself.”  In its second sense, 
then, the Machiavellian moment is:  
A name for the moment in conceptualized time in which the republic was seen as 
confronting its own temporal finitude, attempting to remain morally and 
politically stable in a stream of irrational events conceived as essentially 
destructive of all systems of secular stability.  In the language which had been 
developed for the purpose, this was spoken of as the confrontation of ‘virtue’ with 
‘fortune’ and ‘corruption’ and the study of Florentine thought is the study of how 
Machiavelli and his contemporaries pursued the intimations of these words.49  
  
Here, a moment is the historical point at which the republic is threatened with collapse.  The 
early sixteenth century in Florence was one such moment, though not the only one.  This second 
interpretation of a moment, however, is intimately bound to the first.  The historical 
circumstance of the republic at a given point in time is mediated through the language of 
“virtue,” “fortune,” and “corruption.”  The “problem itself” can never be fully separated from the 
manner of its presentation.50 
  Similarly, when I use the term “Savonarolan moment,” I mean to describe both the 
historical point at which an apocalyptic transformation of Florence seemed possible in the late 
fifteenth through early sixteenth centuries and the manner in which this possibility “made its 
                                                
48 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, vii.  
49 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, viii.   
50 The discussion in the previous two paragraphs draws on the analysis of Helge Jordheim, “Conceptual History 
Between Chronos and Kairos—The Case of ‘Empire,’” Redescriptions: Yearbook of Political Thought and 
Conceptual History 11 (2007), eds. K. Lindroos and Kari Palonen: 116-8.   
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appearance” and was presented.  The invasion of Charles VIII, for instance, appears against the 
backdrop of an apocalyptic imaginary that expected an imminent end to the known world.  The 
historical moment of the invasion is also rhetorically and imaginatively constituted as a sign that 
this transformation is now at hand. Like the Machiavellian moment, the Savonarolan moment is 
an attempt to find meaning and understanding in the face of radical contingency.51   That is, both 
wrestle with the combination of political indeterminacy, conditionality, and uncertainty.52  
Political outcomes like institutional corruption or invasion by outside forces could have been 
different.  These outcomes are also conditional on a host of other factors, many of which we do 
not understand.  This makes it difficult to predict or even explain political outcomes.  In the face 
of these difficulties, we are left with the paralyzing sense that many of the events which shape 
our collective lives are underdetermined.  The Machiavellian and Savonarolan moments grapple 
differently with this kind of radical contingency.  The former seeks to restore the virtuous 
principles of the republic within secular time and to shore up the polity against the prospect of 
future corruption.  The latter seeks an apocalyptic break with secular time and to prepare the 
polity to take a leading role in bringing history to a close.53   
 Just as Machiavelli was only “one of a number of greater and lesser men engrossed in the 
common pursuit” of republican founding, Savonarola was only one of many figures captivated 
by the apocalyptic imaginary. His eponymous moment both predated and survived him.  The 
friar’s apocalyptic message took form in the context of a much larger revival of biblical 
prophecy in Italy.  Much of this revival consisted of a renewed interest in the apocalyptic 
                                                
51 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, vii-viii. 
52 I draw this three-part understanding of contingency from Andreas Schedler, who argues that indeterminacy, 
conditionality, and uncertainty are the three conceptual pillars of “the semantic architecture of ‘contingency.’”  See: 
Andreas Schedler, “Mapping Contingency,” in Political Contingency: Studying the Unexpected, the Accidental, and 
the Unforeseen, eds. Ian Shapiro and Sonu Bedi (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 70.    
53 Savonarola had republican commitments himself, to be sure, but his vision of a republican polity was never an end 
in itself.  Rather, it was the necessarily worldly preparation for a cosmic transformation.   
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prophecies of Joachim of Fiore, a twelfth-century Calabrian abbot, who proposed a Trinitarian 
model of history in which humankind would be bought to full fruition after a period of false 
leadership by a priestly Antichrist and apocalyptic tribulations.54  Joachimism had been nurtured 
in late medieval Florence and was still very much in circulation in the late fifteenth century, as 
can be seen in the outpouring of Joachite prophecy during the approach of Charles VIII’s 
forces.55  As Marjorie Reeves, a prominent Joachim scholar notes, “the Joachimist marriage of 
woe and exaltation exactly fitted the mood of late fifteenth century Italy,” where the humanist 
golden age was confronting widespread apocalyptic expectation.56  While Savonarola was not a 
close follower of Joachim and lacked the latter’s sophisticated understanding of sacred history, 
the friar did draw on the well-established Joachimist “juxtaposition of tribulation and renewal,” 
as well as the prophecies of a Second Charlemagne that had developed among the Calabrian 
abbot’s more recent followers.57 
 Savonarola was also by no means the only apocalyptic preacher in late fifteenth century 
Florence.  When contemporary chronicler Piero Parenti noted the growth of terrifying 
apocalyptic preaching in Florence, he was not referring to Savonarola, but rather to the 
Franciscan Domenico da Ponzo. 58   In this climate of apocalypticism, preachers vied for 
audiences.  Those offering milder fare saw their crowds dwindle, “a fate which apparently befell 
                                                
54 On the role of the Antichrist in Joachim’s thought, see: Bernard McGinn, Antichrist: Two Thousand Years of the 
Human Fascination with Evil (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 135-142.  On Joachim’s thought in its 
fullest form, see: Marjorie Reeves, Joachim of Fiore and the Prophetic Future (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 
1976). 
55 Reeves, Joachim of Fiore, 88. 
56 Marjorie Reeves, The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages: A Study in Joachimism (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 431. 
57 Reeves, Joachim of Fiore, 89.  There is little evidence that Savonarola was well-read in the works of Joachim or 
his followers.  At times, the friar went out of his way to distance himself from a connection to Joachim, perhaps 
because the church hierarchy saw the latter as having a dangerously revolutionary potential.  Savonarola’s 
engagement in worldly affairs also distances him from Joachim, who seems to have been content constructing 
elaborate prophetic conceptions of sacred history.  Nevertheless, Marjorie Reeves concludes that despite these 
differences, “there can be little doubt that [Savonarola] belonged within the [Joachimite] prophetic tradition.”  
Reeves, Joachim of Fiore, 90.  See also: Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, 95-6, 159, 175. 
58 Piero Parenti, as quoted in Najemy, History of Florence, 375. 
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the preachers of Santo Spirito and Santa Croce as well as the former Medici favorite, Fra 
Mariano.  The message of flagello and repentance was the order of the day.”59  Florence was 
being whipped up into a state of semiotic arousal, wherein everything became a sign, a 
meaningful message about how the apocalyptic drama would unfold.60  When a lightning bolt 
struck the cathedral shortly before the death of Lorenzo de’ Medici in April 1492, Savonarola 
interpreted the event as a sign of an imminent divine scourge.  Fra Domenico went even further, 
giving Florentines an August deadline to change their ways.  If Florence did not repent, the 
streets would be rivers of blood.61  Even Machiavelli concluded in retrospect that the lightning 
damage had been a sign that Lorenzo’s “death would lead to the greatest calamities.”62  
Savonarola was but one influential voice among many, drawing out the signs of God’s imminent 
irruption into human history. 
 Savonarola’s message also drew from well-established older conceptions of Florentine 
identity.  The notion of Florence as an elect nation with a special place in sacred history had been 
well-developed in previous centuries.  In the first written history of Florence, the thirteenth-
century Chronica de origine civitatis, the city’s special destiny is connected to its Roman origins, 
its position as a parva Roma, or “little Rome.”63  The Chronica also suggests that Florence had 
previously been reborn from the rubble of a divine scourge that had happened five hundred years 
after her founding.64  While in the Chronica the city is rebuilt by the Romans, in a fourteenth 
century account the Emperor Charlemagne is the agent of this rebirth.  Here we see the origins of 
                                                
59 Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, 126. 
60 I am borrowing the term ‘semiotic arousal’ from Richard Landes, “Roosters Crow, Owls Hoot: On the Dynamics 
of Apocalyptic Millennialism” in War in Heaven/Heaven on Earth: Theories of the Apocalyptic, eds. Stephen D. 
O’Leary and Glen S. McGhee London: Equinox, 2005), 33. 
61 Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence, 127. 
62 Niccolò Machiavelli, The History of Florence, 8.36 in The Chief Works and Others, vol. 3, trans. Allan Gilbert 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 1434. 
63 Weinstein, “The Myth of Florence,” 21. 
64 Weinstein, “The Myth of Florence,” 21. 
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the linked destinies of France and Florence in apocalyptic prophecy.  By the late fourteenth 
century, sources indicate that the city ceases to be a little Rome and assumes a special 
apocalyptic destiny in her own right.  Various radical religious elements, furiously reworking 
Joachite ideas to suit the needs of a divinely chosen city, kept these prophecies alive.  And, as 
Donald Weinstein has shown, these prophetic elements were blended with conceptions of good 
government into “a single vision which seems to have functioned both as a model of a civic 
ethos and a promise of ultimate rewards.”65  It is this history of Florentine self-identity, at once 
prophetic and republican, that inflects Savonarola’s later apocalyptic sermons.   
 Despite these connections to established prophetic traditions and conceptions of 
Florentine self-identity, it might still be tempting to see the Savonarolan moment as a marginal 
or fringe reaction to what would retrospectively be called the Renaissance.  Such a conclusion 
would be misguided.  The Savonarolan moment, particularly in its hopes for an apocalyptic 
rebirth, participated in and drew from the humanism that has come to define this period in 
Florentine history.  The notion of an enlightened people emerging from a period of darkness and 
ushering in a new age blended easily with the Savonarolan apocalyptic imaginary.  Florentine 
exceptionalism lay at the center of the humanist conception of the city as a special place where 
history, culture, and art flourished as they could nowhere else.66  Savonarola received broad 
support from humanist philosophers like Pico della Mirandola, Oliviero Arduini, and Marsilio 
Ficino.67  The latter proclaimed Savonarola a divine agent whose prophecies had been fulfilled 
                                                
65 Weinstein, “The Myth of Florence,” 35. 
66 Weinstein, “Millenarianism in a Civic Setting,” 196.  
67 Another reason for the close connection between Savonarola and some humanist philosophers was the friar’s 
interest in skepticism.  Savonarola arranged for a complete translation of the writings of Sextus Empiricus and 
showed a deep interest in classical works.  The skeptics’ claims about the unreliability of natural knowledge suited 
Savonarola’s prophetic cause.  He argued, often with philosophical sophistication, that the only reliable knowledge 
was that provided by revelation.  See: R.H. Popkin, “Savonarola and Cardinal Ximines: Millenarian Thinkers and 
Actors at the Eve of the Reformation,” in Millenarianism and Messianism in Early Modern European Culture, vol. 
2, ed. Karl A. Kottman (Boston: Kluwer, 2001), 16-20. 
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and even welcomed Charles VIII to Florence with an oration proclaiming the king as a second 
Charlemagne. 68   Ficino later rejected Savonarola, but he did so within the apocalyptic 
imaginary—denouncing the friar as the Antichrist, who had led Florence astray.69 
While this philosophical following demonstrates that Savonarola’s messages resonated 
with learned humanists, it is in the paintings of the period that we can most clearly see how the 
friar’s apocalyptic preaching drew on and contributed to a shared imaginary.  Sandro Botticelli’s 
connections to Savonarola have been well-established by art historians.70  The artist was a devout 
follower of the friar and even threw some of his own paintings in one of the Savonarola’s 
bonfires of the vanities.  Botticelli’s Mystic Nativity (1500/1) (see Figure 1) bears an inscription 
filled with apocalyptic anxiety and hope: “I Sandro painted this picture at the end of the year 
1500 in the troubles of Italy in the half time after the time according to the eleventh chapter of St 
John in the second woe of the Apocalypse in the loosing of the devil for three and a half years.  
Then he will be chained in the twelfth chapter and we shall see him trodden down as in this 
picture.”71  While Botticelli’s Crucifixion (1498-1500) (see Figure 2) does not offer a similar 
inscription, it renders in visual and visceral form the scourge so often promised by Savonarola.  
Behind the crucified Jesus are fiery brands shooting downward from the skies and the city of 
Florence, bathed in light and partially protected from tribulation.72  
     
 
 
                                                
68 Nancy Bisaha, Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 41.  Bisaha does an excellent job tracing the medieval roots of a sustained interest in 
Charlemagne in Renaissance Europe, particularly among humanists.   
69 Marsilio Ficino, Apologia contra Savonarolam, in Selected Writings, 355-9. 
70 See, for instance: Rab Hatfield, “Botticelli’s Mystic Nativity, Savonarola and the Millennium,” Journal of the 
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 58 (1995): 89-114. 
71 The translation of the Greek is from Weinstein, “Myth of Florence,” 15. 
72 Weinstein, “Myth of Florence,” 16-17.   
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Figure 1: Sandro Botticelli, Mystic Nativity, 1500-1501.  The National 
Gallery, London. 
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Figure 2: Sandro Botticelli, Crucifixion, 1497-8.  Fogg Museum of Art, 
Harvard University. 
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Even more visceral renderings of the apocalyptic imaginary can be found in Signorelli’s 
apocalypse at Orvieto (1499-1502) (Figures 3 and 4). The multi-panel sequence visually 
interprets the apocalyptic events foretold in Revelation.  One panel depicts the Antichrist pausing 
mid-sermon  to receive intimate instructions from the devil.  In another panel, winged demons 
torment the damned before forcing them into the fiery pits of hell.  This remarkable sequence 
blends the typical Renaissance attention to the glory of the human form with shocking divine 
violence.  These images speak to a Renaissance to which scholars give too little attention—one 
captured by an apocalyptic imaginary that saw totalizing divine violence as a prerequisite for 
spiritual rebirth. 
 Savonarola was executed in 1498 by the government which he helped to shape.  Accused 
of false prophecy and even heresy, he was publicly burned alive.73  Yet the apocalyptic 
imaginary to which he gave an enduring voice took on an independent life.  Signs of the 
apocalypse were being spotted everywhere in Italy, from the anxiety about the arrival of the 
Antichrist in 1500 to apocalyptic interpretations of the sack of Rome in 1527.   Savonarola’s 
apocalyptic prophecy imposed a divine order on the crisis and contingency that characterized 
Florentine politics at the end of sixty years of Medici rule.  He held out the promise of an escape 
for a small elect from the frightening unpredictability of power politics.   Savonarola did not 
offer the repentant complete protection from God’s totalizing apocalyptic violence, but rather the 
promise that their suffering would be made meaningful through an apocalyptic rebirth.  Drawing 
on the hopes and fears of Florentines, Savonarola rendered imaginable that most unimaginable of  
  
                                                
73 Savonarola had made a number of enemies in the mid to late 1490s, not the least of whom was Pope Alexander 
VI, who excommunicated the friar.  In 1498, tensions between Savonarolan and anti-Savonarolan factions in 
Florence came to a head.  Savonarola was arrested and subsequently admitted under torture that his prophecies were 
false.  He was then questioned by Alexander’s emissaries and condemned as a heretic before being hanged and 
burned alive with two of his associates.   
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   Figure 3: Luca Signorelli, Apocalypse Sequence, 1499-1502.  Cappella di San Brizio, 
Orvieto. 
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Figure 4: Luca Signorelli, Apocalypse Sequence, 1499-1502. Cappella di San 
Brizio, Orvieto. 
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events—the irruption of God into secular time.  In so doing, he channeled an apocalyptic 
imaginary that would continue to exert its power over Italy long after his death. 
 
Flirting with Apocalypse: Machiavelli’s Savonarolan Moment 
In this section of the chapter, I try to demonstrate that this Savonarolan moment of 
apocalyptic enthusiasm had a profound effect on Machiavelli.  Yet perhaps the possibility of 
such an influence might strike some as strange.  Is Machiavelli not the theorist (even celebrator) 
of naked and violent power politics?  Is he not the first truly modern political theorist, an 
unabashed realist who seeks a clean break from medieval religious statecraft?74 Would he not be 
suspicious of or condescending toward Savonarola’s claims that he received knowledge through 
revelation rather than through sober assessment of political reality? 
As long as we maintain these caricatures of these two men, one as a politically impotent 
and utopian friar and the other as a modern theorist of power, the only possible way to 
conceptualize Machiavelli’s engagement with Savonarola is to see it as dismissive and even 
contemptuous. 75   There is textual evidence that can be marshaled to support such an 
interpretation, but it is by no means unambiguous.  By revisiting what appear to be the two 
                                                
74 This claim is made by a variety of political theorists, with vastly different intellectual agendas, seeking to 
construct a grand narrative of the history of political thought.  See, for instance: Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); Leo Strauss, “The Three Waves of Modernity,” in Hilail Gildin (ed.) 
An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo Strauss (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 
81-98; Harvey C. Mansfield, Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Sheldon S. Wolin, 
Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, expanded edn. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 175-213.   
75 Marcia L. Colish offers one of the more bold and interesting versions of this argument (and one that tends less to 
caricature than some others).  Colish claims that, contrary to a widely held scholarly opinion, Machiavelli is not anti-
Christian.  Rather, in every passage in which Machiavelli appears to be making an argument against Christianity, he 
is actually trying to undermine Savonarola.  The reason for this, Colish suggests, is that Machiavelli wanted to 
strongly defend his own republicanism against the Savonarolan alternative (both of which were themselves 
alternatives to a version of republicanism espoused by the ottimati.  I find Colish’s position a difficult one to 
support, given both the variety of Machiavelli’s statements on Savonarola and the depth and complexity of his views 
on Christianity.  See: Colish, “Machiavelli’s Savonarolan Moment,” 600-1. 
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strongest instances of Machiavelli’s negative assessment of Savonarola, I aim to open space to 
consider the way in which the hopes of the friar became the exhortations of the political theorist.        
We find Machiavelli’s most apparently negative assessment of Savonarola in a letter he 
wrote to Ricciardo Becchi, the Florentine ambassador to Rome, on March 9, 1498.  In June of 
the previous year, Pope Alexander VI, whom Savonarola had “repeatedly denounced as the 
embodiment of a corrupt and fallen church,” had excommunicated the friar and temporarily 
silenced him.76  However, the defiant Savonarola resumed preaching in February 1498, once 
again drawing large crowds.   Machiavelli attended two of the friar’s sermons on Exodus.  
According to his report, the first of these reassured Savonarola’s followers that while they, like 
the Israelites, were being oppressed, God was on their side and their numbers would multiply.  
The second suggested that there was an unnamed tyrant in Florence who was persecuting 
Savonarola and his followers.  Machiavelli provides Becchi with an account of the content of 
these sermons, as well as a description of their effect on the friar’s audiences.  Machiavelli is 
particularly concerned with a shift that occurred in Savonarola’s sermons—from fear of an 
unnamed potential tyrant in Florence to sharp criticism of the Pope.  This shift, argues 
Machiavelli, is purely opportunistic.  The friar has simply “changed coats” and, in Machiavelli’s 
judgment, he “acts in accordance with the times and colors his lies accordingly.”77  One could 
see this assessment in an entirely negative light, as a condemnation of the friar’s blatant 
hypocrisy.  Yet I think such a judgment is too hasty.  Elsewhere, Machiavelli sees an ability to 
change with the times as a rare virtù.78  The ability to “color” one’s “lies accordingly,” and to do 
so as successfully as Savonarola has, suggests some skill in cultivating appearances, which is 
                                                
76 Najemy, History of Florence, 397. 
77 Letter from Niccolò Machiavelli to Ricciardo Becchi, 9 March 1498, in Machiavelli and His Friends: Their 
Personal Correspondence, trans. James B. Atkinson and David Sices (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 
2004), 10. 
78 This is a recurrent theme in The Prince. 
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also a virtù that Machiavelli deems praiseworthy.79  Furthermore, the detail and analysis that 
Machiavelli provides in the letter suggests that he takes Savonarola seriously as an important 
political actor.   
At the very least, some might suggest that Machiavelli’s assessment reduces Savonarola’s 
prophecy to the status of mere lies.  It is certainly true that Machiavelli denies Savonarola’s 
claim to a prophetic status here.  In other works, however, he was more restrained.  For instance, 
in the First Decennale (1504), he states simply that Savonarola was “inspired with heavenly 
virtù.”80  Focusing more on the factional outcomes of Savonarolan rhetoric than on its truth 
claims, Machiavelli nonetheless accepts the friar’s heavenly inspiration as a given.  In the 
Discourses on Livy (1516-1518?), Machiavelli addresses the question more overtly.  He recounts 
that the people of Florence were convinced of Savonarola’s prophetic status, believing that the 
friar spoke with God.  Rather than denying this claim, or reducing it to a lie, Machiavelli refrains 
from judgment.  While he notes that there was no evidence to support Savonarola’s claim, he 
also writes that he does not “wish to judge whether it is true or not, because one should speak 
with reverence of such a man.”81  There is a remarkable echo here of Machiavelli’s earlier 
assessment of Moses in The Prince, whose prophetic status is not up for debate.  We must simply 
admire Moses “for that grace which made him deserving of speaking with God.”82  Thus, in 
Machiavelli’s later discussions of Savonarola in The First Decennalle and The Discourses we 
see a reluctance to pass judgment and an openness to the possibility that his claims to prophecy 
                                                
79 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), ch. 
18, 68-71. 
80 Niccolò Machiavelli, First Decennale, in Chief Works and Others, vol. 3, lines 157-9, 1448.  Allan Gilbert 
translates “virtù” as “vigor” in this passage. 
81 Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), I.12, 36. 
82 Machiavelli, Prince, ch. 6, 22. 
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might be more than just “lies.”  Seen in this light, Machiavelli’s apparently negative assessment 
of Savonarola in the letter to Becchi is more complex than it initially seems. 
Fifteen years after his letter to Becchi, Machiavelli considers Savonarola once again in 
The Prince.  Here, Savonarola is the paradigmatic unarmed prophet.  While the friar successfully 
used his powers of prophetic persuasion to establish “new orders” in Florence, he had no 
recourse to violent force when his persuasive powers expired.  While people may be easily 
persuaded at first, it is “difficult to keep them in that persuasion.  And thus things must be 
ordered in such a mode that when they no longer believe, one can make them believe by force.”83  
Unfortunately, Savonarola “had no [way to hold] firm those who had believed nor for making 
unbelievers believe.”84  It is certainly possible to see Machiavelli’s assessment here as a wholly 
negative one that suggests a fundamental lack of political acumen on Savonarola’s part.  Yet, 
once again, I think Machiavelli’s assessment is more complex.  Savonarola is in the best of 
company in this chapter of The Prince, grouped alongside the great founding legislators of myth 
and history—Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus.  Machiavelli is recognizing Savonarola as a 
(re)founder of a state, a role that the Florentine thinker holds in the highest regard.  Savonarola’s 
ultimate goal is not in question here.  Rather, it is only his mode of action that opens him to 
criticism.  He has no other means of maintaining himself than by keeping the support of the 
masses, who are by nature variable.85  Seen in this way, Machiavelli’s famous assessment of 
Savonarola in The Prince is less a condemnation of the friar’s lack of political skill, and more a 
tribute to what this refounder tried to do and a lamentation of his failure.  These reassessments of 
Machiavelli’s most seemingly negative judgments of Savonarola open a space in which we can 
consider the potentially vital connection between the friar and the political theorist.    
                                                
83 Machiavelli, Prince, ch. 6, 24. 
84 Machiavelli, Prince, ch. 6, 24.  Mansfield translates the passage as “had no mode for holding firm.”   
85 Thierry Ménissier, “Prophétie, politique et action selon Machiavel,” Les études philosophiques 66 (2003): 305. 
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 This connection is on fullest display in the final chapter of The Prince, “An Exhortation 
to Seize Italy and to Free Her from the Barbarians.”  This is a chapter that has posed numerous 
problems for those wanting to cast Machiavelli solely as an empirical and detached political 
analyst.  The exhortation’s passionate and biblical language suggests an author whose apparent 
pragmatism has been overcome by a strange world of prophetic signs.  Machiavelli begins the 
chapter by explaining that he has now reached a point in the work where he must consider 
“whether in Italy at present the times have been tending to the honor of a new prince, and 
whether there is matter to give opportunity [occasione] to someone prudent and virtuoso to 
introduce a form that would bring honor to him and good to the community of men.”86  The 
Florentine thinker wastes no time in offering his answer: “it appears to me that so many things 
are tending to the benefit of a new prince that I do not know what time has ever been more apt 
for it.”87  This time, suggests Machiavelli, is an extraordinary one, an occasione that calls for 
action.  Historically, 1513 was indeed a period of crisis and upheaval in Florentine politics, but 
perhaps not one of any apparent extraordinary significance.  The Medici had been brought back 
to power in the previous year by some of the city’s radical ottimati, aided by Pope Julius and a 
Spanish army.  It was becoming apparent that this was not simply a return to the pre-1494 status 
quo, but rather “something different, more autocratic, less bound to Florentine political 
tradition.”88  Like the period of crisis in which Savonarola wrote, Machiavelli issues his 
exhortation at a time when the foundations of Florentine domestic politics have been shaken and 
the city has found itself once again at the mercy of foreign armies.  And, like the friar, 
                                                
86 Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. 26, 101-2.  Rather than translating virtù as “virtue” and virtuoso as “virtuous”, as 
Mansfield does in this translation, I prefer to render the words in their original Italian in order to clearly signal their 
central and contested place in Machiavelli’s work. 
87 Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. 26, 102. 
88 Najemy, History of Florence, 414. 
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Machiavelli turns what might otherwise have been yet another political crisis into an 
extraordinary moment of rupture that he hopes will inaugurate a radically new future.   
 Yet it is not just upheaval and uncertainty that make this the most apt time for princely 
intervention.  Rather, it is what Machiavelli casts as the complete degradation of Italy that 
provides the appropriate occasione for an extraordinary and prophetic act.  For the virtù of 
Moses to be made visible, it was necessary “that the people of Israel be enslaved in Egypt.”  
Similarly, for the virtù of the Italian spirit to be made manifest, it is necessary “that Italy be 
reduced to the condition in which she is at present, which is more enslaved than the Hebrews, 
more servile than the Persians, more dispersed than the Athenians, without a head, without order, 
beaten, despoiled, torn, pillaged, and having endured ruin of very sort.”89  Here, Machiavelli is 
picking up a theme that he had begun developing in chapter 6, where he explains that Fortune 
provides virtuoso founders with an occasione for action.  For Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus, this 
occasione consisted in finding their people devastated or dispersed.90  In his Exhortation, 
Machiavelli makes the shocking assertion that the suffering of Italians is even worse than that of 
the Israelites, Persians, and Athenians.  It is an occasione without precedent that demands an 
extraordinary act.  
The nature of this act is both prophetic and apocalyptic.  Machiavelli is not merely calling 
for a great founder here.  He is hoping for a redemptive prince, someone to save Italy “from 
these barbarous cruelties and insults”91—to give form to the matter of a suffering people.  The 
entire chapter is suffused with the language of redemption.  Like Savonarola, Machiavelli offers 
various signs from God that the moment for an extraordinary rebirth is at hand.  Beyond the 
‘empirical’ signs of Italy’s devastation, there are the allegorical signs taken from Exodus: “the 
                                                
89 Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. 26, 102. 
90 Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. 26, 23. 
91 Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. 26, 102. 
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sea has opened; a cloud has escorted you along the way; the stone has poured forth water; here 
manna has rained; everything has concurred in your greatness.”92  Not only do these signs 
indicate the existence of an extraordinary moment, they also suggest that the Italians are a chosen 
people, the Israelites of the Renaissance.  They are an elect people—chosen to suffer so that they 
could be redeemed. 
 Lest these signs be dismissed as the accidents of a world governed by contingency, God 
or Fortuna must provide a prophet to explain them.  Savonarola saw himself as a prophet chosen 
by God to interpret the signs of a coming apocalypse to a Florence undergoing a scourge and 
eventual rebirth.  The friar offered Florentines a narrative that located the crises of the present in 
a Christian eschatological drama in which suffering would be redeemed in the establishment of a 
New Jerusalem with Christ as its king.  Machiavelli attempts to draw out a prophetic figure 
capable of a similar interpretive endeavor.  He calls for a redemptive prince who is capable of 
giving meaning to Italy’s degradation by locating it within a redemptive eschatology in which 
violence and suffering are the necessary prerequisites for a collective rebirth.  The “barbarous 
cruelties” that Italy has endured demand both a meaning and an end.  It is unbearable, 
Machiavelli seems to be suggesting, that such suffering be yet another accident of an inscrutable 
Fortune.  It cries out for a prophetic, and ultimately apocalyptic, interpretation. 
   Yet, similar to Savonarola’s prophetic message, the boundary between interpreting and 
enacting an apocalypse is blurred here.  Savonarola confuses the question of apocalyptic agency 
by casting himself, on the one hand, as merely a messenger who announces events that will be 
carried out by God and, on the other, as an agent of Florence’s sacred transformation.  In the 
final chapter of The Prince, Machiavelli puts God in the role he had assigned to Fortune in the 
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previous chapters.  God signals an occasione for apocalyptic rebirth by offering signs that the 
present is an extraordinary time.  However, “the remainder” the redemptive prince must do 
himself.  “God does not want to do everything, so as not to take free will from us and that part of 
the glory that falls to us.”93  The redemptive prince must become an agent of the apocalyptic 
transformation.  Machiavelli effectively destroys the line between the prophetic interpreter and 
the divine actor.  The redemptive prince here boldly takes on the role that even Savonarola could 
never quite leave entirely to God—that of actually carrying out the apocalyptic transformation.  
His success is guaranteed both by his prophetic ability to persuade others of the truth of his 
interpretation and by a divine ability to enact the apocalypse.           
Just as Savonarola promised spiritual as well as temporal rewards to a chosen Florence, 
Machiavelli offers his redeemer prince not only divine favor but also unparalleled political 
power, buttressed by unconditional love and obedience.  He concludes: “I cannot express with 
what love he would be received in all those provinces that have suffered from these floods from 
outside; with what thirst for revenge, with what obstinate faith, with what piety, with what tears.  
What doors would be closed to him?  What peoples would deny him obedience?  What envy 
would oppose him?  What Italian would deny him homage?”94  This is a very important, yet 
strikingly peculiar, promise.  No longer would the support of the masses be variable.  
Machiavelli offers the prophetic hope of a profound human transformation that would alter the 
people’s very nature.  Like the biblical and Savonarolan apocalypses, Machiavelli’s revelation 
ends in a millennium defined by absolute power and absolute love.  This love is “a spontaneous 
submission to the prince’s redemptive power: an acknowledgement of, and surrender to, his 
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transformative omnipotence.”95  In Italy’s eschaton, the people thus offer themselves up for a 
sacred transformation after which the absolute power of the redemptive prince is guaranteed by 
the absolute love of the radically altered masses.  It marks an end to the contingency that defines 
the political world. 
 While this apocalyptic exhortation participates in and transforms the rhetoric of the 
Savonarolan moment, it seems to many to be fundamentally inconsistent with the rest of The 
Prince.  Surely, this is just an emotional outburst from a patriotic Italian.  Perhaps it was even 
added later with the sole purpose of gaining the favor of the newly returned Medici.96  Yet, what 
would it mean to take this exhortation seriously?  What might we uncover if we examine it in 
relation to the preceding chapters?  Such an examination reveals that it is not at all peculiar that 
The Prince should end in such an exhortation.  Even more boldly, I might suggest that there 
hardly seems a way in which The Prince could end in anything other than an apocalypse. 
 As Machiavelli casts it, the purpose of The Prince is to offer illuminating historical 
examples and to extract from them meaningful political wisdom, or a set of rules for behavior 
worthy of imitation or avoidance.97  Machiavelli offers his “knowledge of the actions of great 
men, learned by me from long experience with modern things and a continuous reading of 
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ancient ones.”  He suggests that he has “thought out and examined these things with great 
diligence,” filtering them and reducing them “to one small volume.”98  The promise here is 
therefore of a distillation of historical examples into general rules—a systematic study to render 
the apparent contingency of history and politics intelligible and useful.  Initially, The Prince 
seems to deliver on this promise.  The chapters in the first half of the work are characterized by 
obsessively neat and contained categories.  Principalities are either hereditary or new.  They are 
acquired through virtue, Fortune, or crime.  Machiavelli is doing his utmost to keep analytical 
divisions precise and separate.  Similarly, the lessons derived from historical and contemporary 
examples seem clear and categorical.  Would-be conquerors must either eliminate or inhabit 
republics in order to hold them.99  “Those who become princes from private individual solely by 
fortune become so with little trouble, but maintain themselves with much.”100  In the early 
chapters of The Prince, Machiavelli is desperately trying to fulfill the work’s initial promise to 
give meaning to history and render the political world intelligible by wrenching lessons from its 
apparent contingency.  
 As the work proceeds, however, this intelligibility breaks down.  Rules that had 
previously been extracted from history and expressed with unambiguous clarity are now 
increasingly qualified.  Machiavelli is finding it necessary to complicate generalizations and 
modify rules.  The project of historical and political intelligibility has begun turning back on 
itself.101  Chapter 17 offers an illustrative example.  At the heart of the chapter is an apparently 
unambiguous lesson—it is better for a prince to be feared than loved.  Yet, as the chapter moves 
forward, the rule becomes more and more qualified, and ultimately less clear.  After invoking 
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Cesare Borgia’s reputation for cruelty, which brought unity and peace to the Romagna, 
Machiavelli goes on to suggest that the prince should nonetheless “proceed in a temperate 
manner with prudence and humanity.”102  While the prince should make himself feared, he 
should do so “in such a way that if he does not acquire love, he escapes hatred.”103  The prince 
should deploy cruelty, but “he must abstain from the property of others.”104  While cruelty 
toward one’s people should be tempered, a prince should not be so limited when dealing with his 
soldiers.  The “inhuman cruelty” of Hannibal should be imitated because it promoted unity and 
discipline.105 Not all of the rhetorical moves that Machiavelli makes in this chapter involve a 
qualification of its central rule.  Yet the number of qualifications is suggestive of the thinker’s 
difficulty in extracting clear guidelines from historical experience.  This chapter provides an 
example of how Machiavelli’s “conceptual clarity becomes more visibly overgrown.”106   
We can trace a similar breakdown in Machiavelli’s attempt to grapple with the idea of 
Fortune.  As a political theorist, Machiavelli has tried to render the political world intelligible 
and in so doing has attempted to provide the princely man of action with the knowledge 
necessary to deploy his virtù to pull order and glory from apparent contingency.  In the final 
chapters of The Prince, Machiavelli turns to a focused consideration of how this might be done.  
To be sure, he has examined the interplay of virtù and Fortuna in earlier chapters.  But, with the 
exception of chapter 6, which foregrounds themes and ideas developed toward the end of the 
work, virtù tends to be conceptualized as a kind of “enabling talent”107 and autonomy, while 
Fortuna is treated as a dependence on others.108  Machiavelli’s reconsideration of these themes 
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begins at the end of chapter 24, where he argues that princes who have held their principalities 
for many years “may not accuse fortune when they have lost them afterwards.”109  Such men are 
not victims of Fortune, but rather of their own laziness.  “Never having thought that quiet times 
could change (which is a common defect of men, not to take account of the storm during the 
calm), when later the times became adverse, they thought of fleeing and not defending 
themselves.”110  These princes wait in expectation that their people will call them back.  While 
this may be an acceptable course of last resort, a prince should first consider more activist 
remedies.  For, Machiavelli warns, “one should never fall in the belief you could find someone to 
pick you up.  Whether it does not happen or happens, it is not security for you, because that 
defense was base and did not depend on you.  And those defenses alone are good, are certain, 
and are lasting, that depend on you yourself and on your virtù.”111  Once again, Machiavelli 
conceptualizes virtù as autonomy.  However, he has provided a metaphor for the variation and 
contingency of Fortune that hardly renders it more intelligible.  The effects of Fortune, like a 
storm, cannot be prevented.  One may prepare for them.  Yet Machiavelli does not explain how a 
prince might prepare to confront Fortune’s unaccountable variation.  Furthermore, his weather 
analogy suggests a completely impersonal Fortune, totally beyond human influence.112 
 Machiavelli attempts to dismantle this conception of Fortune in the following chapter.  
He intends to counter the common opinion “that worldly things are so governed by fortune and 
by God, that men cannot correct them with their prudence.”113  He admits that he himself has 
been inclined to this opinion and that it is one that “has been believed more in our times because 
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of the great variability of things which have been seen and are seen every day, beyond human 
conjecture.”114  Yet, while the sheer variability of events in his own time seems to render the 
political world unintelligible, Machiavelli proposes to open a space for understanding by making 
variation itself subject to generalization.  His motives for this project, however, do not appear to 
derive from any sense that such variation is inherently intelligible.  Rather, he seeks to preserve 
autonomy and free will.  It is not acceptable that worldly things be governed entirely by Fortune 
because, if that were true, men would cease to exercise their autonomy.115  They might “not 
sweat much over things” and would surrender themselves to pure chance.116  If Fortune is 
unintelligible, men may fail to act.  In order to save the free will and autonomy of men, 
Machiavelli judges that “it might be true that fortune is arbiter of half of our actions, but also that 
she leaves the other half, or close to it, for us to govern.”117  Yet this hypothesis hardly makes 
fortune more intelligible and thus does not remedy the paralyzing effect of an absence of 
understanding on the possibility of political action. 
 Machiavelli then shifts tactics, returning to a conception of Fortune as an impersonal 
force.  This time, however, it is a force subject to human control.  He likens Fortune “to one of 
these violent rivers which, when they become enraged, flood the plains, ruin the trees and the 
buildings, lift the earth from this part, drop in another; each person flees before them, everyone 
yields to their impetus without being able to hinder them in any regard.”118  Fortune seems at its 
most inscrutable and unstoppable when the extraordinary happens and the river floods.  
However, in quiet times, prudent men may prepare for these extraordinary onslaughts by 
building dams and dikes.  Technological mastery and foresight are the tools for navigating 
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fortune.  Yet The Prince is laden with examples of prudent leaders who are foiled by Fortune in 
spite of themselves, or whose careful calculations are rendered meaningless when faced with a 
bold show of military force.119  Once again, Machiavelli has not made Fortune intelligible.  He 
has explained when men should act—during calm times—but he has not adequately answered 
the question of how they should act.  
 Machiavelli attempts to answer this lingering question by offering a general rule: a prince 
must adapt his “mode of proceeding to the qualities of the times.”120  Men have been successful 
in their confrontations with Fortune by being both bold and cautious, violent and artful, patient 
and impetuous.  Their success depends on how well their chosen course matches the quality of 
the times.  Yet Machiavelli does not explain how we may know which trait matches any given 
time.  One suspects this is something that may only be determined in retrospect, if even then.121  
In an even more frustrating move, Machiavelli admits that man is fundamentally incapable of 
varying his nature with the times, “whether because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines 
him to or also because, when one has always flourished by walking on one path, one cannot be 
persuaded to depart from it.”122  Were he capable of varying his own nature, a man could vary 
seamlessly with the times and “his fortune would not change.”123  The importance of this 
impossible human variability means that the cautious and prudent builder of dams cannot always 
succeed.124  Indeed, here Machiavelli considers the example of Pope Julius II, who was not a 
cautious man but a bold one.  Julius was able to match his actions with the times.  However, he 
succeeded not because he was capable of a super-human variability, but merely because he was 
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fortunate enough to die before times changed and he came to ruin.  Had times changed while he 
was alive, “he would never have deviated from those modes to which nature inclined him” and 
would have come to ruin.125  Machiavelli has led himself right back to the opinion he had 
intended to disprove.126  Fortune remains impersonal and unintelligible, leaving men unsure 
whether their actions will overcome it or lead to political ruin.   
 Attempting to salvage this endeavor, Machiavelli concludes by personifying Fortune 
through yet another metaphor.  Resorting once again to a general rule, Machiavelli proclaims: “it 
is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if one 
wants to hold her down, to beat her and strike her down.  And one sees that she lets herself be 
won more by the impetuous than by those who proceed coldly.”127  The metaphor of Fortune as a 
woman assigns to variability and contingency a nature that implies a course of action.128  Having 
fixed the nature of Fortune, Machiavelli has leveled the playing field somewhat.  Man, with his 
inflexible nature, is now at less of a disadvantage.  Yet the metaphor itself raises profound 
questions, beyond the usual ones connected to its obvious misogyny.  The metaphor does not 
offer us an intelligible fortune.  It merely suggests that brute force may sometimes contain her 
infinite variety.129  Without intelligibility, however, the variability of the world remains mere 
contingency, contained occasionally by violence but fundamentally unknowable.   
 Is it, then, a surprise after this agonizing struggle to bring the contingency of the political 
world within the realm of human understanding that The Prince ends in an apocalyptic 
exhortation?  If Fortune cannot be understood by rules, or calculations, or even metaphors, then 
even prudent princes have little hope for reliably engaging in effective political action.  The 
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“great variability of things…beyond human conjecture”130 in Machiavelli’s own times calls, 
then, not for a prudent prince but for a prophet.  Such a man seeks not to understand the apparent 
contingency of the political world, but to discern in it signs of prophetic importance.  What 
appears to be a crisis arising from the pure variability of Fortune becomes the sign that the 
occasione has arrived for an apocalyptic rebirth.  What appears to be contingency gains meaning 
and purpose through its location in an apocalyptic narrative that offers the hope of a final escape 
from Fortune’s variability.  Machiavelli’s apocalyptic solution does not offer the promise that 
Fortune’s variability becomes intelligible, but rather that it is given a meaning and a conclusion 
in a way that transcends human understanding at the same time as it transforms humanity. 
                     
Fear and Longing: An Ambivalent Rejection of the Apocalyptic Imaginary 
 
 The apocalyptic solution for which Machiavelli pleaded at the end of The Prince was one 
which offered to give suffering a meaning and an end, to transform humanity, and transcend the 
political condition.  However, in his later works and particularly in The Discourses, Machiavelli 
denies that these goals are possible or desirable.  He turns away from his earlier flirtation with 
the apocalyptic imaginary by embracing a tragic vision of the political world.  This tragic vision 
entails a reassertion of human frailty in the face of a powerful Fortune and a warning about the 
dangers of political overreaching.  Yet, unlike the apocalyptic imaginary, it does not invite a 
retreat from the political world, but rather a continued engagement with it even in the face of its 
inevitable decline.     
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 Machiavelli is not conventionally seen as a tragic writer.131  Yet, in a 1525 letter to 
Francesco Guicciardini, Machiavelli signs as “Niccolò Machiavelli, historico, comico et 
tragico.”132  The first two parts of this identification are hardly controversial.  In his guise as an 
historian, Machiavelli wrote several historical works, most notably The Florentine Histories, and 
his political pieces are suffused with a concern for history.  As a comedian, Machiavelli offered 
the world Mandragola and Clizia, as well as the numerous amusing letters he addressed to his 
close friends.  It is Machiavelli’s self-identification as a tragedian that seems unusual, given that 
he wrote no works that could be seen as tragedies in the conventional sense of the term.133  Yet, 
Machiavelli’s life was marked by political upheaval and crisis, conditions he often laments.  Just 
before closing his letter to Guicciardini, Machiavelli writes: “I vent my feelings by accusing the 
princes who have all done everything they can bring us to this situation.”134  For Roberto Ridolfi, 
one of Machiavelli’s most passionate biographers, Machiavelli is a tragedian who takes 
contemporary Italy as his subject.135  Yet it is not just in his considerations of the present that 
Machiavelli embraces the tragic.  Machiavelli’s later political writings, and particularly the 
Discourses on Livy, are suffused with the “techniques, scenes, and imagery of tragedy—tyrants, 
reversals of fortune, stunning acts of cruelty, prophetic dreams and visions, bitter laments.”136  I 
intend to take seriously the tragic dimension of Machiavelli’s work and to consider how this 
embrace of tragedy allows him to resist the allure of the apocalyptic imaginary.   
                                                
131 For notable and interesting exceptions, see: Vickie B. Sullivan, “Introduction,” in The Comedy and Tragedy of 
Machiavelli: Essays on the Literary Works, ed. Vickie B. Sullivan  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), ix-
xxi; Ronald L. Martinez, “Tragic Machiavelli,” in Comedy and Tragedy of Machiavelli, 102-119; J. Peter Euben, 
“The Politics of Nostalgia and Theories of Loss,” in Vocations of Political Theory, eds. Jason A. Frank and John 
Tambornino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 73-83; Giorgio Bárberi-Squarotti, La forma 
tragica del ‘Principe’ e altri saggi sul Machiavelli (Florence: Olschki, 1966).   
132 Machiavelli et al., Letter to Francesco Guicciardini (after October 21, 1525), in Machiavelli and his Friends, 371. 
133 This point has previously been made by Sullivan, “Introduction,” xi. 
134 Machiavelli, Machiavelli and His Friends, 371. 
135 Roberto Ridolfi, The Life of Niccolò Machiavelli, trans. Cecil Grayson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1963), 219. 
136 Martinez, “Tragic Machiavelli,” 110.   
 117 
 The tragic form is one that acknowledges the unaccountable variability of political life.  It 
recognizes that efforts to provide stability and order are always and necessarily temporary.137  
While Machiavelli’s project in The Prince had been to render the political world understandable 
by containing it with categories and general rules, the opening chapters of The Discourses signal 
a radically different epistemological approach.  The Prince had attempted to group political 
regimes into stable categories—principalities or republics, new principalities or inherited ones, 
etc.   In The Discourses, Machiavelli denies the stability attempted by this earlier approach.  
There are three types of ‘good’ regime—principality, aristocracy, and republic.  Yet these 
regimes are inherently unstable and liable to shift into a corresponding ‘bad’ regime.  Each of 
these regimes is “so similar to the one next to it that they easily leap from one to the other.  For 
the principality easily becomes tyrannical; the aristocrats with ease become a state of the few; the 
popular without difficulty converted into the licentious.”138  The best political forms are 
necessarily temporary, “for no remedy can be applied there to prevent it from slipping into its 
contrary because of the likeness that the virtue and the vice have in this case.”139  Here, 
Machiavelli demonstrates a disposition toward the flux and variability of the political world—of 
the potential for forms to slip into their opposites—that is distinctly tragic.  Indeed, a central 
feature of the tragic form is an attention to the way in which virtue, when taken to excess, 
becomes vice.140  This is an approach that remains open to the variability of politics yet still 
seeks to understand it.  However, it is also an approach which, through its very openness, resists 
attempts to resolve or put an end to the flux that inheres in politics.   
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 Machiavelli famously develops this idea by drawing on a cyclical conception of political 
time borrowed from Polybius.  Political regimes inevitably become corrupted and collapse in an 
unending cycle.  Here, Machiavelli is proposing an alternative political temporality that avoids 
apocalypticism’s linear teleology and persistent hope for a ruptural ‘end.’  In this cyclical 
temporality, degeneration, decay and crisis can no longer be seen as extraordinary and prophetic 
signs of an imminent apocalypse.  Rather, they gain meaning and intelligibility from their place 
within a cycle whose broadest outlines have been rendered familiar, and even predictable.   
However, I do not want to make too much of the idea of Polybian cycles or of the 
proposed solution of a mixed government, as both are applied at best unevenly in The Discourses 
and are totally absent from Machiavelli’s other later works.141  What remains, however, is a 
broadly cyclical conception of political time.  As Machiavelli explains in The Florentine 
Histories,  
In their normal variations, countries generally go from order to disorder then from 
disorder move back to order, because—since Nature does not allow worldly 
things to remain fixed—when they come to their utmost perfection and have no 
further possibility for rising, they must go down.  Likewise, when they have gone 
down and through their defects have reached the lowest possible depths, they 
necessarily rise, since they cannot go lower.142     
 
Indeed, the entire project that Machiavelli embraces in The Discourses, as well as some of his 
other historical works, is premised on the notion of perennial political problems that recur as old 
patterns continue to repeat.  However fragmentary and partial the resources of the past are, they 
can be deployed in the present precisely because human nature remains the same and because 
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“all people, everywhere and always, [have] led similar histories.”143  In such an understanding of 
political time, crises that seem extraordinary and potentially apocalyptic are rendered ordinary 
and perennial.  This cyclical conception of time is often taken as evidence of Machiavelli’s 
republicanism.  But it is also a sign of his mature realism—his belief that the crises and 
antagonisms of political life will repeat themselves indefinitely and resist any attempts at final 
settlement. 
 The constant in Machiavelli’s various musings on political time is the inevitability of 
decline.  The world, explains Machiavelli, is eternal.144  But earthly things rise, decline, and 
eventually die in “a tragic drama played out again and again.”145  The familiar reasons for this 
inevitable decline have been well-rehearsed by scholars of Machiavelli’s republicanism.  
Citizens lose a sense of their founding virtues and republics become increasingly corrupt over 
time.146  The founding institutions become ossified as a kind of entropy sets in and the republic’s 
political energies become unfocused.147  Yet Machiavelli raises a third reason for the inevitability 
of political decline.  While founders should be considered among the most praiseworthy and 
honorable of men, they tend to become dangerously emboldened by their past success.  After 
having achieved a successful founding, they become “deceived by a false good and a false glory” 
and “almost all let themselves go, either voluntarily or ignorantly, into the ranks of those who 
deserve more blame than praise; and though, to their perpetual honor, they are able to make a 
republic or a kingdom, they turn to tyranny.”148  Past success, suggests Machiavelli, heightens 
the potential for future failure and political decline.  Here, the cycles of political time are not 
                                                
143 Edmund E. Jacobitti, “The Classical Heritage in Machiavelli’s Histories: Symbol and Poetry as Historical 
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extrinsic and impersonal forces.  Rather, they are patterns in which we ourselves are inescapably 
implicated.  Once again, Machiavelli is invoking a tragic sensibility that emphasizes persistent 
human frailties and points to the dangers of attempting to exceed our limits.    
 With this tragic sense of the limits to political action Machiavelli reconsiders the figure of 
the redemptive prince.  He considers a situation that is structurally similar to the one he describes 
at the end of The Prince—a polity that is utterly degraded and devastated.  In the language of 
republicanism, this is a polity whose corruption has become profound, putting it outside the 
familiar cycles of growth and decline he describes elsewhere in The Discourses.   He suggests 
that the transformation and apocalyptic rebirth that he had hoped and pleaded for at the end of 
The Prince are simply impossible.  He reasons: “where [the matter] is corrupt, well-ordered laws 
do not help unless indeed they have been put in motion by one individual who with an extreme 
force ensures their observance so that the matter becomes good.  I do not know whether this has 
ever occurred or whether it is possible.”149  In light of the final chapter of The Prince, this is a 
remarkable admission.  The redemptive figure Machiavelli had hoped for in that work was 
extraordinary and unprecedented—a figure that exists outside of history and is able to effect a 
transformation that has never occurred before and is not ordinarily possible.  The transformative 
re-founder discussed in The Discourses seems similar.  He is a charismatic leader who promises 
to renovate a devastated polity, transform its complacent masses, and innovate new orders “at a 
stroke.”150  However, the figure in The Prince is able to perform a miracle that redeems his 
people’s suffering, transforms them, and ushers in a new age.  Here in The Discourses, 
Machiavelli denies the possibly of such a miracle, revealing the promise of a transformative 
refounder to be both fraudulent and dangerous.   
                                                
149 Machiavelli, Discourses, I.17, 48. 
150 Machiavelli, Discourses, I.18, 51. 
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In the mode of rational deliberation rather than apocalyptic hope, Machiavelli considers 
the possibilities available to a corrupt polity.  The only way in which a political rebirth is 
possible is “through the virtù of one man who is alive [at the time]…As soon as such a one is 
dead, [the polity] returns to its early habit.”151  Here, the re-founder is merely human and 
therefore subject to mortality.  The rebirth he initiates allows new orders to be sustained, but only 
as long as he lives to guarantee them.  Unable to effect a transformation of the people 
themselves, the re-founder cannot protect his new polity from decay.  While the millennial 
community hoped for at the end of The Prince was unable to be undermined because absolute 
power was guaranteed by absolute love, the reborn republic is destined for an eventual decay 
from which there is no apocalyptic exit. 
Shifting from the mode of rational deliberation to normative critique, Machiavelli argues 
that even if a redemptive and prophetic leader were possible, he would not be the kind of person 
for whom we should hope longingly.  Even if a single re-founder could live an exceptionally 
long life or could arrange to be succeeded by one who shares his predecessor’s virtù and political 
mission, the polity could only “be reborn with many dangers and much blood.”152  This is a clear 
allusion to the violence that would be required to effect the kind of transformation longed for at 
the end of The Prince.  In this earlier work, the transformation takes the form of a miracle of 
spontaneous transformation and submission to the absolute power of a redemptive prophet.  
Here, however, Machiavelli exposes the bloody work of any transformative endeavor aimed at 
total and eternal human transformation. Here, the price of an attempted transformation has 
become too high.  Lurking behind Machiavelli’s remarks in The Discourses is also a deeper fear 
that, instead of waiting for an occasione of devastation and suffering, a self-proclaimed redeemer 
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might attempt to create this occasione for himself through the use of profound and unimaginable 
violence.  While the redemptive figure in The Prince is not an agent of violence, having come 
across an already devastated people, the transformative refounder of The Discourses unleashes a 
violence that may ultimately be irredeemable.  Consistent with a tragic mood, Machiavelli 
confronts us with the limits of political action and the profound dangers we create by trying to 
exceed them.   
Yet Machiavelli’s message is certainly not one of retreat from the political world.  
Rather, the struggle with Fortune and with human limits is the stuff of politics. Machiavelli 
summarizes this connection between the tragedy of politics and engagement with the world in 
verse: 
That which more than anything else throws kingdoms down from the highest hills 
is this: that the powerful with their power are never sated. 
From this results that they are discontented who have lost, and hatred is stirred up 
to ruin the conquerors; 
whence it comes about that one rises and the other dies; and the one who has risen 
is ever tortured with new ambition and with fear. 
This appetite destroys our states; and the greater wonder is that all recognize this 
transgression, but no one flees from it.153 
 
Seen in this light, the heroes of The Discourses are those who found and refound polities 
knowing that they will eventually decay.  All earthly creations, suggests Machiavelli, have limits 
to their lives.154  Yet, since fortune “proceeds by oblique and unknown ways,” it makes little 
sense to withdraw from the world of politics.  While the lives of states and men have limits, the 
aim should be “to live in a manner that would allow one to live out that limit.”155  Machiavelli, in 
his guise as a tragedian, does not leave us despairing or encourage us to turn away from the 
world.  Rather, like the Florentine thinker himself, who must write about politics or remain 
                                                
153 Niccolò Machiavelli, The [Golden] Ass, in Allan Gilbert (ed.) Chief Works and Others, vol. 2 (Durham: Duke 
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silent,156 we must engage with the political world even in the face of the limits imposed both by 
ourselves and by Fortune. 
 The political world that Machiavelli describes and celebrates in The Discourses and other 
later works is a turbulent one that resists any attempts to impose an eternal stasis.  In the early 
chapters of The Discourses, Machiavelli makes  “a series of decisions against studying the 
closed, aristocratic, defensive state—Sparta or Venice—which makes stability its only goal, and 
in favour of studying the dynamic, popular, warlike state—Livian Rome—which opts for liberty, 
expansion and dominion, even if this choice condemns it to ultimate decline and tyranny.”157  
The entire project of The Discourses embraces a model of politics in flux—the constant motion 
produced by repeated engagements with Fortune and confrontations with other political actors.  
Against an ideal of an eternal stillness, Machiavelli celebrates a Roman ideal of antagonism and 
struggle.  The “tumults between the nobles and the plebs,” for instance, “were the first cause of 
keeping Rome free.”158  It is also an ideal that is explicitly anti-apocalyptic insofar as it eschews 
the promise of order, unity and quiet offered by a final exit from the tumult and antagonism of 
the political condition. 
 Yet Machiavelli’s embrace of a fluid politics is haunted by the lingering persistence of 
the apocalyptic imaginary.  I suggest that this persistence manifests itself in the desire to put an 
end to the flux and struggle of politics by establishing an everlasting republic.  Like the 
apocalyptic and redemptive ‘end’ envisioned at the end of The Prince, the everlasting republic 
would mark the eternal culmination of the movement that characterizes the political world.  For 
the most part, Machiavelli eschews a redemptive and apocalyptic end to politics in The 
Discourses.  He argues that there are no certain remedies for political disorders and that “it 
                                                
156 Machiavelli, Letter to Francesco Vettori (April 9, 1513), in Machiavelli and His Friends, 225.   
157 Pocock, “Onely Politician,” 277.  See also: Machiavelli, Discourses, I.1, 2, 5, 6. 
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follows that it is impossible to order a perpetual republic, because its ruin is caused through a 
thousand unexpected ways.”159  This is consistent with Machiavelli’s insistence on the inevitable 
decline of states and the constant flux and struggle that inheres in the political condition.  Yet he 
simply cannot fully abandon the hope of a ruptural and extraordinary figure who “with his 
example might renew the laws, and not only restrain [the republic] from running to ruin but pull 
it back [such that] it would be perpetual.”160  Like the Savonarolan apocalyptic imaginary, the 
hope for an everlasting republic envisions an end that is achieved through a backward movement 
in time to a simpler and uncorrupted period that can be held in stasis eternally.  This halting of 
the motion of Fortune would, if possible, be “the true political way of life and the true quiet of a 
city.”161  Given Machiavelli’s openness to a politics in motion, animated by struggle and discord, 
the hope for a perpetual republic characterized above all by ‘quiet’ is troubling.  It resonates 
eerily and closely with St. Augustine’s famous description of the eschatological City of God as a 
place in which “we shall have the leisure to be still.”162  This haunting eschatological hope 
reveals a lingering ambivalence in Machiavelli’s rejection of apocalypse and perhaps an implicit 
admission that even the tragedian and the realist cannot fully extinguish the desire to escape from 
politics.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have offered a reading of Machiavelli that challenges some of the 
dominant interpretations of the Florentine thinker in the history of political thought, particularly 
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those that treat him as a modern political realist.  However, my aim here has not been to contest 
Machiavelli’s identification as a realist, but rather to offer a more complex and nuanced account 
of the development of his realism in response to the apocalyptic imaginary.  This account has 
several implications for Machiavelli’s identification as a realist.  First, many are inclined to treat 
The Prince as the primary locus of Machiavelli’s realism and to see The Discourses as an 
exclusively republican work.  However, I have offered a reading of The Prince that emphasizes 
the utopian and apocalyptic character of the concluding chapter of the work.  The Prince must 
culminate in an apocalyptic exhortation because the rest of the work has failed to achieve the 
goal of a narrow and underdeveloped political realism—to subject the variability of politics to 
princely control by containing it with categories and general rules.  I find a much more 
developed and complex realism in Machiavelli’s later works, and especially The Discourses, 
which are infused with a tragic sensibility that emphasizes the real limits to political action and 
the dangers we create by trying to exceed them.  Importantly, while this may be a tragic realism, 
it is not one that prescribes withdrawal from the world, but rather continued engagement with it.   
Second, the reading that I have offered here suggests that Machiavelli’s realism is deeply 
contextual. It only fully develops through an attempt to reject the apocalyptic imaginary.  
Importantly, however, this is not simply an engagement between Machiavelli (‘the realist’) and 
Savonarola and his followers (‘the apocalypticists’).  It is also a struggle that is internal to 
Machiavelli’s own work.  The complex and tragic realism that Machiavelli eventually embraces 
emerges only after an engagement with the apocalyptic imaginary.   
Third, the interpretation I have offered here complicates attempts to cast Machiavelli as a 
modern realist—a thinker whose commitment to exploring the effectual truths of power politics 
marks his work as a definitive break from the political thought of medieval Christianity.  
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Machiavelli’s engagement with political theology in general, and the apocalyptic imaginary in 
particular, necessarily complicates any attempt to place him firmly on either side of a pre-
modern/modern divide.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I have pointed to lingering 
questions about the adequacy of tragic realism as a response to the apocalyptic imaginary.  While 
Machiavelli’s turn toward a robustly tragic sensibility in his later work represents an attempt to 
turn away from the apocalyptic imaginary and its fantasies of a final solution to the contingency 
of political life, this rejection is incomplete.  The Discourses are haunted by an eschatological 
hope for a perpetual republic.  The apocalyptic imaginary is not easily purged.  As I explore in 
the following chapter, Thomas Hobbes will opt not for a strategy of purging the apocalyptic 
imaginary but rather of subversively integrating it into the very foundations of his political 
thought. 
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    CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THOMAS HOBBES: “FEIGNING THE WORLD TO BE ANNIHILATED” 
 
 
 Recalling the circumstances of his birth, Thomas Hobbes wrote that his mother “brought 
twins to birth, myself and fear at the same time.”  His premature birth on April 5, 1588 was 
caused, Hobbes claimed, by rumors of an approaching Spanish Armada that “was bringing the 
day of doom to our race.”1  These rumors had been circulating for several months and the 
English awaited the Spanish fleet with a sense of utter dread.  But there were other reasons to 
expect “the day of doom.”  The year 1588 had been the focus of apocalyptic expectation and 
terror for over a century.  One prominent fifteenth-century prediction expected that the year 
would bring “with it woe enough.  If this year, total catastrophe does not befall, if land and sea 
do not collapse in total ruin, yet will the whole world suffer upheavals, empires will dwindle and 
from everywhere will be great lamentation.”2  During the course of Hobbes’ life, there would be 
an explosion of apocalyptic prophecy that combined fears of the imminent end of the known 
world with hopes for a radically new future.   The chaos and violence of the English Civil War 
only seemed to confirm these prophetic revelations and there emerged a widespread expectation 
that God would irrupt into secular history to save the elect and condemn the damned.   
 In this chapter, I argue that this apocalyptic imaginary shaped Hobbes’ later work, and 
particularly Leviathan.  Yet, while a substantial amount of scholarship has grappled with the 
English thinker’s understanding of the political implications of religion and his accounts of the 
origins of the civil war, Hobbes’ engagement with apocalypticism remains profoundly 
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underexplored.3  I argue here that the radical apocalyptic imaginary let loose during the civil war 
is a central preoccupation of Hobbes’ work.  While Christian eschatology had initially been 
deployed as a legitimating tool by kings and church authorities, the apocalyptic imaginary 
escaped this effort at sovereign control and was suddenly abroad in the land.  Hobbes responds to 
this threat not by condemning the apocalyptic imaginary, but by trying to put it back in the 
service of sovereign power.  He fights apocalypse with apocalypse.  Hobbes pursues two paths in 
his project—one that is overtly Christian and another that is seemingly secular.  His theological 
argument offers a de-radicalized Christian eschatology in which the sovereign is the only 
authority capable of proclaiming the apocalypse.  Hobbes’ political argument stages a secular 
apocalypse, in which the terror and chaos of the state of nature are the preconditions for a 
kingdom ruled by a mortal God.  In pursuing these two paths, Hobbes does not escape the 
apocalyptic imaginary, but rather redeploys it and tries to return it safely into sovereign hands.      
 This chapter proceeds in three parts.  First, I begin by tracing the evolution of the 
apocalyptic imaginary from the late sixteenth century to the English Civil War, with a particular 
focus on its relationship to sovereign power.  Second, I outline Hobbes’ theological response to 
the apocalyptic imaginary.  Here I raise questions about the value of a response to Christian 
eschatology that does not engage with the capacity of apocalypticism to captivate the 
imagination and provoke belief.  Third, I argue that Hobbes’ seemingly secular response to the 
anarchic potential of apocalypticism is more successful because it works on an imaginistic 
register, offering a vivid and frightening picture of an alternative eschaton.   
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The English Apocalyptic Imaginary 
 The apocalyptic imaginary that captivated England from the Reformation through the 
civil war drew on a rich theological tradition.  Other scholars have captured this richness in fuller 
detail than I am able to provide here.4  I focus on three of the most important and influential 
theological sources for the apocalyptic imaginary that would come to dominate Hobbes’ world: 
John Bale’s Image of Both Churches (1547)5, John Foxe’s Acts and Monuments (1563)6, and the 
Geneva translation of the Bible (1560, 1599).7  The choice of these three works is far from 
arbitrary.  Historians studying sixteenth and seventeenth century English apocalypticism tend to 
agree that Bale, Foxe, and the translators and annotators of the Geneva Bible developed an 
interpretive tradition that would provide the basis for the radical apocalyptic polemics of the 
seventeenth century.8  In addition, these writers came into frequent contact with one another and 
with theologians and religious dissidents on the Continent, building upon and integrating one 
another’s ideas into a self-consciously new Protestant apocalyptic tradition.9  Together, these 
works articulated a uniquely Protestant reading of the apocalypse that would take on a life of its 
own in the violence and hopes of the English Civil War.   
                                                
4 For more detailed accounts, see: Paul Christianson, Reformers and Babylon: English Apocalyptic Visions From the 
Reformation to the Eve of the Civil War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 13-92; Katharine R. Firth, 
The Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Bernard Capp, “The 
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8  See: Christianson, Reformers and Babylon, 13-46; Gribben, Puritan Millennium, 26-79; Firth, Apocalyptic 
Tradition, 32-149. 
9  Large parts of Bale’s “apocalyptic framework” were absorbed into Foxe’s Acts and Monuments and the 
annotations in the Geneva Bible.  See: Christianson, Reformers and Babylon, 36.    
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 Appropriately enough, these apocalyptic writers all wrote in exile.  John Bale fled to 
Flanders when his powerful protector, Thomas Cromwell, fell out of favor with King Henry VIII 
in 1540.  He returned briefly with the accession of King Edward VI, but like John Foxe and the 
translators and annotators of the Geneva Bible he was forced into exile once again with the 
accession of the violently pro-Catholic Queen Mary in 1553.  Like other Marian exiles, Bale, 
Foxe, and those who worked on the Geneva translation, fled to Protestant cities on the Continent.  
By virtue of their exile, they were engaged in an ancient apocalyptic tradition.  As Crawford 
Gribben explains, “apocalyptic interest always seemed to thrive when the godly were both 
persecuted and geographically estranged.  The place of exile, like the Biblical wilderness, was a 
topography loaded with spiritual significance.  Daniel had received his eschatological prophecy 
while in Babylonian exile, and John had documented Revelation while in banishment.”10  Irish 
bishop John Bale makes this connection explicit in the preface to his work, The Image of Both 
Churches.  He notes that Revelation was written in exile, and then continues: “In exile are the 
powers thereof most earnestly proved of them that have faith…[F]or nought is it not therefore, 
that [God] hath exiled a certain number of believing brethren of the realms of England; of which 
afflicted family my faith is that I am one.”11    Together, these exiles would help forge an English 
apocalyptic tradition informed by their persecution at home and their connections to a vibrant 
Protestant community on the Continent.12  
 While the writings of the Marian exiles would soon shape increasingly radical Puritan 
movements in England, the intentions of their authors were far from revolutionary.  The 
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European Protestants with whom the Marian exiles associated were deeply wary of the 
destabilizing potential of apocalyptic hopes.  Twenty years earlier, the German town of Münster 
had been the site of an Anabaptist apocalyptic revolt, in which radicals proclaimed the town to 
be the New Jerusalem and attempted to create a proto-socialist theocracy.  Besieged by Catholic 
forces and cut off from the outside world, the town succumbed to famine and cannibalism.  
Those who survived eventually surrendered in exchange for the offer of safe conduct, but were 
instead brutally massacred and their corpses exhibited in cages as a lesson to others attracted to 
the antinomian messages of Revelation.13  To the Continental Protestants of the 1550s and the 
Marian exiles who dwelt among them, Münster served as a powerful reminder of the 
destabilizing potential of the apocalyptic imaginary and the dangers of a “totally unlegislated 
reading” of Scripture.14  Protestant theology would now have to direct itself with equal vigor 
toward “the twin threats of the totalitarianism of Rome and the danger of sectarian frenzy.”15  
The work of the Marian exiles is centrally concerned with these twin threats. 
 John Bale’s Image of Both Churches offers a sophisticated theological response that 
attempts to both condemn the Catholic Church and to close off the destabilizing potential of the 
apocalypse.  Written before the period of the Marian exile, Bale’s apocalyptic understanding of 
history had a profound influence on Foxe’s Acts and Monuments and the translations and 
annotations in the Geneva Bible.  Borrowing from Augustine’s conception of two cities, Bale 
reads Revelation as a prophecy of the unfolding of Christianity.  To Bale, the final book of the 
Bible describes the parallel development and opposition of two churches—the “true Christian 
church…the meek spouse of the Lamb without spot…and the sinful synagogue of Satan.”16  
                                                
13 Gribben, Puritan Millennium, 34-5. 
14 Gribben, Puritan Millennium, 67.   
15 Gribben, Puritan Millennium, 35.   
16 John Bale, as quoted in Gribben, Puritan Millennium, 37. 
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Bale’s reading identifies his Protestant contemporaries with the persecuted elect of the “true” 
church.  In so doing, he gives Protestants a past that stretches back to the early church.  The 
Church establishment in Rome is the false church, and therefore among the forces of Antichrist.  
As Paul Christianson explains, “By applying the idea of the two churches, Bale stood history on 
its head.  The church establishment of the middle ages, headed by the papacy, became the vassals 
of antichrist, while many hounded as heretics in the same period became the small, pure, 
persecuted elect of the true church.”17   
Yet, while Bale’s historical reading of Revelation provided theological fodder for the 
contemporary struggles between Protestants and Rome, he does not offer a call to apocalyptic 
action.  As we shall see, many of his Protestant contemporaries pinned their hopes for 
apocalyptic transformation on an established political authority—a godly prince able to carry out 
the events prophesied in Revelation by ending the persecution of the elect and doing battle with 
the forces of Antichrist.  For Bale, however, kings and princes are incapable of such divine tasks.  
God has not given kings the power “to subdue these beasts.  Only is it reserved to the victory of 
his living word.”18  The agents of God are the persecuted, the oppressed, and those who preach 
the divine message.  Yet Bale is careful to avoid the kinds of destabilizing doctrines that might 
fuel politically radical ambitions.  Following Augustine, he offers no immediate hope for a 
glorious millennium and is cautious and vague when addressing possible futures prophesied in 
Revelation.19  His commentary on the portions of Revelation describing the New Jerusalem 
simply paraphrases the Biblical text and avoids drawing almost any connection to the plight of 
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Protestant reformers.20  Ultimately, his work provided Protestants with an eschatological history, 
but did not urge them toward a prophetic future. 
 Like Bale, Foxe focuses his reading of Revelation on the past and present.  Acts and 
Monuments, also known as The Book of Martyrs, blends an eschatological reading of history 
with an older genre describing the lives of saints.  Deploying Bale’s notion of two churches, 
Foxe catalogues and details the persecution of the elect in an historical eschatology that links the 
Marian exiles back to the apostles in an unbroken trail of blood.21  The elect are identified by 
their suffering and the forces of Antichrist are marked by their eagerness to persecute.22  Yet, 
while their persecution and martyrdom give members of the true church a place in the 
apocalyptic drama, Foxe does not encourage any direct action on their part.  Political agitation 
and subversion are vices practiced by papal supporters: “What kings have been deposed, and 
emperors stripped from their imperial seat, and all because they would not stoop and bend to the 
image of the beast, that is, to the majesty and title of Rome.”23  To the extent that the elect have 
an active role to play in the apocalypse, it is through their leaders.  In the 1563 edition of Acts 
and Monuments, Foxe casts Queen Elizabeth as a new Constantine, a godly ruler who ends the 
persecution of the elect and “confound[s] the dark and false-valorized kingdom of Antichrist.”24  
The work’s dedication to Elizabeth makes this connection clear.  In the opening lines of the 
dedication, the C in ‘Constantine’ is illustrated with a picture of the Queen triumphing over the 
body of the Pope (see figure 5).  Just as Constantine ended the persecution of the early church, 
Elizabeth will stop the suffering of Protestants.  The dedication in the 1570 edition of the book  
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22 Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood, 259. 
23 John Foxe, as quoted in Capp, “The Political Dimension,” 94.   
24 John Foxe, as quoted in Christopher Hill, Antichrist in Seventeenth-Century England (London: Verso, 1971), 14.  
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Figure 5: Illustration in the ‘C’ from the dedication of the 1563 edition of John Foxe’s Acts and 
Monuments, 1653.  Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino.   
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discusses Christ, rather than Constantine.  But the C in ‘Christ’ bears the same image of 
Elizabeth.25  Foxe thus builds on Bale’s framework to develop a Protestant eschatological 
identity grounded in history and prophecy, while only offering the elect an active role in the 
apocalypse through the actions of their godly sovereign. 
 The Geneva Bible further develops Bale’s Protestant apocalyptic theology.  This clear 
and forceful translation was one of the most enduring achievements of the Marian exiles.  Rich 
with detailed annotations, cross-references, indices, woodcut illustrations, and maps of the holy 
land, it was a mass-produced translation that provided its English readers with the world’s first 
study bible.   It gained official status in Scotland, where a 1579 Act of Parliament required that 
“every substantial householder [be] required to purchase a copy.”26  Even without official 
recognition, “the Geneva Bible became the Bible of Elizabethan England.” 27   It was 
Shakespeare’s bible and that of many of other Elizabethan and Jacobean authors.28  It was also  
one of the bibles taken to America on the Mayflower and the translation became wildly popular 
in the colonies.29  And when Oliver Cromwell’s Parliamentarian troops marched into battle, they 
did so with a Soldiers Pocket Bible comprised of verses taken from the Geneva translation.30     
Influenced by the ideas of Bale and Foxe, the Geneva Bible has an overt anti-Catholic 
and apocalyptic agenda.  While Antichrist plays a small role in the bible and is mentioned in only 
three passages31, the translators of the Geneva version chose to capitalize “Antichrist.”  This 
decision was not maintained in the Authorized (King James) Version, a fact that hints at the 
                                                
25 Frances Amelia Yates, Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 
42. 
26 Maurice S. Betteridge, “The Bitter Notes: The Geneva Bible and Its Annotations,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 
14, no.1 (1983): 44. 
27 Betteridge, “The Bitter Notes,” 44.   
28 David Daniell, The Bible in English: Its History and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 295.   
29 Betteridge, “The Bitter Notes,” 53.   
30 Daniell, The Bible in English, 295.   
31 1 John 2:18, 22; 1 John 4:3; and 2 John 7. 
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Geneva translation’s “more polemical apocalyptic agenda.”32  The annotations further support 
this assessment.  “Antichrist” is identified with “the man of sin” and the “son of perdition” of 2 
Thessalonians 2:3.  This antichristian adversary is then identified with the papacy and the Pope 
with the second beast in Revelation 13.  The second beast inherits the powers of the first, which 
the notes identify as the Roman Empire.  The Pope “is the head both of the tyrannical Empire, 
and also of the false prophets.”  He “exercises a most wicked and most insolent tyranny over the 
persons of men…and over their goods and actions.”33  The papacy was part of a chain of 
antichristian forces, for Antichrist “comprehendeth the whole succession of the persecutors of 
the church.”  He “shall not reign without the Church, but in the very bosom of the Church.”34 
Yet, like Bale and Foxe, the Geneva Bible attempts to avoid encouraging the kind of Protestant 
enthusiasm that had been so disastrous at Münster.  Indeed, the Bible’s marginal annotations 
were meant to “offer the interpretive guidelines required by those protestants concerned to 
support the social and religious status quo.”35  The destruction of Antichrist would not occur 
through the spontaneous action of individual Protestants, but rather would be exercised through 
existing channels of sovereign power.  The distinctly eschatological preface to the 1560 Geneva 
Bible was addressed to Queen Elizabeth.  One of the notes on Revelation explains that “Kings 
and Princes (contrary to that wicked opinion of the Anabaptists) are partakers of the heavenly 
glory, if they rule in fear of the Lord.”36  While the Geneva Bible claims Scriptural authority for 
the Protestant cause, it does not challenge sovereign power.     
                                                
32 Gribben, Puritan Millennium, 28. 
33 1599 Geneva Bible, note on Revelation 13: 12-16.   
34 1599 Geneva Bible, note on 2 Thessalonians 2: 3-4. 
35 Gribben, Puritan Millennium, 67. Nevertheless, the Church of England and King James recognized enough anti-
monarchical exegesis in the Geneva translation to justify commissioning an Authorized Version to replace it.  This 
move did not decrease the popularity of the Geneva Bible, which was still in widespread use during the English 
Civil War.   
36 1560 Geneva Bible, note on Revelation 21:24.  As Crawford Gribben explains, “this confirmation of England’s 
establishment would find fewer echoes in succeeding editions of puritan scriptures.”  This shift is part of a larger 
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 While Bale, Foxe, and the translators and annotators of the Geneva Bible had attempted 
to avoid encouraging Protestant enthusiasm, their works would form the theological basis for the 
Puritan apocalypticism of the English Civil War.  This fact confronts historians with a bit of a 
puzzle.  How did the politically moderate Protestant apocalypticism of the sixteenth century 
become the radical apocalypticism of the seventeenth century?  In order to understand how this 
happened, we must trace three important shifts in English apocalypticism that occurred between 
the reigns of Queen Elizabeth I (1558-1603) and King Charles I (1625-1649).  First, England 
gained a special role in the apocalyptic drama.  For Bale and Foxe, the true church was universal 
and the elect were spread throughout the world.37  Both drew substantial material from English 
history, reading the experiences of the country’s reformers and Protestants alongside Revelation.  
However, they did not single England out for a special role in any apocalyptic transformation.38  
This special status developed in the aftermath of England’s defeat of the Spanish Armada in 
1588, after which the country was increasingly cast as an elect nation chosen by God to take an 
active role in the apocalyptic drama.39  The failure of the Gunpowder Plot in 1605 was taken as a 
further sign that England was under divine protection.40  This special role for England would be 
an overtly activist one.  As Bernard Capp explains, “English Protestants were no longer merely 
                                                                                                                                                       
transformation in English apocalypticism that I explore in the following pages.  See: Crawford Gribben, 
“Deconstructing the Geneva Bible: The Search for a Puritan Poetic,” Literature and Theology 14, no. 1 (2000): 5.   
37 Capp, “The Political Dimension,” 96. 
38 William Haller argues that Foxe did identify England as an elect nation.  See: William Haller, Foxe's First Book of 
Martyrs and the Elect Nation (London: Jonathan Cape, 1963).  Katharine Firth, among others, has convincingly 
criticized this thesis.  See: Firth, The Apocalyptic Tradition, 107-8.  It is worth noting, however, that Foxe’s work 
was added to substantially over time and later editions did incorporate a stronger role for England.  Also, as Bernard 
Capp has explained, it is worth remembering that the focus on English examples in the work of both Foxe and Bale 
had the effect of appearing to confirm England’s importance in the apocalyptic drama.  See: Capp, “The Political 
Dimension,” 96.   
39 Capp, “The Political Dimension,” 98. 
40 Christianson, Reformers and Babylon, 108. 
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preachers spreading the Gospel or martyrs suffering patiently” but an army “which would throw 
down Babylon.”41   
 At the same time, there was a second shift in the agent of the apocalyptic transformation.  
For Bale and Foxe, the principal actors in the apocalyptic drama are martyrs—the persecuted and 
the oppressed who belong to the true church.  But they play a passive role.  To the extent that 
early Protestant apocalyptics envision any kind of active agency, it is in the role of a “godly 
prince” who will fight the forces of Antichrist and end the persecution of the true church.  This is 
the role that Foxe and the translators and annotators of the Geneva Bible assign to Queen 
Elizabeth I.42 When James I succeeded Elizabeth, he became the focus of similar apocalyptic 
hopes.  This is understandable, given that James had written an extensive commentary on 
Revelation, identifying the pope as Antichrist and prophesying the imminent overthrow of 
Catholic nations.43  James I seemed to have all the right Protestant apocalyptic credentials.  Yet 
the political decisions he made during his reign did little to satisfy radical apocalyptic hopes.  He 
made peace with Spain, he refused to intervene on the Protestant side in the Thirty Years War, 
and he proved almost as hostile to Puritans as he was to papists.44  James’ son, Charles I, proved 
even less satisfactory as a candidate for the “godly prince.”  He married a Catholic and supported 
the Arminian45 party in the Church, which promoted religious ceremonies widely condemned as 
“popish.” He was also openly hostile to the identification of the papacy with Antichrist.46  With 
their hopes of a “godly prince” dashed, radical Protestants in England began to focus on 
                                                
41 Capp, “The Political Dimension,” 98. 
42 A caveat is in order here.  Bernard Capp reminds us that while “most Protestant writers saw Elizabeth as having a 
major, distinctive or even unique position in the Church’s history…they stopped short of ascribing a messianic role 
to her.”  See: Capp, “The Political Dimension,” 96. 
43 Capp, “The Political Dimension,” 102. 
44 Capp, “The Political Dimension,” 103. 
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46 Capp, “The Political Dimension,” 104. 
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Parliament, or even the community of believers at large, as agents of apocalyptic 
transformation.47  The alliance between apocalyptic hope and sovereign power had dissolved.   
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there was a shift in the location of Antichrist.  
Bale, Foxe, and the translators and annotators of the Geneva Bible had all associated the pope 
and the institution of the papacy with Antichrist.  By Elizabeth’s reign, these links had become 
even more overt.  It was entirely respectable to argue that the pope himself was Antichrist.  This 
identification served the interests of sovereign power, unifying England against a common papal 
enemy—Spain.  Before he succeeded Elizabeth, James had written a commentary on Revelation 
in which he clearly asserted that the pope was Antichrist.48  He viewed papal attempts to meddle 
in the secular jurisdiction of princes as particularly anti-Christian and as a threat to sovereign 
power.49  Yet, during his reign, James seems to have become increasingly aware of the politically 
destabilizing effects of identifying the pope with Antichrist.  It was hard to argue against those 
who criticized James’ peace with Spain and failure to intervene on behalf of Protestants abroad, 
as these critics were merely seeking action against the Roman Antichrist.50  Perhaps for this 
reason, James backed down from his earlier views.51   
 The more radical implications of this identification emerged under Charles I. The Church 
of England under Archbishop Laud and the Arminians was widely seen by its Puritan opponents 
as “popish” and sympathetic to the Catholic Church.  Since the pope was Antichrist, argued 
                                                
47 Capp, “The Political Dimension,” 105; Gribben, Puritan Millennium, 45.  This shift is on full display in William 
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some Puritans, so too must be his agents in England.52  The “hatred traditionally directed 
outwards towards the pope or Hapsburgs was now turned inwards.”53  Realizing that the 
identification of the pope with Antichrist had become destabilizing, Laud and the Church of 
England backed away from this doctrine.  The Laudians also censored works that espoused this 
identification, editing out the relevant passages or refusing to publish them entirely.54  These 
efforts proved unsuccessful and the identification of the bishops of the Church of England with 
Antichrist soon bled into politics.  Charles I, as head of the Church of England and a king with a 
Catholic wife, was increasingly seen as antichristian.  No longer safely abroad, Antichrist was 
now at home.  Sovereign power had been undermined and disobedience had become a religious 
duty.55    
While this apocalyptic message circulated among learned students of Scripture, these 
ideas were also able to penetrate the popular and political consciousness in Britain.  With the 
breakdown of censorship in 1641, there was an explosion of apocalyptic prophecy, distributed 
mainly as pamphlets widely available to the masses.56  From late 1640 onwards, apocalyptic 
preachers also had the ear of Parliament.  After a series of invited sermons, the House of 
Commons began an official program of monthly fast sermons in 1642.  Most of those who 
preached before Parliament offered an apocalyptic interpretation of England’s recent political 
and religious unrest. 57   Stephen Marshall, a nonconformist churchman who preached to 
Parliament on several occasions, was particularly forceful in this interpretation.  In a sermon 
                                                
52 Christopher Hill quotes an anonymous tract with a note that adds up the values of VVILL LAUD to 666 and adds: 
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commemorating the accession of Queen Elizabeth I, Marshall argued that the Laudians were in 
league with Satan, who “knows his time is short” and therefore “stirs up all his instruments.”58  
Dangerous times lay ahead: “Little quiet I fear is to be expected in Christendom, till the beast his 
kingdom be ruined.”59  In a later sermon, Marshall urged Parliament and godly men to be 
unflinching in their use of divine violence.  Drawing on the language and images of Psalm 137, 
he argued: “If this work be to avenge God’s church against Babylon, he is a blessed man that 
takes and dashes the little ones against the stones.”60  Parliament regularly invited preachers like 
Marshall, officially thanked them, and often published their sermons.61  It is therefore clear that 
Parliament welcomed this particular brand of apocalypticism.     
Marshall’s ideas were widely disseminated as fodder for the Parliamentarian cause.  
Edward Symmons, a royalist chaplain, begins his response to Stephen Marshall’s apocalypticism 
with a description of an encounter with two Parliamentary prisoners in Shrewsbury in the spring 
of 1644.  The chaplain’s account of this exchange is worth quoting at length: 
and questioning them about their taking up of Armes against their Soveraigne, 
they answered me, that they took up Armes against Antichrist, and Popery; for 
(said they) ‘tis prophesied in the Revelation, that the Whore of Babylon shall be 
destroyed with fire and sword, and what doe you know, but this is the time of her 
ruine, and that we are the men that must help to pull her downe.  I answered that 
the Revelation tells us, that ‘tis the worke of Kings…to pull downe the whore of 
Babylon, to hate her, to make her naked, and to burne her with fire.  But as for 
them, they (in my apprehension) laboured to keep up the whore of Babilon, that 
shee might not fall, by their endeavouring to pull downe Kings, who were 
appointed of God to pull downe her: they replyed, that ‘tis said in the Revelation, 
that the People, the Multitude and Nations should also pull her downe: but I 
reading the verse out of one of their Bibles, shewed them their mistake, that the 
People, Multitude and Nations…were those whom the Whore did sit upon, and as 
it were did brood under her, that is, shee did rule over them, had them under their 
                                                
58 As quoted in Christianson, Reformers and Babylon, 185. 
59 As quoted in Christianson, Reformers and Babylon, 185. 
60 As quoted in Hill, The Antichrist, 81.  The excerpt is from a 1642 sermon on Judges 5:23. 
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obedience, insomuch that they might rather be said to submit unto her, then to 
pull her downe.62 
 
The prisoners then asked whether Symmons believed that kings can pull down the Whore 
of Babylon without the help of their subjects.  Symmons answered: “no, nor yet the People 
without their Kings, who are appointed of God, to lead them thereunto, and in whole power 
alone it is, to Authorize people to be active and assistant in such a businesse.”  The chaplain 
went on to explain that the prisoners were mistaken in their belief that Popery was the Whore of 
Babylon.  For, the Antichrist and the Whore “dwelt at Rome, and not here in England: and it was 
the very Roman seat or City which was to be so abolished.”  The prisoners replied “that all the 
true godly Divines in England (amongst them they named in speciall M. Marshall) were of the 
opinion, that Antichrist was here in England as well as at Rome, and the Bishops were Antichrist, 
and all that did endeavour to support them…and therefore they thought they were bound in 
conscience to fight against them.”63  This exchange clearly indicates that the apocalypticism of 
Parliamentary preachers like Stephen Marshall had penetrated the popular consciousness and 
was being overtly deployed as a challenge to sovereign power.   
 The political use of apocalyptic ideas persisted throughout the English Civil War, as 
those on both sides justified their actions with reference to Revelation. Groups like the Diggers 
and the Levellers drew on the hopes of the apocalyptic tradition for a millennial and egalitarian 
future.  The Fifth Monarchists were convinced that the end-times were at hand and that they 
would rule with Jesus in his millennial kingdom. Several Fifth Monarchists were judges at the 
trial of King Charles I and ultimately signed his death warrant.  There is some debate about 
                                                
62 Edward Symmons, Scripture vindicated from the mis-apprehensions, mis-interpretations, and mis-applications of 
Mr. Stephen Marshall (Oxford: Leonard Lichfield, 1645), preface [electronic reproduction]. 
63 Symmons, Scripture vindicated, preface.   
 143 
whether Oliver Cromwell shared the apocalyptic zeal of groups like the Fifth Monarchists.64  
However, it is clear that he often closely surrounded himself with apocalypticists.  Cromwell’s 
1649 campaign to suppress Irish Royalists was widely interpreted in apocalyptic terms.  John 
Owen, Cromwell’s friend and chaplain on this campaign, saw the Irish as the “sworn vassals of 
the man of sin” and “followers of the beast.”65  Cromwell himself frequently drew upon the 
apocalyptic imaginary in his public addresses.  In a speech to the Barebones Parliament, he 
conveyed a sense of expectation: “Indeed I do think something is at the door.  We are at the 
threshold…[Y]ou are at the edge of promises and prophecies.”66   
Later, when Cromwell’s power was formalized in the Protectorate, he would once again 
draw on the apocalyptic imaginary—this time to dash the millennial hopes of groups like the 
Diggers and the Levellers.  At the opening of Parliament under the Protectorate, Cromwell 
quoted St. Paul’s warning to Timothy: “In the last days perilous times should come, for men 
should be lovers of their own selves, covetous, boasters, proud, blasphemers, disobedient to 
parents, unthankful, &c.”  He continued: “And surely it may well be feared these are our times.  
For when men forget all rules of law and nature…these are sad tokens of our time.”67  In the end, 
however, Cromwell himself would be the victim of apocalyptic condemnation.  The Fifth 
Monarchists, who had once been Cromwell’s allies but were outraged by the creation of the 
Protectorate, eventually condemned the Lord Protector as the Beast of Revelation and actively 
sought to undermine his power.68   Once again, the apocalyptic imaginary refused to remain 
safely in sovereign hands.   
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Hobbes’ Theological Project 
 As the religious and political conflicts of the English Civil War intensified, Thomas 
Hobbes’ political works became increasingly concerned with the challenge that these radical 
apocalyptic ideas posed for political order.69  At the most general level, the trajectory of Hobbes’ 
thought during the English Civil War suggests a growing concern with the conflict between 
secular and religious authority.  Hobbes circulated The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic on 
May 9, 1640, just four days after Charles I dissolved the Short Parliament.70  Only two of the 
work’s twenty-nine chapters deal with the conflict between ecclesiastical and civil authority.71  
Following a series of unsuccessful campaigns in Scotland, Charles I was forced to call The Long 
Parliament in November 1640.  As some members of Parliament began denouncing monarchical 
books, Hobbes started to fear for his safety.  After all, he had defended absolute sovereignty in 
The Elements of Law.  In late November or early December 1640, Hobbes fled to Paris.  There, 
he worked on De Cive, his next major work of political philosophy, which he published in 1642.  
Here, four of the eighteen chapters deal with religious matters and they are grouped in their own 
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section at the end of the work.  Yet, as David Johnston rightly notes, “Scriptural and religious 
questions remained a distinctly subordinate subject in Hobbes’ work.”72  
This would soon change.  Hobbes monitored events in England very closely during his 
exile.  A little more than eight years into his stay in Paris, he would have received news of the 
execution of Charles I on January 30, 1649.  Some scholars suggest that Hobbes began work on 
Leviathan earlier that month.73  The book was published in 1651 and contains his most extended 
treatment of Scriptural and religious matters.  He includes a completely new chapter on religion, 
which he positions at the end of his account of human nature and before his description of the 
state of nature, which forms the basis for his theory of the origins of the commonwealth.74  The 
final two parts of Leviathan—“Of a Christian Commonwealth” and “Of the Kingdom of 
Darkness”—deal, respectively, with Scriptural interpretation and Scriptural error.  These two 
parts occupy as much space as the first two parts on human nature and the commonwealth.  
Thus, as Johnston summarizes, “Scriptural and religious questions occupy more space in 
Leviathan than any other topic discussed in the work, including Hobbes’s theory of the 
commonwealth itself.”75  It is reasonable to suggest that the importance that Hobbes places on 
religious questions in Leviathan, and in later works like Behemoth (1668/1681)76, stemmed from 
his realization of the central role that theological disputes played in the English Civil War. 
However, Leviathan is not only Hobbes’ most theological work, it is also his most 
eschatological.  As I discuss below, he devotes substantial space to undermining the appeal of 
prophecy, explaining the error of the belief that the Pope is Antichrist, and de-radicalizing the 
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75 Johnston, Rhetoric of Leviathan, 115. 
76 Hobbes completed Behemoth, Or the Long Parliament in 1668, but it was not published until 1681, two years 
after Hobbes’ death.   
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Puritan apocalypse.  While De Cive contains a chapter on Christ’s kingdom on earth, Leviathan 
offers a much more detailed and sustained examination of Christian eschatology.  This might 
seem to pose a problem for Hobbes scholars.  As J.G.A. Pocock notes: “If we conclude that 
Hobbes’s interest in eschatology increased between 1642 and 1651, this must have occurred 
during his residence in Paris, in a milieu not usually considered eschatologically-minded.”77  
Why, then, does Hobbes write his most theological and eschatological work in Paris, surrounded 
by intellectuals and rationalists?  There are two related responses to this question.  First, the 
character of the civil war had changed between 1642 and 1651.  The war did not begin in earnest 
until 1642.  Hobbes may still have hoped that the King could survive this challenge.  By 1651, 
the King had been executed, an event that shocked Royalists and moderates alike.  The 
theological and apocalyptic arguments that had been made by Parliamentarians and their 
supporters demanded a response.   In addition, as Pocock himself notes, by the time Hobbes 
published Leviathan in 1651, “the collision between private inspiration and the authority of the 
civil magistrate had become a staple of political debate.  The far greater attention paid to 
apocalyptic in Leviathan than in De Cive may perhaps be a consequence of this.”78  Second, one 
must not ignore the importance of Hobbes’ exile from England.  He followed the events of the 
war closely from Paris, sometimes offering written commentary on them. 79   Growing 
increasingly uncomfortable and anxious in France, he watched as the situation in England 
continued to deteriorate. He was caught between a home to which he felt he could not return and 
an adopted country that was increasingly targeting those who, like him, were critical of 
Catholicism.  The fact that he wrote his most eschatological work in exile puts Hobbes in the 
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best apocalyptic company—alongside Daniel, John of Patmos, and the Marian exiles, whose 
work while abroad was motivated by political developments at home.        
 Hobbes’ response to the apocalypticism of the English Civil War is idiosyncratic and 
complex.  He combats the politically destabilizing potential of the apocalyptic imaginary not by 
trying to escape it or condemn it but by attempting to put it back in the service of sovereign 
power.80  Hobbes pursues two paths to this end—one that is overtly theological and another that 
is seemingly secular.  This section of the chapter traces the first path, while the next explores the 
second.  In examining Hobbes’ theological response to the apocalyptic imaginary, I argue that he 
denounces apocalypse with apocalypse. He condemns the radical Puritan apocalypse as false and 
reveals a “true” apocalypse that has been safely returned into sovereign hands.81  Hobbes does 
this by attacking false prophets, narrowing the definition of Antichrist, and offering an 
alternative Christian eschatology.82  Yet, with each of these moves, the radical apocalyptic 
imaginary seems to escape Hobbes’ attempt to control and subdue it.  This hardly seems 
surprising, given that throughout the civil war and afterward, the apocalyptic imaginary had 
tended to resist and escape efforts at sovereign control. 
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for whom matters of canonicity are determined by the sovereign.  Hobbes’ sovereign had pronounced on this matter.  
Revelation was conical.  This may be one reason why Hobbes is compelled to fight apocalypse with apocalypse.  
See: Hoekstra, “Disarming the Prophets,”109, fn. 60.  
81 This move of denouncing false apocalypses is, for Derrida, one of the defining features of the apocalyptic tone.  
After pointing to the focus in Revelation on identifying and testing false apostles and envoys, he asks: “Shall we 
thus continue in the best apocalyptic tradition to denounce false apocalypses?”  See: Jacques Derrida, “Of an 
Apocalyptic Tone Newly Adopted in Philosophy,” in Derrida and Negative Theology, eds. Harold Coward and 
Toby Foshay.  (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 59.   
82 In pursuing this line of argument, I am suggesting, along the lines of J.G.A. Pocock, that Hobbes’ eschatological 
argument in the last two books of Leviathan is worthy of serious attention from political theorists.  When Pocock 
first published his analysis of Hobbes’ eschatology, very little work had been done in this area.  Pocock summarizes 
the scholarship as follows: “The two books in which Hobbes expounds Christian faith and its sacred history are 
almost exactly equal in length to Books I and II [of Leviathan]; yet the attitude of far too many scholars towards 
them has traditionally been, first, that they aren’t really there, second, that Hobbes didn’t really mean them.”  See: 
Pocock, “Time, History and Eschatology,” 161-2.  This situation is now being remedied in the Hobbes scholarship, 
but more slowly than one might have hoped. 
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 As we have seen, the breakdown of censorship in 1641 led to the explosion of 
apocalyptic prophecy in England.  Distributed as pamphlets, these prophecies became widely 
available to the masses.  In addition, Parliament opened its doors to apocalyptic preachers who 
prophesied and encouraged an unrestrained outpouring of divine violence in preparation for a 
new millennium.   
While Hobbes identified these developments as threats to political order, he certainly 
understood the appeal of prophecy. For him, the roots of religious belief lie in man’s Promethean 
condition, his inescapable tendency to look “too far before him, in the care of future time” and 
therefore to have “his heart all the day long gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other 
calamity.”83  Hobbes will go on to argue that this same anxiety about the future can be harnessed 
to get men to accept an absolute sovereign.84  But it can also bring them under the power of self-
proclaimed prophets offering a compelling interpretation of the crises of the present and a 
captivating vision for a new future.  In Hobbes’ time, these prophets claimed divine inspiration 
from God or special insight into Scripture to authorize their claims.  The performance of this 
divine inspiration carried special appeal.  The radical Puritan preachers, Hobbes explains, “used 
the Scripture phrase (whether understood by the people or not), as no tragedian in the world 
could have acted the part of a right godly man better than these did.”85  They feigned divine 
inspiration, giving their sermons the appearance of spontaneity, as if they had in that very 
moment been “dictated by the spirit of God within them.”86  The prophets and preachers of 
                                                
83 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), book I, chapter 
12, paragraph 5, page 64.  Future references to Leviathan will take the following form: I.12.5, 64.   
84 Stephen Holmes put its well: “If the yet unreal future had no causal power, human beings could never be moved 
by threats of punishment or fear of violent death.”  See: Stephen Holmes, “Introduction,” in Behemoth or the Long 
Parliament (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), xiv.   
85 Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), dialogue I, page 
24.  Future references to Behemoth will take the following form: I, 24.   
86 Hobbes, Behemoth, I, 25.   
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Hobbes’ day appealed to a human anxiety about the future and offered an apocalyptic vision of 
the time to come.87 
 For Hobbes, the problem here concerns divided allegiance.  Both the prophet and the 
sovereign appeal to our anxiety about the future.  When what they each ask of us is 
contradictory, the decision about whom to obey could then rest on whose vision of the future is 
more compelling.  As Stephen Holmes explains, “the struggle for sovereignty is fought on a 
battlefield of wholly unreal imaginings or rationally unjustifiable assumptions about the future.  
Whoever controls the future (or the idea people have of the future) has unstoppable power.”88  
Because the prophet can offer us a different and perhaps more compelling vision of the future 
than the one our sovereign provides, the former can undermine civil sovereignty by dividing our 
allegiances.  For Hobbes, “the most frequent pretext for sedition and civil war, in Christian 
commonwealths, hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of 
obeying at once both God and man…when their commandments are contrary to one another.”89  
The claim of the prophet to speak in God’s name allies him with the divine and reduces the 
sovereign to the status of a mere “man.”  This problem is made worse by our inability or 
unwillingness to question those who claim to speak in God’s name.  Dazzled by a prophetic 
                                                
87 For Hobbes, the fault here does not lie entirely with self-proclaimed prophets and their cunning uses of rhetoric, 
but also with fundamental tendencies of human nature.  This marks an important shift for Hobbes.  In his earlier 
work, The Elements of Law, he crafted a strong opposition between reason and rhetoric and attributed man’s 
outbursts of irrationality to shrewd rhetoricians.  “And such is the power of eloquence,” explains Hobbes, “as many 
times a man is made to believe thereby, that he sensibly feeleth smart and damage, when he feeleth none, and to 
enter into rage and indignation, without any other cause, than what is in the words and passion of the speaker.”  
[Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, Book II, Chapter 8, Para 14, electronic edition].  However, by the time 
Hobbes comes to consider the problem of prophecy in Leviathan, the use of rhetoric is not the only, or even the 
primary, culprit for man’s irrationality.  The main source of irrationality is the power of superstitious and magical 
beliefs.  While they can manipulate such beliefs, rhetoricians do not create them.  Rather, these beliefs emerge from 
a basic human fear of the unknown.  “Ignorance of natural causes disposeth a man to credulity, so as to believe 
many times impossibilities.”  This ignorance of natural causes, along with men’s failure to remedy it, instills a fear 
“of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm [and they] are inclined to suppose and feign unto 
themselves several kinds of powers invisible, and stand in awe of their own imaginations” [Hobbes, Leviathan, 
I.11.23-25, 62].  This analysis is drawn from Johnston, Rhetoric of Leviathan, 60-1, 106-8.     
88 Holmes, “Introduction,” xiv.   
89 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.43.1, 397. 
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vision of the future, men may fail to identify the “many false prophets…that seek reputation with 
the people by fantastical and false doctrines, and by such reputation…govern them for their 
private benefit.”90  Their anxiety about the future and their reverence toward those who claim to 
speak in God’s name leads men astray, away from the proper obedience owed to their sovereign 
and toward rebellion and civil war. 
 Hobbes’ solution to this problem is to identify those who claim to speak in the name of 
God against the sovereign as “false prophets.”  In making this denouncement, Hobbes has 
aligned himself with a rich Christian apocalyptic tradition of identifying false prophets 
announcing the imminent end of the known world.91  Consistent with this tradition, Hobbes 
demands that we test those who claim to be prophets.  Anyone claiming to speak in the name of 
God is “worthy to be suspected of ambition and imposture, and consequently, ought to be 
examined and tried by every man before he yield them obedience.”92  Hobbes first asks men to 
use their reason to assess what the prophet is telling them and whether this should command 
belief or adherence.  To those prophets who claim that God has spoken to them through 
Scripture, Hobbes responds that this is no different than the manner in which God speaks to “all 
other Christian men.”93  The prophet claiming inspiration from Scripture can therefore have no 
special status or authority.  To the prophet claiming divine inspiration through a dream, Hobbes 
wryly responds: “to say he hath spoken to him in a dream is no more than to say he dreamed that 
God spake to him, which is not of force to win belief.”94  A prophet who claims to have had 
                                                
90 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.43.1, 397. 
91 Chapters 2 and 3 of Revelation deal with false prophets and a duty of perseverance.  Similarly, the ‘mini-
apocalypse’ in Matthew warns that “many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ; and shall deceive many” and 
“many false prophets shall rise, and shall deceive many” (24: 5, 11).   
92 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.36.19, 290. 
93 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.32.6, 247. 
94 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.32.6, 247.   
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waking visions may do so because he has failed to observe “his own slumbering.”95  Similarly, 
the prophet’s claim of supernatural inspiration may merely amount to “an ardent desire to speak, 
or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can allege no natural and sufficient reason.”96 
 Not confident in man’s capacity to rationally assess prophetic claims, Hobbes offers a 
more concrete test for identifying false prophets.  He argues that Scripture provides “two marks 
by which together, not asunder, a true prophet is to be known.  One is the doing of miracles; the 
other is not teaching any other religion than that which is already established.”97  In line with the 
contemporary doctrine of the Church of England, Hobbes declares that miracles no longer 
happen.  They ceased because belief in miracles was not necessary for salvation after the work of 
Jesus and Scripture was finished.    The Bible supplies the place of miracles and recompenses 
“the want of all other prophecy, and from which, by wise and learned interpretation and careful 
ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, 
without enthusiasm or supernatural inspiration, may be easily deduced.”98  The cessation of 
miracles alone means that no self-proclaimed prophet can meet Hobbes’ test, as the two marks of 
prophethood must both be present.  Nevertheless, Hobbes also addresses the second mark of a 
prophet—his consistency with established religious doctrine.  The responsibility for establishing 
                                                
95 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.32.6, 247.   
96 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.32.6, 247.   
97 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.32.7, 247-8.  Hobbes draws these criteria from Deuteronomy 13:1-5: “If there arise among 
you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, And the sign or the wonder come to pass, 
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98 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.32.8, 249.  For a discussion of the cessation of miracles as Church of England doctrine and 
the debates among Protestants about this doctrine, see: Jane Shaw, Miracles in Enlightenment England (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006), 21-50.   
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and defending doctrine rests entirely with the sovereign.  Like Moses, the sovereign of a 
Christian commonwealth is the sole interpreter of God’s commands: 
no man ought in the interpretation of the Scripture to proceed further than the 
bounds which are set by their several sovereigns.  For the Scriptures, since God 
now speaketh in them, are the Mount Sinai, the bounds whereof are the laws of 
them that represent God’s person on earth.  To look upon them, and therein to 
behold the wondrous works of God, and learn to fear them, is allowed; but to 
interpret them, that is to pry into what God saith to him whom he appointeth to 
govern under him, and make themselves judges whether he govern as God 
commandeth him or not, is to transgress the bounds God hath set us, and to gaze 
upon God irreverently.99  
  
Thus, those who claim prophetic status while attempting to subvert the religious interpretation 
established by the sovereign must necessarily be false prophets.   
 This attempt to eliminate the subversive potential of prophecy would, if successful, go 
some way towards undermining the radical and antinomian potential of the apocalyptic 
imaginary.  Those claiming the status of apocalyptic prophets must, on Hobbes’ criteria, be false 
prophets.  But Hobbes’ method here rests uneasily with this own diagnosis of the religious unrest 
of the English Civil War.  His argument about false prophets relies on man’s ability to rationally 
assess prophetic claims or, barring that, to simply accept that miracles have now ceased and that 
his sovereign is the only legitimate interpreter of Scripture.  This kind of blind obedience is itself 
rational, if we agree with Hobbes that the sovereign is the only entity capable of rescuing man 
from the state of nature and a constant fear of violent death.  Yet the godly men of the civil war 
succeeded, according to Hobbes, because they appealed not to reason but to the imagination.  
Drawing on man’s anxiety toward the future, they offered a captivating apocalyptic 
interpretation of the crises of the present and the promises of the time to come.  And they 
captivated by virtue of their performance, their ability to play the part of the godly man and to 
enact moments of divine inspiration.  These performances were so convincing that their content 
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became less important than their source.  Hobbes explains, “I think that neither the preaching of 
friars nor monks, nor of parochial priests, tended to teach men what, but whom to believe.  For 
the power of the mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people.”100  The 
basis for authority, then, “is not coercion of the body but captivation of the mind.”101  One is left 
wondering whether Hobbes’ denouncement of false prophets and tests for the assessment of 
prophetic claims can adequately deal with the real threat of radical apocalyptic prophecy—its 
capacity to captivate the imagination and provoke belief.   
 Having attempted to undermine prophetic claims, Hobbes directs his attention to the 
particular content of the prophecies that helped animate the civil war.  In the lead up to the civil 
war, the doctrine that the pope was Antichrist had gained wide mainstream acceptance.  This 
became a particular problem for England when Archbishop Laud and his followers initiated 
reforms that were seen by many as undoing the work of the Reformation and bringing the 
Church of England closer to the Roman Catholic Church.  If the pope and the papacy were 
Antichrist and the Church of England had become “popish,” then the agents of Antichrist must 
be in England.  With the dissolution of censorship and rising religious tensions, “the explosive 
accusation of antichristianity could be levelled against anything one disliked, so it was necessary 
to pin [the accusation] down as something politically harmless.”102  This is precisely what 
Hobbes attempts to do.   
                                                
100 Hobbes, Behemoth, I, 16.  As Stephen Holmes points out, this statement raises important questions about the 
centrality of rational self-interest and self-preservation in Hobbes’ political theory.  The account of human 
motivation in Behemoth, as well as in the last two books of Leviathan, raises serious questions about what Hobbes 
takes to be the true foundation of political authority.  Holmes: “Human behavior, no matter how self-interested, 
remains unpredictable because it is guided partly by assessments of the future, assessments that, in turn, result from 
irrational traits of the mind (naïve trust in prognostications, a gloomy disposition, etc.), not from the calculations of 
a rational maximizer.”  See Holmes, “Introduction,” xv.   
101 Holmes, “Introduction,” xi.   
102 Hoekstra, “Disarming the Prophets,” 107. 
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 He addresses this question in a lengthy chapter of Leviathan that responds to the 
arguments of Cardinal Bellarmine, a prominent defender of the authority of the pope in secular 
matters.  Most of the chapter deals with Bellarmine’s individual claims and reasserts and 
develops Hobbes’ argument that ecclesiastical power does not extend to secular matters.  
However, when he reaches the point in Bellarmine’s argument where the cardinal deals with the 
question of whether the pope is Antichrist, Hobbes becomes conciliatory.  “For my part,” he 
explains, “I see no argument that proves he is so, in that sense the Scripture useth the name, nor 
will I take any argument from the quality of Antichrist to contradict the authority he exerciseth, 
or hath heretofore exercised in the dominions of any other prince or state.”103  While Hobbes 
aggressively defends the jurisdiction of civil sovereigns against papal interference, he will not 
base his argument on an identification of the pope with Antichrist.  Hobbes then makes an 
additional move to render Antichrist politically impotent.  Appealing to Scripture, he argues that 
Antichrist must possess two characteristics: “one, that he denieth Jesus to be the Christ; and 
another that he professeth himself to be Christ.”104  From these two attributes of Antichrist, a 
third follows: “he must also be an adversary of Jesus the true Christ, which is another usual 
signification of the word Antichrist.”105 
 Clearly, then, the Pope cannot be Antichrist, as he does not claim to be Christ, nor does 
he deny that Jesus is the Christ.  While the pope is illegitimately usurping the power of Christian 
kings, “he doth it not as Christ, but as for Christ, wherein there is nothing of The Antichrist.”106  
Hobbes’ narrowing of the definition of Antichrist does not only exclude the pope.  It also 
                                                
103 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.42.87, 376-77. 
104 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.42.88, 377.  Hobbes bases the first characteristic on a passage from 1 John: “Every Spirit 
that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; and this is the spirit of Antichrist” (4:3).  He 
bases the second characteristic on two passages from Matthew: “Many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ” 
(24:5) and “If any man shall say unto you, lo! here is Christ, there is Christ, believe it not” (24:23).   
105 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.42.88, 377.  Emphasis in original. 
106 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.42.88, 378.  Emphasis in original.  
 155 
excludes Archbishop Laud, the episcopacy of the Church of England, the royalists, and the 
parliamentarians, none of whom claimed to be Christ or denied that Jesus is the Christ.  The 
requirement that Antichrist claim to be Christ further excludes the non-Christians historically 
identified as Antichrist, like Muslims or “Turks.”  Hobbes thus excludes “almost any 
conceivable Christian or non-Christian” from the category of Antichrist.107  The true Antichrist 
will come at the end of days, “but that tribulation is not yet come.”108  We will know when it 
does because we will witness “such tribulation as was not [seen] since the beginning of the 
world,” followed by “a darkening of the sun and moon, a falling of the stars, and a concussion of 
the heavens, and the glorious coming again of our Saviour in the clouds.”109  And if we should be 
in any doubt about this, we must always remember that our sovereign is the only legitimate 
interpreter of Scripture.  Thus, the king himself has the authority “to determine whether or not he 
[himself] is the Antichrist predicted in the New Testament.  And one could expect the stars to fall 
well before he would give an affirmative answer to this question.”110  With this, Hobbes appears 
to conclude that the matter is closed.  Antichrist has successfully been divested of its subversive 
potential. 
 Once again Hobbes has offered a rational argument in order to render politically impotent 
a figure that captures the imagination.  Accusations that the pope or the Laudian Church or 
Cromwell was Antichrist did not work at the level of rational persuasion.  Rather, they captivated 
people by drawing on an apocalyptic imaginary that envisioned a final and bloody struggle 
between the forces of good and evil.  Hobbes’ attempt to suck the subversive power from 
Antichrist is subject to the same criticism as his arguments about false prophecy—it does not 
                                                
107 Hoekstra, “Disarming the Prophets,” 108.   
108 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.42.88, 378. 
109 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.42.88, 378. 
110 Hoekstra, “Disarming the Prophets,” 109. 
 156 
adequately acknowledge the imaginative bases of religious conviction.  The accusation that the 
pope was Antichrist did not take the form of an argument.  Rather, it relied on a series of 
imagistic associations.  In the annotations to the Geneva Bible, the first Beast in Revelation 13 is 
the Roman Empire, the “Whore of Babylon.”  The second Beast, who “exerciseth all the power 
of the first beast before him,”111 is then the Roman Catholic Church.  It is hard to know how 
Hobbes expected an argument about the nature of Antichrist to undermine the captivating images 
at work in the apocalyptic imaginary.  Indeed, even Hobbes himself is captivated by the image of 
the Catholic Church swallowing up the authority of the Roman Empire.  For, as he famously 
declares, “the Papacy is no other than the ghost of the deceased Roman empire, sitting crowned 
upon the grave thereof.  For so did the Papacy start up on a sudden out of the ruins of that 
heathen power.”112  It is precisely this imaginative association that lay at the root of the claims 
that the pope was Antichrist.  Despite his argument that the pope cannot possibly be Antichrist, it 
seems that Hobbes too is captivated by the imagery of the apocalypse.  In the throes of this 
captivation, he offers us one of the most enduring images from Leviathan, and one that is all the 
more memorable for the fact that it is embedded in a theological argument that is largely devoid 
of appeals to the imagination.   
 Hobbes’ final theological response to apocalypticism takes the form of an alternative 
Christian eschatology that has been divested of its subversive potential.  Two features of this 
alternative eschatology are particularly important for our analysis here.  First, Hobbes attempts to 
undermine claims that the apocalypse is imminent.  Before and during the English Civil War, 
many apocalyptic prophets had claimed that England was experiencing the end of days foretold 
                                                
111 Revelation 13:12 and Geneva Bible (1599), notes on Revelation 13:12.   
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and Eschatology,” 194.   
 157 
in Revelation.  This lent a sense of divine urgency and importance to England’s struggles and 
was often used to lend the violence of war a sacred legitimacy.  Those who might have been 
unwilling to challenge sovereign power under “normal” circumstances were enticed to rebellion 
by a belief that they were participating in a final battle, after which there would be peace in a 
New Jerusalem.  Hobbes responds to this belief in an imminent apocalypse by condemning it as 
blatantly false.  He explains that the “second coming, not yet being, the kingdom of God is not 
yet come, and we are not now under any other kings by pact, but our civil sovereigns.”113  As 
Hobbes tells us, we will know when the apocalypse begins because the sun and moon will 
darken and the stars will fall.  It is not in our power to hasten or predict the arrival of the last 
days.  Drawing on Scripture, Hobbes summarizes Christ’s position: “my kingdom is not yet 
come, nor shall you foreknow when it shall come; for it shall come as a thief in the night.”114  In 
making this argument, Hobbes is adopting a conservative eschatology that is similar to that of St. 
Augustine.  In colloquial terms, the argument amounts to this: the apocalypse will come, but we 
can never understand it to be happening here and now. 
 Hobbes’ second move in offering an alternative eschatology is more original.  
Apocalyptic prophets and godly men held sway during Hobbes’ time not only because they held 
out the hope for a millennial future but also because they wielded the threat of eternal damnation.  
Failure to participate in the battles of the last days would ensure one a place in the fiery depths of 
hell.  This was indeed a menacing threat.  For his part, the only viable threat the sovereign can 
make is to punish disobedience with death.  The clear imbalance in the power of these two 
threats is politically destabilizing. When the dictates of those threatening eternal damnation 
conflict with those of the sovereign, who can only threaten death, it is clear whose demands will 
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triumph.  “For no man can serve two masters; nor is he less, but rather more a master, whom we 
believe we are to obey for fear of damnation, than he whom we obey for fear of temporal 
death.”115  Hobbes recognizes that this imbalance of threat lies at the origins of the political 
chaos of the civil war.  He notes: “as much as eternal torture is more terrible than death, so much 
they would fear the clergy more than the King.”116  Indeed, there is hardly anything that could be 
more damaging to sovereignty than that “men should, by the apprehension of everlasting 
torments, be deterred from obeying their princes.”117  
 It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this problem for Hobbes’ political 
argument.  The fear of death is the primary passion inclining men to peace and therefore to the 
acceptance of sovereign authority.118  For Hobbes, this passion is so fundamentally legitimate 
and reasonable that it can totally excuse those who violate the laws of the sovereign “by the 
terror of present death…because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation.”119  
Fear of death is therefore the basis of Hobbes’ political argument about the grounds and reach of 
sovereign power “and of his view of the irreducible liberty of subjects.”120  The problem is that 
death is not the only object of human fear.  Hobbes explains: “The passion to be reckoned upon 
is fear; whereof there be two very general objects: one, the power of spirits invisible; the other, 
the power of those men they shall therein offend.”  In this passage and elsewhere in Leviathan, 
                                                
115 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, in Man and Citizen, ed. Bernard Gert (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), chapter 6, section 
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Hobbes treats the latter as “the greater fear.”121  However, when he comes to consider the forces 
that threaten a commonwealth, he admits that the fear of spirits may in fact be the greater fear.  
When civil and spiritual powers come into conflict, the former will draw more people because 
the civil authority is “more visible” and stands “in the clearer light of natural reason.”  Yet the 
spiritual power may still attract “a party sufficient to trouble, and sometimes to destroy a 
commonwealth” because “the fear of darkness and ghosts is greater than other fears.”122  This is 
a remarkable admission.  It calls into question the behavioral basis of Hobbes’ account of 
sovereign power.  It suggests a fundamental disjunction between men as they are—fearful of 
invisible things, like the fiery pits of hell—and men as they should be, according to Hobbes’ 
political theory—rational, egoistic beings who are primarily motivated by a fear of death.     
 Hobbes responds to the problem of the fear of eternal damnation by offering an 
alternative account of the Day of Judgment that denies the possibility of hell and everlasting 
torment.  According to Hobbes, we will all die a corporeal death.  Upon Christ’s return to earth, 
our bodies will be resurrected and we will be judged.  The righteous “shall have their bodies 
suddenly changed, and made spiritual and immortal.”123  However, the sinners will not be 
subjected to eternal torments.  Their punishment is simply that they undergo a second death.  
Hobbes cites those passages of the Bible that refer to unquenchable fire, weeping, and gnashing 
of teeth, but concludes that the pain mentioned there is metaphorical.  It is a metaphor “for a 
grief and discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternal felicity in others which they 
themselves through their own incredulity and disobedience have lost.”124  Upon witnessing the 
felicity of the elect, each wicked man will suffer a second death “after which he shall die no 
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123 Hobbes, Leviathan, IV.44.27, 427.   
124 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.38.14, 309. 
 160 
more.”125 It is inconceivable, Hobbes adds later, that a merciful God “should punish men’s 
transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of torture that men can 
imagine, and more.”126   
This still leaves Hobbes with the challenge of dealing with those parts of the Bible that 
suggest that the fires and torments are everlasting.  He responds that they are endless because 
there will be a perpetual supply of the damned: “For the wicked, being left in the estate they 
were in after Adam’s sin, may at the resurrection live as they did, marry, and give in marriage, 
and have gross and corruptible bodies…and consequently may engender perpetually, after the 
resurrection as they did before.”  The children of the damned “are not worthy to be counted 
amongst them that shall obtain the next world, and an absolute resurrection from the dead; but 
only a short time, as inmates of that world, and to the end only to receive condign punishment for 
their contumacy.”127  The punishment and torment of a second death will last, “by the succession 
of sinners thereunto, as long as the kind of man by propagation shall endure, which is 
eternally.”128  In short, Biblical references to everlasting torments are not meant to suggest that 
such punishment is everlasting for any particular person, but rather that the generations of the 
damned will be perpetually replenished.  In promising us merely a second death, rather than 
everlasting torment, Hobbes thus attempts to remove the threat of eternal damnation from the 
arsenal of those who urge us to act against our sovereign in the name of faith.   
 Once again, Hobbes gives reasons and arguments to counteract a threat that plays on the 
imagination and draws on our deepest fears about endless torture.  He presents some of the most 
terrifying imagery of the Christian bible and then asks his reader to rationally assess the degree 
                                                
125 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.38.14, 309. 
126 Hobbes, Leviathan, IV.44.26, 426. 
127 Hobbes, Leviathan, IV.44.29, 428.   
128 Hobbes, Leviathan, IV.44.29, 429. 
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to which those images logically square with the existence of a merciful God.  Even if we grant 
that Hobbes’ attempt to eliminate hell from the Christian account of the Last Days has been 
successful, at best he has only leveled the playing field between prophets and preachers, on the 
one hand, and the civil sovereign, on the other.  Both are capable of threatening death in 
exchange for disobedience.  Hobbes is thus back in a position which he has consistently tried to 
avoid—one in which the godly and the sovereign can make equal claims upon us.  And given the 
choice between an ordinary death at the hands of one’s sovereign and a second death in the sight 
of an enthroned and judging Christ and his elect, the former may still be vastly preferable to the 
latter.  If one adds to this the utter hopelessness of the knowledge that, once damned, one will 
beget children who will likewise be “doomed to perish utterly without help from the God who 
visibly and humanly reigns over them,”129 death at the hands of one’s sovereign may be a 
welcome fate.130   
 Thus, Hobbes’ attempt to offer an alternative Christian eschatology to counteract the 
radical apocalyptic imaginary is problematic on Hobbes’ own terms.  The apocalyptic prophets 
of the English Civil War had offered visions that captivated the imagination, eliciting the deepest 
fears of their audiences in order to provoke belief.   Hobbes offers arguments to combat 
captivation, reasons to undermine fear, and Scriptural analysis to counter belief.  At every move, 
the apocalyptic imaginary seems to escape his efforts to control and subdue it.  In his theological 
arguments, Hobbes is never quite able to overcome apocalypticism’s capacity to captivate the 
imagination. 
                                                
129 Pocock, “Time, History and Eschatology,” 175.   
130 Hobbes himself seems to have realized that the sexuality of the damned undermined his attempt to offer a more 
humane account of hell.  The 1668 Latin Leviathan omits references to the sexuality of the damned.  A.P. Martinich 
suggests that Hobbes’ account of the endless regeneration of the damned “was undoubtedly an unfortunate view.  
What started off as a humane reinterpretation of hellfire went seriously wrong.  There is not enough difference 
between the eternal suffering of some people and the finite but intense suffering of an infinite number of people.  
Hobbes eventually came to see that his views about eternal flames were not acceptable.”  See: Martinich, Hobbes, 
251.    
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 This criticism may strike some as unfair.131  If Hobbes intended that his theological 
argument be read by learned students of Scripture and intellectuals, then surely his strategy of 
offering Scripturally based arguments is a reasonable one.  After all, these are not the “simple 
people” who are regularly abused by “crafty ambitious persons” wielding prognostications and 
false prophecies.132  They are those who have overcome their “superstitious fear of spirits” and 
“powers invisible.”133  However, it is not at all clear that Hobbes had such a restricted view of 
the audience of Leviathan.  There are certainly moments in this text where Hobbes seems to 
suggest that he intends the work to be read by a very select audience—sovereigns or university 
men.134  Yet the fact that the work was published in English and distributed widely points to 
Hobbes’ effort to expand his audience.  He did not have The Elements of Law printed, but rather 
circulated it among his friends.  Hobbes did have De Cive printed, but circulated it only among a 
small group of international scholars.  Both pieces were printed in Latin—a decision that opened 
Hobbes’ work to international scrutiny, but that limited the size of his audience substantially.  
Leviathan seems aimed a broader audience—the English reading public.   
 However, Hobbes gives important indications that while the audience of the text of 
Leviathan may be limited to the reading public, the intended audience for the book’s philosophy 
is even larger.  Because they are either too busy or too lazy to engage in “deep meditation…in 
the matter of natural justice,” most men “receive the notions of their duty chiefly from divines in 
                                                
131 I would like to thank Dwight Allman and Matthew Evangelista for raising the questions to which I attempt to 
respond in the following three paragraphs.   
132 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.2.8, 11.   
133 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.2.8, 11; II.11.26, 62.   
134 For an argument that Hobbes wrote Leviathan for sovereigns or potential sovereigns, see: Gary Shapiro, 
“Reading and Writing in the Text of Hobbes’s Leviathan,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 18, no. 2 (1980): 
151.  For an argument that Hobbes wrote Leviathan for the purpose of having the book taught in universities, see: 
Tracy Strong, “How to Write Scripture: Words, Authority, and Politics in Thomas Hobbes,” Critical Inquiry, 20, no. 
1 (1993): 131, 159.  For an assessment of these arguments, among others, see: Geoffrey M. Vaughan, “The 
Audience of Leviathan and the Audience of Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” History of Political Thought 22, no. 3 
(2001): 448-471.  My analysis in the following three paragraphs draws heavily on that of Vaughan.   
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the pulpit, and partly from such of their neighbours or familiar acquaintance as having the faculty 
of discoursing readily and plausibly seem wiser and better learned in such cases of law and 
conscience than themselves.”135  The goal of Leviathan is to provide the “wiser and better 
learned” the tools with which to acquaint others with their duties.  At the end of Leviathan, 
Hobbes reflects that his doctrine might profitably be “taught in the Universities,” which “are the 
fountains of civil and moral doctrine, from whence the preachers and the gentry, drawing such 
water as they find, use to sprinkle the same (from both the pulpit and in their conversation) upon 
the people.”136  These remarks suggest that while the audience for the text of Leviathan was 
limited to the reading public, the intended audience for Hobbes’ ideas was much larger.  
  This expanded conception of Hobbes’ audience explains many of the particular features 
of Leviathan—its rhetorical qualities137, its memorable title and frontispiece, and its powerful use 
of imagery, particularly in the first two books.  Hobbes is providing his readers with ways to 
communicate his ideas to the masses, who have neither the time nor the inclination to increase 
                                                
135 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.30.14, 225.   
136 Hobbes, Leviathan, Review and Conclusion, para. 16, 496.   
137 Hobbes’ use of rhetoric in Leviathan has received substantial scholarly attention.  For many of these scholars, 
Leviathan marks a shift in Hobbes’ style from his earlier, more “scientific” works like Elements of Law and De Cive.  
While Leviathan contains some of Hobbes’ most memorable denunciations of rhetoric, it also deploys rhetorical 
techniques like metaphor much more freely and comfortably than his earlier works.  David Johnston argues that 
Hobbes intended Leviathan as a political act designed to initiate a “cultural transformation through which Hobbes 
hoped to lay the foundations required for any truly rational polity to come into being” (xx). Hobbes deploys his early 
humanist education in rhetoric because he has come to understand the power of public opinion and has come to 
consider rationality as something that is artificial, rather than natural.  See: Johnston, Rhetoric of Leviathan, 66-133.  
Quentin Skinner argues, along somewhat similar lines, that Elements of Law and De Cive mark a “scientific” phase 
in Hobbes’ writing during which he was confident that rational argument alone could be persuasive.  However, by 
the time he wrote Leviathan, Hobbes was convinced that reason could do little without rhetoric.  Thus, for Skinner, 
“Leviathan constitutes a belated but magnificent contribution to the Renaissance art of eloquence.”  See: Quentin 
Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 4.  Bryan Garsten offers a useful and persuasive critique of Skinner’s position.  Garsten notes that “the mere 
presence of rhetorical tropes and tricks in Leviathan does not by itself suggest that Hobbes reconsidered the 
opposition to rhetoric that he articulated in Elements and De Cive” (29).  Rather, Hobbes remained hostile to what he 
saw as the central purpose of rhetoric—to generate controversy.  For Garsten, Hobbes’ uses of rhetoric in Leviathan 
“are best understood as an attack on the…rhetorical tradition rather than a return to it” (31).  See: Bryan Garsten, 
Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 25-54.   
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their rational capacity “by study and industry.”138  He must therefore provide the tools to evoke 
their passions.  For, as he noted in an earlier work, “not truth, but image, maketh passion.”139  
And Leviathan, as we shall see, is a work suffused in imagery.  This is what makes it all the 
more surprising and disappointing that when he attempts a theological response to the 
apocalyptic imaginary, Hobbes relies for the most part on dry, scriptural argument.140  He fails to 
adequately confront apocalypticism on the battleground of the imagination.   
 
Hobbes’ Secular Apocalypse 
 However, Hobbes employs a second strategy in his engagement with the apocalyptic 
imaginary that I think is at once more successful and more daring.  He offers a captivating 
secular apocalypse in which the terror of chaos is the prerequisite for a peaceful and orderly 
commonwealth.  As I argue below, both the specific imagery and the structural and narrative 
features of Hobbes’ argument draw on the apocalyptic imaginary of seventeenth-century 
England.  Hobbes’ innovation was to put this antinomian imaginary to new use by redeploying it 
in the service of sovereign power.141    
                                                
138 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.3.11, 14.  This marks a shift in Hobbes’ political thought.  In earlier works, like The 
Elements of Law, Hobbes treats reason as a natural human faculty.  In Leviathan, he suggests that reason, unlike 
prudence, is acquired and artificial.  For an analysis of this transition, see: Johnston, Rhetoric of Leviathan, 94-98.  I 
discuss these views toward the end of this chapter. 
139 Hobbes, Elements, I.13.7. 
140 There are two notable exceptions—the points at which Hobbes refers, almost in the same breath, to the Roman 
Catholic Church as analogous to the “kingdom of fairies” and to the Papacy as “no other than the ghost of the 
deceased Roman empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof.”  See: Hobbes, Leviathan, IV.47.21, 482-483.  
However, for the most part, the theological response to the apocalyptic imaginary in the last two books of Leviathan 
relies heavily on Scriptural argument, rather than compelling imagery.     
141 While it is not possible to make any firm claims about Hobbes’ intention in using the apocalyptic imagery in the 
way that he does, I think it is certainly plausible to suggest that his response to apocalypticism is part of a larger 
rhetorical strategy not “of criticism and rejection but rather of subversive reintegration.”  This is the argument that 
Franck Lessay makes about Hobbes’ use of covenant theology.  See: Franck Lessay, “Hobbes’s Covenant Theology 
and Its Political Implications,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. Patricia Springborg 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 258.  A similar argument could be made about Hobbes’ 
idiosyncratic appropriation of the image of Leviathan, the biblical symbol of primeval chaos, as a secular symbol of 
political order.     
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Philosophy begins, Hobbes argues, with “feigning the world to be annihilated.”142  This 
imagined destruction of the world is an act of mental “privation” that allows Hobbes to construct 
his scientific arguments from the ground up.  On the surface, this may seem like an 
uncomplicated example of Hobbes’ devotion to the scientific method as a basis for philosophical 
reflection.  Yet he does not leave it at that.  He applies this method to his political project.  He 
begins by drawing a comparison between states and mechanical objects.  In order to understand 
how a watch, or a small engine, or a wheel works, “it must be taken insunder and viewed in 
parts.”  Similarly, in order “to make a more curious search into the rights of states and the duties 
of subjects, it is necessary not to take them insunder, but yet that they be so considered as if they 
were dissolved.143   Of course, Hobbes does not want to advocate the destruction of states in the 
name of philosophical inquiry.  We must not take the state “insunder,” but we should imagine 
that it has already been annihilated. 
 The political uses of this apocalyptic method become clearer in Hobbes’ account of the 
state of nature—the condition in which men find themselves in the absence of government.  
Hobbes’ classic description of the state of nature merits a close examination: 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy 
of every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other 
security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them 
withal.  In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof 
is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of 
the commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no 
instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no 
knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no 
society, and which is worst of all, continued fear and danger of violent death, and 
the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.144       
 
                                                
142 Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. 1, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London: Bohn, 
1839), 91. 
143 Hobbes, De Cive, preface, 98. 
144 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.13.9, 76. 
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Here, Hobbes’ annihilating imagination is in full play.  From a philosophical standpoint, the state 
of nature is the void—a condition of nothingness that will form the basis for Hobbes’ 
construction of the Leviathan state. In a political ontology, “order had been the equivalent of 
being, anarchy the political synonym for non-being.”145  Hobbes is describing a condition of non-
existence of the type that follows the political destruction brought about by war.   
Like the threatened apocalypse that haunted his life and work, Hobbes’ state of nature is a 
chaotic and terrifying moment in which all mankind is driven by a “perpetual and restless desire 
of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.”146  It is a violent rupture in the apparent 
temporal continuity of history—a war in which there is “no account of time.”  If the Biblical 
apocalypse is the rupture between the saeculum and the eternity of Christ’s kingdom, then 
Hobbes’ state of nature is the rupture between the life of a political order that has dissolved and 
the creation of the Leviathan state.147  The state of nature is thus an imagined catastrophe that is 
the precondition for a new world order.  In describing this state, Hobbes performs an apocalyptic 
“uncreation.”  All the markers of life in a commonwealth are called to mind only then to be 
annihilated—“no place for industry,” “no navigation,” “no commodious living,” “no letters, no 
society.”  As Mark Houlahan astutely observes, “the stabbing, anaphoric clauses, all predicated 
from ‘there is no,’ mime the uncreation they describe.  The effect is paradoxical…that which is 
described and then negated is powerfully present, only to vanish at the behest of the narrative 
                                                
145 Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, Expanded 
Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 218. 
146 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.11.2, 58.   
147 I tend to agree with Sheldon Wolin, who argues that “the political order was not a condition without precedent, 
but a prior condition once enjoyed, but then lost, and must now be recaptured.”  The state of nature is a “recurrent 
human possibility,” the ever-present threat of a “relapse.”  See: Wolin, Politics and Vision, 236-7.  This reading 
makes sense, I think, in light of the connections that Hobbes draws between the state of nature and the experience of 
civil war.   
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voice.”148  The focus of Hobbes’ frightening account is the annihilation of the commonwealth, 
rather than the condition of natural man. The destruction of man’s creations signals a kind of 
devastation that far exceeds mere barbarism.   
Hobbes could not confine his apocalypse to the imagination.  His account of uncreation 
had its foundation in the realities of the civil war.  He makes this connection clear.  In responding 
to the potential criticism that his description of the state of nature has no foundation in 
experience, Hobbes responds: “it may be perceived what manner of life there would be where 
there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived 
under a peaceful government use to degenerate into, a civil war.”149  A similar though more 
compelling association of the state of nature and civil war is embedded in an argument about the 
dangers of not taking one’s own “Christian sovereign for God’s prophet.”  Men who fail to do 
this, argues Hobbes, are liable to be bewitched into rebellion “and by this means destroying all 
laws, both divine and human, reduce all order, government, and society to the first chaos of 
violence and civil war.”150  Hobbes’ account of the English Civil War in Behemoth echoes these 
frightening associations.  However, perhaps the most terrifying account of war as a radical form 
of uncreation is in Hobbes’ 1629 translation of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War: 
But as this war, it both lasted long, and the harm it did to Greece was such, as like 
in the like space had never been seen before.  For neither had there been so many 
cities expunged and made desolate, what by the barbarians and what by the 
Greeks warring against one another…nor so much banishing and slaughter, some 
by war, some by sedition, as was in this.  And those things which concerning 
former time there went a fame of, but in fact rarely confirmed, were now made 
credible: as earthquakes, general to the greatest part of the world, and most 
violent withal: eclipses of the sun, oftener than is reported of any former time: 
great droughts in some places, and thereby famine: and that which did none of the 
                                                
148 Mark Houlahan.  “Leviathan (1651): Thomas Hobbes and Protestant Apocalypse,” 1650-1850: Ideas, Aesthetics, 
and Inquiries in the Early Modern Era, vol. 2, ed. Kevin L. Cope (New York: AMS Press, 1996), 104-5.   
149 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.13.11, 77. 
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least hurt, but destroyed also its past, the plague.  All these evils entered together 
with this war.151 
 
Hobbes’ translation gives this account of the world-annihilating catastrophe of war a vividness 
that is rarely matched.  While one cannot attribute this imagery directly to Hobbes, I think that it 
is reasonable to conclude that his translation of Thucydides provided him with a vocabulary with 
which to both imagine and describe an apocalyptic moment of uncreation. 
 Yet from the ashes of the annihilated commonwealth the people create the Leviathan 
sovereign, an absolute authority who promises to prevent a relapse into apocalyptic chaos.  There 
are at least two ways to understand the figure of the Leviathan in light of Hobbes’ ruptural 
account of the state of nature.  The first is to see this mythological figure as an entity capable of 
restraining or holding back apocalyptic violence.  The second is to see the Leviathan state as the 
fulfillment of Hobbes’ apocalypse, or the secular equivalent of the Kingdom of Christ.  I will 
explore each of these alternatives in turn.      
 Following some insights first made by Carl Schmitt, some scholars have argued that 
Hobbes’ Leviathan is a secularized katéchon—a figure that restrains the Antichrist and holds 
back the apocalypse.152  As we saw in Chapter 2, the Scriptural basis for the katéchon is in Paul’s 
second letter to the Thessalonians.  In his previous letter, Paul had emphasized that Christ’s 
return to the world would be sudden and unexpected, “like a thief in the night.”153  Paul’s second 
letter suggests that the Thessalonians had mistaken suddenness for imminence and were 
                                                
151 Thomas Hobbes, Hobbes’s Thucydides, ed. Richard Schlatter (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1975), 
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 169 
expecting Christ’s return at any moment, leading to some disorder in the community.  Paul 
assures them that the final days are not at hand.  Christ’s return will be preceded by events that 
have not yet happened.  Jesus will come only after there had been a “falling away” during which 
the “lawless one” will reveal himself by sitting in the temple of God and “declaring himself to be 
God.”154  Yet, as Paul writes, the “lawless one” remains restrained: “And you know what is now 
restraining him, so that he may be revealed when his time comes.”155  Paul continues: “The 
mystery of lawlessness is already at work, but only until the one who now restrains it is removed.  
And then the lawless one will be revealed, whom the Lord Jesus will destroy with the breath of 
his mouth, annihilating him by the manifestation of his coming.”156  The Greek word for the “one 
who restrains” is katéchon, or restrainer.  If we take the “man of sin” to be Antichrist, then the 
katéchon is the force restraining Antichrist and, by extension, the arrival of the apocalypse. For, 
the apocalypse cannot arrive until the Antichrist is loosed.   
 Historically, the restrainer has often been identified with sovereign and imperial power.  
For instance, Christian theologians Hippolytus (170-263) and Tertullian (160-220) identify the 
katéchon with the Roman Empire.  The identification of sovereign power with the mysterious 
restrainer appealed to Schmitt, who sympathized with what he took to be Hobbes’ attempt to 
restrain the apocalyptic promise and antinomian danger of Christian belief.   For Schmitt, the 
Leviathan sovereign performs the same function as Paul’s mysterious “restrainer.”  In a rather 
idiosyncratic comparison, Schmitt likens the Hobbesian sovereign to Dostoevsky’s Grand 
Inquisitor, who arrests the returned Jesus for threatening the order and stability that has been 
achieved by offering men happiness in exchange for their freedom.   Both the Leviathan and the 
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Grand Inquisitor seek to prevent the radical disorder that would come with the Second Coming 
of Jesus without doing away with Christianity altogether.  Thus, for Schmitt:    
Hobbes articulated and provided scientific reason for what the Grand Inquisitor 
did: to make the effect of Christ harmless in the social and political sphere; to de-
anarchize Christianity but to leave it at the same time some kind of legitimating 
effect in the background and in any case not to do without it.  A clever tactician 
gives up nothing, at least as long as it is not totally useless.  Christianity was not 
yet spent.  Therefore, we may ask ourselves: who is closer to Dostoevsky’s Grand 
Inquisitor: the Roman Church or Thomas Hobbes’s sovereign?157 
 
The sovereign does not merely restrain the forces of chaos, but holds back the arrival of Christ 
on earth.158  The radical apocalyptic imaginary is an anarchic and destabilizing force that must be 
kept in check by sovereign power.  It if were to be let loose, we would experience a reversion to 
primordial chaos.   
 As we have seen in the foregoing analysis, Hobbes certainly offers some support for this 
interpretation, particularly if we accept the connections between anarchy, civil war, and the 
apocalypse.  For Hobbes, the civil war was anarchic because of the proliferation of private 
interpretation and judgment.  Private judgments about the nature of justice and injustice, good 
and evil proliferated.  In the state of nature, “nothing can be unjust.  The notions of right and 
wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place.  Where there is no common power, there is no 
law; where there is no law, no injustice.  Force and fraud are the cardinal virtues.”159  The 
sovereign puts an end to this ethical and linguistic anarchy by stabilizing values and language 
through positive law.  Similarly, Hobbes locates the roots of England’s civil war in a 
proliferation of private interpretations of Scripture made possible by the translation of the Bible 
                                                
157 Carl Schmitt, Glossarium.  Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951, as quoted and translated in Palaver, “Hobbes 
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158 Palaver, “Hobbes and the Katéchon,” 68. 
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into the vernacular.160  Now the potentially radical and anarchic message of Christ was available 
for interpretation by anyone.  In response to this threat, Hobbes invests in his Leviathan the sole 
authority for the interpretation of Scripture.  Finally, it is clear that Hobbes sees a dangerous 
anarchic potential in claims to prophetic inspiration.  This problem has become so acute, he 
explains, “that the number of apostates from natural reason is almost become infinite.”  He 
continues by arguing that the opinion that faith is acquired through inspiration “sprang from sick-
brained men, who having gotten good store of holy words by frequent reading of the Scriptures, 
made such a connexion of them usually in their preaching, that their sermons, signifying just 
nothing, yet to unlearned men seemed most divine.  For he whose nonsense appears to be a 
divine speech, must necessarily seem to be inspired from above.”161  In order to thwart the 
potentially dangerous effects of such “nonsense,” Hobbes demands that we accept our sovereign 
as our only prophet.162  In all of these ways, Hobbes’ sovereign moves to restrain the anarchic 
and antinomian features of Christianity. 
   However, while I think this Schmittian account offers a compelling reading of the 
political and theological characteristics of Hobbes’ sovereign, it misses the way in which the 
Leviathan must participate in a secular apocalypse in order to hold back its Christian 
counterpart.  In so doing, the sovereign becomes not just the mortal God, but also the mortal 
Christ, establishing a secular kingdom on earth.  Because it is so focused on the anarchic and 
dangerous character of the state of nature, the Schmittian reading fails to recognize how the 
apocalyptic violence of civil war provides the preconditions for Hobbes’ secular millennial 
kingdom.  For, as terrifying as the state of nature or civil war is, it offers the opportunity for an 
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act of profound political creativity—the construction of an enduring commonwealth from the 
fear and emptiness of apocalyptic anarchy.  
 We can grasp how Hobbes’ Leviathan state can be seen as a secularized millennial 
kingdom by comparing his accounts of civil sovereignty and the Kingdom of Christ.  Before 
embarking on the comparison, however, it is worth noting some important differences between 
Hobbes’ secular and sacred kingdoms.  Hobbes’ sovereign is forced to deal with men as they are, 
rather than men “as they should be.”163  Those ruled by Hobbes’ Leviathan are fearful, 
acquisitive, and sinful, while those in Christ’s millennial kingdom have been saved and are 
secure from sin.  Thus, while the secular state is governed by enforceable laws, Christ’s kingdom 
has no need for law.164  Nevertheless, there are striking similarities between Hobbes’ accounts of 
the secular and sacred kingdoms.  For instance, both have a single locus of authority.  In the 
millennial kingdom, Christ rules both in his spiritual and political capacities.  Hobbes is clear 
that Christ’s kingdom, like the Jewish Kingdom of God that existed before it, will be a civil 
kingdom on earth.165  The first Kingdom of God was created by a covenant between the people 
of Israel and God, was “cast off in the election of Saul,” and will be restored by Christ at the Day 
of Judgment.166  Sovereignty in both the secular and sacred kingdoms is unified and not 
participatory.  In the secular kingdom, the sovereign acts as the sole judge and author of laws.167  
Similarly, Christ acts as the sole judge in his sacred kingdom, passing judgment on all of 
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power (in which I comprehend both right and might) necessary to rule them.”  See: Hobbes, De Cive, 16.15, 323.  I 
draw my analysis in these two paragraphs largely from Joel Schwartz, “Hobbes and the Two Kingdoms of God,” 
Polity 18, no. 1 (1985): 7-24.   
164 Hobbes, De Cive, 17.8, 340.   
165 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.35.   
166 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.35.13, 276.   
167 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.18.6, 112.   
 173 
humanity in a ritual that fuses absolute grace and absolute power.  He “shall judge the world, and 
conquer his adversaries, and make a spiritual commonwealth.”168 
 Perhaps most importantly, both the secular and sacred sovereigns carry out a fundamental 
transformation of humanity.  Christ grants immortality to the faithful by transforming their 
natural and mortal bodies into spiritual and immortal bodies.169  For Hobbes, this transformation 
from mortal to immortal bodies is the essence of salvation.  He reasons: “because man was 
created in a condition immortal, not subject to corruption…and fell from that happiness by the 
sin of Adam, it followeth that to be saved from sin is to be saved from all the evil and calamities 
that sin hath brought upon us.  And therefore, in the Holy Scripture remission of sin, and 
salvation from death and misery, is the same thing.”170  Through the sin of Adam humanity lost 
its immortality.  The act of salvation and redemption is therefore the restoration of immortality to 
the saved.  While the Leviathan state cannot save men from eventual death or redemption from 
sin, the provision and enforcement of laws by the sovereign go some way in protecting them 
from the senseless and premature deaths that occur in the absence of civil authority.  The state of 
nature is fraught with dangers.  Christ cannot offer any kind of redemption or salvation here and 
now because he will not be an earthly sovereign until he comes again.  Thus, in the saeculum, the 
sovereign is the only redeemer.  He can save men from possible death in this life, offering a 
temporary salvation.  The value of this worldly salvation should not be underestimated.  As A.P. 
Martinich explains, “since ‘life’ and ‘death’ are meant literally when Hobbes applies them in 
both his political and religious discussions, salvation here and now is every bit as precious to 
humans as salvation at the Second Coming will be then.”171  
                                                
168 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.42.128, 394. 
169 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.42.128, 394. 
170 Hobbes, Leviathan, III.38.15, 310. 
171 Martinich, Two Gods of Leviathan,  272. 
 174 
Perhaps most impressively, the Leviathan is able to draw on man’s anxiety about the 
future to transform rebellious and anarchic beings into obedient subjects.172  These subjects 
reduce their wills “unto one will,” that of a mortal God who through sheer terror “is enabled to 
conform the wills of them all to peace.”173  This is a remarkable feat.  By the time he wrote 
Leviathan, Hobbes was not at all confident that one could rely on men’s rational capacities and 
their natural fear of death to lead them toward peace.  In earlier works like The Elements of Law, 
Hobbes had treated reason as a natural human faculty.  However, in Leviathan he suggests that 
reason is acquired and artificial.  Beyond prudence, there is “no other act of man’s 
mind…naturally planted in him so as to need no other thing to the exercise of it but to be born a 
man.”  Other faculties, like reason, must be “acquired and increased by study and industry.”174  
One cannot then rely on reason to incline men toward peace and the acceptance of an absolute 
sovereign.  Similarly, as I discussed earlier in the chapter, Hobbes is not entirely confident that 
the fear of death can be relied upon for this purpose either.  While he seems to want to suggest 
that the fear of death is our most basic and reliable fear, he worries that “the fear of darkness and 
ghosts is greater than other fears.”175  In order to produce a lasting secular peace, the sovereign, 
as a mortal God, must therefore terrify man and hold him in awe.  Through his power over both 
secular punishments and Scriptural interpretation, he must turn his subjects into the kinds of men 
that imagine no rewards greater than life and no punishments worse than death.  In short, he must 
turn them into the kind of men who could rationally accept an absolute sovereign.176  This is a 
                                                
172 Schwartz, “Two Kingdoms of God,” 21-23. 
173 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.17.13, 109.   
174 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.3.11, 14.   
175 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.29.15, 216.   
176 There is an authorization problem here.  According to Hobbes’ account of the origins of sovereign power, men 
consent to an absolute sovereign because as rational beings who are fearful of death they see it as the only way to 
avoid the violence of the state of nature.  However, at numerous points in Leviathan, Hobbes seems to suggest that 
we are not naturally rational and that some of us may have fears greater than death.  It is only through learning and a 
correct interpretation of Scripture, which remove the possibility of fears greater than death, that we can be made into 
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transformation of theological proportions.177  Hobbes even holds out the possibility that there 
may be a way to make this secular kingdom, like the Kingdom of Christ, “everlasting.”178  Thus, 
while Hobbes’ state, as katéchon, may indeed hold back the anarchic potential of the Christian 
apocalypse, it can only do so by first participating in a secular apocalypse of its own. 
The analogy between Hobbes’ account of Christ’s kingdom and that of the secular state 
extends beyond the text of Leviathan.  In an admittedly speculative move, I would like to suggest 
that there are distinctively Christic features in the Leviathan represented in Hobbes’ famous 
frontispiece (see figure 6).179   The picture depicts a large figure wearing a crown, holding a 
sword in his right hand and a crosier in his left.  These items are not placed in opposition to one 
                                                                                                                                                       
the kinds of beings capable of consenting to a sovereign.  Yet, for Hobbes, neither this kind of learning nor the 
imposition of a particular Scriptural interpretation can occur in the absence of the peace guaranteed by a sovereign.  
Thus, in order to consent to a sovereign, we would have to already be the subjects of a sovereign.  Whether or not 
this poses a fundamental problem for Hobbes’ social contract theory depends on one’s assessment of the importance 
the theorist places on consent.  My sense is that consent is not as important to Hobbes as it is to other social contract 
theorists, like John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.     
177  David Johnston argues that Hobbes’ “recognition of the pervasiveness of ignorance and the power of 
superstitious beliefs” did not lead Hobbes to argue that sovereign power must rest on myths, beliefs, and illusions.  
As Johnston explains, “Hobbes did not argue that the real power of a sovereign over the lives (and deaths) of his 
subjects should be supplemented by the kind of awe that derives from belief in the supernatural.”  See: Johnston, 
Rhetoric of Leviathan, 110-111.  I think Johnston is right.  Hobbes does not make this argument.  However, as a 
student of Hobbes’ rhetoric, it is surprising that Johnston does not consider that this may be something that Hobbes 
does not have to argue.  The metaphors and images associated with the sovereign—the “Mortal God,” the 
Leviathan—as well as the fabulously evocative frontispiece to the work may make this point in ways that exceed the 
possibilities of any kind of argument.    
178 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.30.5, 221.   
179 There are two frontispieces of Leviathan—the more familiar engraved image in the 1651 printed edition of the 
work and the hand-drawn image in the manuscript copy.  Vaughan summarizes the differences between the two as 
follows: “In the printed version the people making up the body of Leviathan are shown almost in full and all have 
their eyes fixed upon the face of the mortal god.  In the penned version the body of Leviathan is made of faces 
looking out in the same direction as the head.  There are also some differences in the face of Leviathan between the 
two copies…and a quotation from Job is inserted into the printed version.  Some minor discrepancies exist within 
the landscapes and among the buildings of the city in the foreground.  The general impression however, is very 
much the same.”  See: Vaughan, “Audience of Leviathan,” 466.  Despite the similarity in the “general impression,” 
it is worth emphasizing the importance of the orientations of the people who make up the Leviathan’s body.  Keith 
Brown, who has offered one of the most detailed analyses of the frontispiece image, suggests that the manuscript 
version in which the people are looking outwards seems “much better to express the more traditional view…that in 
his book Hobbes is trying to get as close as possible to asserting that what is done by the sovereign in his official 
capacity is, quite literally, also done by his subjects.”  See: Keith Brown, “Thomas Hobbes and the Title-page of 
Leviathan,” Philosophy 55, no. 213 (1980): 411.  See also: Keith Brown, “The artist of the Leviathan title-page,” 
British Library Journal 4, no. 1 (1978): 24-36.  Given that the manuscript frontispiece predates the 1651 printed 
frontispiece, Brown and others argue that the earlier version of the image was likely the one over which Hobbes 
himself had the most input.         
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Figure 6: Frontispiece of Leviathan, ‘Head’ edition, 1651.    
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another, “but are pointed in such a way that they would converge above Leviathan’s head if they 
were extended.”180 His body consists of numerous smaller people.  In the engraved frontispiece 
that accompanies the 1651 printed edition of Leviathan, these people are all looking toward the 
head of the mortal god.  The figure dominates a landscape dotted with fortresses, churches, and 
orderly rows of houses.  While the picture draws the eye upward toward the Leviathan, there are 
some detailed illustrations in the lower half of the image.  Opposite panels lie under the sword 
and the crosier, offering visual representations of secular and religious authority.  Looking from 
left to right and top to bottom, the images are: a castle and a church; a crown and a miter; a 
cannon and a thundercloud; the weapons of war and the “weapons of intellectual disputation, as 
it is practiced in the clergy-dominated universities”181; and a battle and a curial assembly.182  
While scholars disagree about the degree to which Hobbes himself had input into the image, 
most acknowledge that the frontispiece conveys the general thrust of his argument and especially 
to the fusion of secular and religious authority in the person of the sovereign.  The most 
pronounced disagreements concern the question of whose face that of the Leviathan might be 
modeled upon.  Scholars have guessed that the face is meant to resemble that of Charles I, Oliver 
Cromwell, Charles II, or even Hobbes himself.183 
Yet, given that the image represents the fusion of secular and religious authority, is it not 
also possible that the figure has the bearing and manner of Christ?  As A.P. Martinich suggests, 
“the size of Leviathan is consonant with a divine figure.  His two outstretched arms indicate both 
divine, or quasi-divine, judicial judgment and universal jurisdiction.”  Furthermore, the 
                                                
180 Martinich, Two Gods of Leviathan,”  363.   
181 Martinich, Two Gods of Leviathan, 366. 
182 Martinich, Two Gods of Leviathan, 364-6; Vaughan, “Audience of Leviathan, 466. 
183 For reviews and evaluations of these possibilities, see: Martinich, Two Gods of Leviathan, 362-363; Vaughan, 
“Audience of Leviathan,” 467-9; M.M. Goldsmith, “Hobbes’s Ambiguous Politics,” History of Political Thought 
11, no. 4 (1990): 654-73.   
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Leviathan is in a pose that is similar to that of Christ in many Renaissance paintings.184  
Martinich does not pursue this line of visual association, but one may do so in at least a tentative 
manner by examining a selection of works by Anthony Van Dyck, England’s leading court 
painter during the reign of Charles I.  Van Dyck painted numerous portraits of Charles I (see 
figures 7 and 8 for two prominent examples), many of them in which the king is shown either 
wielding or wearing the symbols of secular power.  In none of these paintings is England’s 
sovereign shown with his arms open, in the manner of Leviathan.  One hand is often on the 
king’s hip, while the other holds a sword or rests elegantly at his side.  In fact, it is difficult to 
find any Renaissance image of a sovereign with his arms open.  Yet this open-armed pose had 
been a standard one for images of a judging or healing Christ since the medieval period.  Van 
Dyck’s own Christ Healing the Paralytic (see figure 9) offers a typical Renaissance example of 
the open-armed pose.  However, Gislebertus’ medieval Last Judgment (see Figure 10) provides 
the most striking visual comparison with Hobbes’ frontispiece.  Like Leviathan, Christ is 
portrayed here as a giant towering over his subjects.185  The text carved into lintel could just as 
easily be applied to the secular reign of the Leviathan sovereign: “That here the horror terrifies 
horror, those bonded to earthly error.”186 
  
                                                
184 Martinich, Two Gods of Leviathan, 363.   
185 Horst Bredekamp is, to my knowledge, the first scholar to make the visual association between Hobbes’ 
frontispiece and this image of Christ.  See: Hors Bredekamp, “Thomas Hobbes’s Visual Strategies,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. Patricia Springborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 50.   
186 As translated in Bredekamp, “Hobbes’s Visual Strategies,” 51.   
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Figure 7: Anthony Van Dyck, King Charles I, ca. 1635.  
Musée du Louvre, Paris. 
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Figure 8: Anthony Van Dyck, Charles I, King of England, 
1636.  Windsor Castle, Windsor. 
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Figure 9: Anthony Van Dyck, Christ Healing the 
Paralytic, 1619.  British Royal Collection. 
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Figure 10: Gislebertus, The Last Judgment, 1130-1135.  Autun Cathedral, Autun.    
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My suggestion here is not that the image of Leviathan is meant to be a clear 
representation of Christ, but rather that the figure partakes of both the secular and the Christic.  
It is clear that Hobbes himself thought that his own sovereign, Charles I, was a Christ-like figure: 
For in a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent 
than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman penny?  Yet the coherence 
to me was manifest enough.  For the thought of the war introduced the thought of 
delivering up the king to his enemies; the thought of that brought in the thought of 
the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the 30 pence which was 
the price of that treason.187  
 
And, as we have seen, there are close connections for Hobbes between the secular kingdom and 
the kingdom of Christ—both emerge from apocalyptic terror and violence and both begin with a 
fundamental transformation of humanity.  The figure that looms over the landscape of the 
frontispiece will, like Christ, preside over a kingdom of peace on this earth.   
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that Hobbes, like Machiavelli, developed his political 
thought in an environment marked by widespread fears and hopes about the end of the world.  
Unlike Machiavelli, Hobbes does not turn away from the apocalyptic imaginary and embrace a 
tragic sensibility.  Rather, he fights apocalypse with apocalypse.  In his theological argument, he 
offers a de-radicalized Christian eschatology aimed at returning the apocalypse safely into 
sovereign hands.  I argue that his efforts here are less successful because he fails to engage the 
apocalypse as an imaginary.  However, Hobbes’ political argument relies on a secularized 
rendering of the themes from the apocalypse that engages the imagination with rich visual and 
rhetorical strategies.  In short, in his political argument, Hobbes is able to confront the 
apocalypse on the battleground of the imagination.  The account I have offered here therefore 
                                                
187 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.3.3, 12.   
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differs from those who read his political argument ahistorically as merely an abstract account of 
the normative foundations of sovereignty.  Such a reading fails to account for the ways in which  
Hobbes’ argument relies not only on the persuasive force of a logical thought experiment but 
also on the power of apocalyptic narratives and imagery to provoke belief.  
 This reading of Hobbes has several implications for his identification as a political realist.  
First, as is the case with Machiavelli, Hobbes’ realism is deeply contextual.  Leviathan is often 
taken to be Hobbes’ most politically realist work.  Its pessimistic account of human nature, its 
commitment to a scientific approach to understanding the political world as it is, and its attention 
to the importance of power all seem to support this classification.  It is important, however, that 
this work only develops in response to a civil war rife with apocalypticism.  Only by considering 
this context can we understand why half of Leviathan is devoted to the assessment of theological 
arguments.  This engagement with theology suggests that Hobbes is a more interesting and 
complex realist than caricatures of him suggest.  He recognizes that power has both material and 
ideational, or in this case theological, foundations.  For the project of a peaceful political order to 
succeed, one must engage both the struggle for material power and the battle over “powers 
invisible.”   
Second, the analysis in this chapter suggests that there is a powerful normative core at the 
root of Hobbes’ realism.  His pessimistic account of man as self-interested, egoistic, and fearful 
of death is seriously challenged by the hold that the apocalyptic imaginary and other “powers 
invisible” held over the minds of many of Hobbes’ contemporaries.  At numerous points in 
Leviathan, Hobbes worries that the influence of prophets and preachers may engender a belief in 
rewards greater than life and punishments worse than death.  The task of Leviathan, then, is not 
to describe men as they are but to offer a vision of what they should be and a strategy for their 
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transformation.  For it is only egoistic, self-interested men who fear death who will consent to an 
absolute sovereign promising worldly peace.  Thus, contrary to conventional readings of his 
argument, Hobbes does not assume the existence of egoistic, self-interested men.  He aims to 
create them.188            
Finally, Hobbes’ engagement with the apocalyptic imaginary suggests that there may be a 
rhetorically pragmatic character to his realism.  He recognizes that the apocalyptic imaginary 
captivates people, often holding them back from being the kinds of egoistic, self-interested 
beings that can be made to accept a sovereign.  Instead of rejecting the apocalyptic imaginary, as 
Machiavelli does, Hobbes redeploys it.  In fighting apocalypse with apocalypse, he uses the 
ideational tools of his enemies against them.  Both the imagery and the narrative structure of his 
secular political argument appropriate elements of the seventeenth-century English apocalyptic 
imaginary.  Understood in this way, the political argument of Leviathan is not merely an abstract 
account of the normative basis of sovereign power meant to persuade through careful reasoning.  
It is also an attempt to subvert the apocalyptic imaginary from within by appropriating its 
imagery and narrative structure to provoke belief in a secular sovereign.  Yet there are important 
questions about the degree to which this strategy could be effective in combating the apocalyptic 
imaginary.  After all, the experience of Hobbes’ own time suggests that the apocalyptic 
imaginary consistently escapes efforts at sovereign control.  More importantly for the 
development of Hobbes’ thought, his redeployment of the apocalyptic imaginary coincides with 
this most pronounced abandonment of the realist commitment to take man as one finds him.  
Instead, Hobbes offers the utopian promise that humanity may be transformed through an 
encounter with a monstrous Leviathan sovereign capable of eliciting the kinds of fears required 
                                                
188 Michael Williams puts the point similarly (though to somewhat different ends) in: The Realist Tradition and the 
Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14.   
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for an enduring earthly peace.  In fighting the apocalypse with apocalypse, Hobbes succumbs to 
one of its most radical hopes.  In the next chapter, I will argue that Hans Morgenthau’s later 
work betrays a similar abandonment of realist principles.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HANS MORGENTHAU AND THE POSTWAR APOCALYPTIC IMAGINARY 
 The previous two chapters traced the responses of Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas 
Hobbes to outbreaks of apocalypticism in their respective times.  I argued that while Machiavelli 
is initially captivated by the apocalyptic imaginary, he later turns away from it and adopts instead 
a robustly tragic sensibility.  Hobbes takes an entirely different approach.  Rather than turning 
away from the apocalyptic imaginary, he redeploys it in the service of sovereign power.  He 
fights apocalypse with apocalypse.  In this chapter, I will argue that Hans Morgenthau does both.  
  Writing in the shadow of the Nazis, the Holocaust, and the atomic bomb, Morgenthau’s 
political realism was shaped by a context that initially seems radically different than the 
Christian apocalyptic movements to which Machiavelli and Hobbes were responding.  However, 
using the political theological approach outlined in Chapter 1, I will argue that the way in which 
these events were imagined is at crucial points analogous to the religious apocalyptic beliefs of 
the Italian Renaissance and the English Civil War.  From the Nazi belief in a millennial Reich to 
the redemptive hopes that nuclear war could usher in a new world of peace and prosperity, the 
Judeo-Christian apocalypse insinuated itself into the seemingly secular ideas and images of the 
twentieth century.  Morgenthau’s postwar work is centrally concerned with the dangers of this 
secular apocalyptic imaginary.  From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, his work takes aim at the 
eschatological hopes of contemporary political religions.  While the memory of Nazism looms 
large during this period, Morgenthau’s primary target is liberal internationalism.  In its most 
aggressive form, this secular religion sees a decisive battle against the forces of tyranny as the 
necessary prerequisite for a permanent democratic peace.  Morgenthau’s response to the liberal 
apocalyptic imaginary is a turn to tragedy.  Like Machiavelli, he opposes the apocalyptic longing 
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for the violent birth of a new world with a tragic insistence on the inescapable and undecided 
struggle of politics.  However, in the early 1960s, in the shadow of the terrifying prospect of 
thermonuclear war, Morgenthau turns away from tragedy and adopts the Hobbesian strategy of 
fighting apocalypse with apocalypse.  Against dangerously optimistic scenarios of nuclear war, 
he offers a terrifying account of an apocalypse without worldly redemption.  Faced with the 
novel threat of nuclear annihilation, he seems to conclude that tragedy is not enough.  We must 
constantly imagine the apocalypse in order to prevent it. 
 This chapter proceeds in three parts.  First, I sketch the contours of the postwar 
apocalyptic imaginary, with a particular focus on the ways in which elements of the Judeo-
Christian apocalypse were secularized in the narratives and images of Nazism, the Holocaust, 
and nuclear era.  Second, I outline Morgenthau’s critique of the apocalyptic longings of liberal 
internationalism and the dangers that he diagnoses in a postwar world dominated by crusading 
political religions with the means to wage total war.  I then trace his turn to tragedy as a counter-
apocalyptic worldview.  Third, I argue that Morgenthau eventually finds this tragic worldview 
inadequate for confronting the novel dangers of a nuclear world.  Instead, he strategically 
redeploys the apocalyptic imaginary to cultivate the existential fear required to prevent nuclear 
annihilation.         
 
‘For Us, Time Stopped’: The Postwar Apocalyptic Imaginary  
 On January 8, 1918, ten months before the end of World War I, Woodrow Wilson made 
an eschatological promise to Americans and the world.  This war would be the “final and 
culminating war for human liberty.”1  He had already told Americans that they would be put to 
                                                
1 Woodrow Wilson, Address to Joint Session of Congress (January 8, 1918), accessed February 25, 2011, 
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson's_Fourteen_Points    
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the test in a battle to make “the world safe for democracy.”  A new world would be born not of 
slow and progressive change, but of “fiery trial and sacrifice” in “the most terrible and disastrous 
of all wars”—a war for “civilization itself.”2  In imagining the Great War in these terms, Wilson 
cast it as a violent rupture in the temporal continuity of history, the terrible prerequisite for a new 
world order.  Given the staggering number of casualties and the horrifying realities of trench 
warfare and poison gas, this apocalyptic narrative might have comforted those looking for some 
purpose and promise in a war that seemed absurd.   
Yet, even before the memories of gangrene, gas clouds, and corpses rotting in “no man’s 
land” could fade, the world was witnessing a second war, and one that would fundamentally 
transform the twentieth-century apocalyptic imaginary.  The numbers alone seem to take on 
apocalyptic proportions: over 60 million total deaths, including six million European Jews and 
millions of others killed in the Nazi genocide and final death tolls of 135,000 and 50,000 in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively.   Yet it is the images, rather than the numbers, that would 
come to dominate collective visions of the end times—Hitler’s rallies, the mass graves at 
Auschwitz, and the atomic bomb clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a German Jew who 
left his country in 1932 and emigrated to the United States in time to witness the birth of a 
nuclear age, Morgenthau struggled to envision the prospects for order and survival in a world in 
which the apocalypse loomed not only as an imminent future but also as an experience that had 
been lived in the concentration camps and the burning remains of annihilated cities.  In this 
section of the chapter, I focus on the apocalyptic dimensions of Nazism, the mass exterminations 
of the Holocaust, and the development and deployment of the atomic bomb, all of which created 
a constellation of narratives and images that would haunt Morgenthau’s work. 
                                                
2 Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress (April 2, 1917), accessed February 25, 2011, 
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson's_War_Message_to_Congress    
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At the heart of Nazism lay an apocalyptic myth centered on a millenarian account of time 
that cast the present as a moment of both catastrophe and promise.3  History had reached a 
turning point that would lead either to salvation for some or the annihilation of all.  Hitler’s 
mentor, Dietrich Eckart, announced in 1919: 
Signs and wonder are seen—from the flood a new world will be born.  These 
Pharisees however whine about wretched nest eggs!  It’s not simply a question of 
our collapse—it’s a question of our Golgotha!  Salvation is to befall our Germany, 
not misery and poverty.  No other people on Earth are so thoroughly capable of 
fulfilling the Third Reich than ours!  Veni Creator spiritus!4 
 
This conception of a “Third Reich” as a final and millennial age has its roots in an idiosyncratic 
appropriation of the writings of Joachim of Fiore, the twelfth-century Calabrian abbot whose 
apocalyptic theology had influenced Savonarola, among others.5  Joachim proposed a tripartite 
division of history into three ages, or statuses.  The third status would begin at the end times, 
during which a spiritual elect would defeat Antichrist and usher in a final age in which humanity 
would be transformed.  Historians of ideas have proposed that the Nazis might have become 
aware of Joachim’s thought through the secular appropriations of it in the work of Gutthold 
                                                
3 In making the argument that Nazism relied on apocalyptic narratives and images, I am drawing on and echoing the 
arguments made by: James M. Rhodes, The Hitler Movement: A Modern Millenarian Revolution (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1980); Robert Wistrich, Hitler’s Apocalypse: Jews and the Nazi Legacy (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1985); Thomas Flanagan, “The Third Reich: Origins of a Millenarian Symbol,” History of European Ideas 8, 
no. 4 (1987): 283-295; David Redles, Hitler’s Millennial Reich: Apocalyptic Belief and the Search for Salvation 
(New York: New York University Press, 2005); David Redles, “Nazi End Times: The Third Reich as Millennial 
Reich,” in End of Days: Essays on the Apocalypse from Antiquity to Modernity, ed. Karolyn Kinane and Michael A. 
Ryan (Jefferson: McFarland and Company, 2009), 173-196.  These works elaborate on a set of fragmentary and 
largely intuitional arguments offered by: Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1952), 110-27; Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary 
Messianism in Medieval and Reformation Europe and Its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements, 2nd edition 
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), 308-11; Michael Barkun, Disaster and the Millennium (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1974), 192-4.   
4 Dietrich Eckart, as quoted in Redles, “Nazi End Times,” 173. Veni Creator spiritus (Come Creator spirit) is a 
Catholic chant generally reserved for special Church occasions.  However, as David Redles explains, “seen from the 
perspective of Joachite millennialism…the descent of Holy Spirit upon the Earth takes on a more nuanced meaning.  
‘Golgotha’ [is] where the Romans purportedly crucified Jesus.  For an anti-Semite like Eckart, however, the linkage 
of liberation from ‘the curse of gold’ to the crucifixion is a blaming of Jews for both Germany’s economic woes and 
the death of Jesus.”  Redles, “Nazi End Times,” 189 (n1). 
5 It is worth stressing that Nazism is in no way a natural or logical evolution of Joachim’s thought.  While proto-
Nazi and Nazi thinkers drew upon Joachim’s notion of a third status (i.e. age of the spirit) in their conceptualization 
of a Third Reich, it should be noted that Joachim never meant “status” to refer to any kind of political entity. 
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Lessing and strands of German Idealism,6 as well as through Henrik Ibsen’s Emperor and 
Galilean (1873), which includes a memorable discussion of a coming ‘Third Empire’ in which 
Emperor and God will be one. 7   These ideas were transformed into a distinctly Nazi 
understanding of history by Dietrich Eckart and Otto Strasser and through the appropriation of 
Arthur Moeller van den Bruck’s Das Dritte Reich (1923), which argued for the replacement of 
the Weimar Republic with a Third Reich.  According to Moeller van den Bruck, humanity would 
have to be transformed to “make good again what we have made so bad.”8  The Nazis thus saw 
themselves ushering in a new age. 
 Knowledge of this apocalyptic vision came through experiences of conversion and 
revelation.  Alfred Rosenberg, one of the most powerful authors of Nazi ideology, described this 
experience: “There comes a moment for anyone who is truly searching when, out of thinking and 
fighting, suddenly an experience arises.  From this moment on, the present, past and the outlook 
of the future appear to him in an entirely different light than before.”9  For Hitler and Herman 
Göring, the source of these revelations was a racial identity that called them to an eschatological 
mission.10 Nazi organizational reformer Gregor Strasser suggested that this revelation was also a 
collective experience of turning vague feelings into certain knowledge: 
More and more the unclear feeling of young Germans in all camps is becoming a 
clear realization, that the confusion, the decay of the preceding political, 
economic, and cultural ‘order’ is only the visible expression of one of the most 
thoroughgoing reformations, of the revolutionary stirrings of a new world 
view…on August 1, 1914, a revolution broke out which, with the most serious 
                                                
6 Flanagan, “The Third Reich,” 285.   
7 “JULIAN: Emperor-god; --god-emperor.  Emperor in the kingdom of the spirit,--and god in that of the flesh.  
MAXIMUS: That is the third empire, Julian!  JULIAN: Yes, Maximus, that is the third empire.  MAXIMUS: In that 
empire the present watchword of revolt will be realised.”  Henrik Ibsen, Emperor and Galilean: A World-Historic 
Drama, ed. William Archer (New York: Scribner and Welford, 1890), 274 (Act III).  See also: Redles, “Nazi End 
Times,” 174-5; Flanagan, “The Third Reich,” 285-6; Steven F. Sage, Ibsen and Hitler: The Playwright, the 
Plagiarist, and the Plot for the Third Reich (New York: Basic Books, 2009). 
8 Dietrich Eckart, Das Dritte Reich, as quoted in Redles, “Nazi End Times,” 180.   
9 Alfred Rosenberg, The Volkish Conception of the State (1923), as quoted in Redles, Hitler’s Millennial Reich, 77. 
10 Rhodes, Hitler Movement, 39. 
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convulsions and struggles—of which the World War was only the necessary 
beginning—will bring forth a new world.11 
   
These “convulsions and struggles” were both an impetus to collective revelation and a sign of 
election.  Hitler had claimed in Mein Kampf that Germany had been singled out as a particular 
target.  The German defeat in 1918 was “but the deserved chastisement of eternal retribution.”   
If Germans responded to this chastisement with reform and struggle, it could become “the 
inspiration of a great future resurrection.”12    The German “people” had been chosen to receive a 
revelation, undergo a terrible retribution, and usher in a new age.   
 However, this new age had to be inaugurated by an apocalyptic battle between good and 
evil.  While Nazis agreed that Jews were the cause of this evil, they could not agree why.  Hitler 
argued that Jews could not be considered human “in the sense of being an image of God.”  They 
were instead “the image of the devil.”13  He hypothesized that Jews were once “veritable devils” 
but had taken on human form over time.14  Other Nazis simply thought Jews behaved in an evil 
way.  Regardless of these disagreements, Nazis were agreed that the source of this evil had to be 
eliminated.  If they were successful, this war would give birth to a new world.  Yet as Hitler told 
an audience in 1925, the stakes were high: “As we banded together in this new movement, we 
made it clear to ourselves that in this contest there are only two possibilities: Either the enemy 
will walk over our corpses, or we will walk over his.”15  By 1943, Heinrich Himmler, 
Reichsführer of the Schutzstaffel, sensed that he had to remind his subordinates of their mission.  
He argued that while many Germans seemed to support Jewish extermination on principle, “each 
                                                
11 Gregor Strasser, Kampf um Deutschland (1932), as quoted in Rhodes, Hitler Movement, 59.  
12 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (1925/6), as quoted from the 1943 Ralph Mannheim translation in Rhodes, Hitler 
Movement, 60.  Note the absence of agency here.  Unlike overtly religious forms of apocalypticism in which God 
singles out particular people or groups for chastisement, Hitler does not identify a selective agent.  The implication 
is that “fate” or “history” has singled out Germany.   
13 Hitler, Mein Kampf, as quoted from the 1943 Mannheim translation in Wistrich, Hitler’s Apocalypse, 30.   
14 Hitler, Mein Kampf, as quoted from the 1943 Mannheim translation in Rhodes, Hitler Movement, 45.   
15 As quoted in Rhodes, Hitler Movement, 64. 
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of them has his ‘decent’ Jew” whom he thought should be exempt.  He continued: “Not one of 
all those who talk this way has witnessed it…Most of you know what it means when a hundred 
corpses are lying side by side, or five hundred, or a thousand…We had the moral right, we had 
the duty to our people, to destroy this people which wanted to destroy us.”16  Upon the success of 
this extermination effort depended the creation of a new world and the salvation and redemption 
of the Volk.17  In sum, while its aspirations for a racially-based program of extermination are 
unique, Nazism shared with the apocalyptic movements of late fifteenth-century Florence and 
seventeenth-century England a narrative of the present as an extraordinary moment of both 
catastrophe and promise that would usher in a new age. 
	   While the Nazi millennium failed to come, Hitler’s program of extermination did succeed 
in creating what was for many a lived apocalypse.  Histories of apocalypticism tend to offer 
ample coverage of the eschatological narratives of Nazism and the development and deployment 
of the atomic bomb, while neglecting to consider the ways in which the Holocaust helped shape 
the twentieth-century apocalyptic imaginary.  There are at least two problems with this neglect.  
First, it fails to recognize that the apocalypse was the lens through which some survivors and 
Jewish thinkers came to understand the Holocaust.  I take Elie Wiesel’s thoughtful and troubling 
essay, “A Vision of the Apocalypse,” as illustrative of such an interpretation.18  Wiesel explains: 
                                                
16 As quoted in Rhodes, Hitler Movement, 56.  Himmler is making a rhetorical move here that Hannah Arendt 
diagnoses as an attempt to overcome the animal pity one feels for others in the face of physical suffering.  This 
move consists “in turning these instincts around, as it were, in directing them toward the self.  So that instead of 
saying: What horrible things I did to people!, the murderers would be able to say: What horrible things I had to 
watch in the pursuance of my duties, how heavily the task weighted upon my shoulders!”  See: Hannah Arendt, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin, 1977), 106.   
17 Like other apocalyptic movements, Nazism did not offer a coherent account of the world to come.  Some seemed 
to have thought that Germans would transform into divine beings.  Others expected an immanent, worldly 
immortality through the eternal salvation of the Volk.  For most, the world to come was likely more mundane, 
though still mythical—a reconstructed Germany that would be protected from future disasters.  The common thread 
in these visions was the transformation of humanity and the founding of a new society, from which Jews and 
German dissenters had been purged.  See: Rhodes, Hitler Movement, 77-82.     
18 I want to stress two things here.  First, Wiesel’s essay is illustrative, but by no means representative, of an 
apocalyptic reading of the Holocaust.  In this instance, I do not think any reading could be cast as representative.  
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“To the extent that my contemporaries believe in the Apocalypse, they refer to the one they lived 
through.  They speak of memory more than vision.”19  For him, the calm slaughter of thousands 
of Jews in a single day, doctors separating potential experimental subjects from those destined 
for the gas chambers, and lawyers crafting the Final Solution at the Wannsee Conference mark a 
fundamental shift in the apocalyptic imaginary.  The apocalypse is “no longer great beasts 
spewing forth flames, or horsemen ushering in destruction, or homes ransacked and collapsing in 
an earthquake imparting to History a hallucinatory, fiery end.”  Rather, it is “a spacious and well-
lighted office, well-bred technocrats, efficient secretaries.  It is government employees working 
together with or without passion, with or without conviction, first to imagine, then to bring 
about, Auschwitz.”20  This is an apocalypse devoid of divine or Satanic agency.  It is carried out 
by calm, cultured professionals who “had all read Goethe and admired Schiller.”21   
 Yet this account of the experience at Auschwitz shares more with older religious 
apocalypses than Wiesel admits.  Both are ruptures in the temporal continuity of history.  For 
Wiesel, even as Auschwitz negates history, it “represents a kind of aberration and culmination of 
History.  Everything brings us back to it.  Illuminated by its flames, the present appears more 
understandable.”22  It is the culmination of a history of anti-Semitism, persecutions, expulsions, 
and violence.  It offers a terrifying revelation of truths about European culture that had been 
hidden or only half visible for centuries.  Finally, the Holocaust ushers in a fundamentally new 
world, but not one of redemption and salvation.  Instead, it is a new world that bears symptoms 
                                                                                                                                                       
Second, an apocalyptic reading of the Holocaust is not unproblematic or uncontested.  See, for instance: David G. 
Roskies, Against the Apocalypse: Reponses to Catastrophe in Modern Jewish Culture (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1984); Michael André Bernstein, Forgone Conclusions: Against Apocalyptic History (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994).     
19 Elie Wiesel, “A Vision of Apocalypse,” trans. Joan Grimbert, World Literature Today 58, no. 2 (1984): 195.   
20 Wiesel, “A Vision of Apocalypse,” 196. 
21 Wiesel, “A Vision of Apocalypse,” 196. 
22 Wiesel, “A Vision of Apocalypse,” 195. 
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and traces of terrifying and irrevocable events.23  Wiesel ends his essay by considering whether 
the apocalypse of Auschwitz could be transposed into the future.  He does not fear a return to 
ghettos and gas chambers, but rather the possibility that the culture of indifference and apathy 
that permitted the Holocaust would now fail to prevent a nuclear apocalypse.   
 The second problem, then, with avoiding the Holocaust in an account of the twentieth-
century apocalyptic imaginary is that it blinds us to the connections between the Final Solution 
and the dawn of a nuclear age.  For Wiesel, the two constellations of events are clearly linked: 
“for us, time stopped between Auschwitz and Hiroshima.”24  This connection is by no means 
particular to Wiesel.   For many, the images and lived experiences of Nazi genocide became a 
way to imagine the possibility of nuclear annihilation.  A 1952 New York Times review of The 
Diary of Anne Frank noted how successful this work is “in bringing us an understanding of life 
under threat.  And this quality brings it home to any family in the world today.  Just as the Franks 
lived in momentary fear of the Gestapo’s knock on their hidden door, so every family today lives 
in fear of the knock of war.”25  In the early 1950s, this knocking hand would have certainly been 
that of atomic war.   
In a 1962 piece in The Atlantic Monthly, poet and critic A. Alvarez went further and 
hypothesized that our fear of nuclear annihilation was one of the reasons the concentration camps 
had captured the popular imagination: 
There are no limits to the inflationary spiral of destruction.  From 1940 to 1945 
nearly 4,500,000 people died in Auschwitz.  The same number would die in 
minutes if a hydrogen bomb landed on London.  The gap is very small between 
the comforts of our affluent society and the bare, animal squalor of Birkenau, or 
the finality of the Auschwitz crematorium, with its rasping iron trolleys.  So, 
                                                
23 James Berger, After the End: Representations of Post-Apocalypse (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1999), 61.   
24 Weisel, “A Vision of the Apocalypse,” 195. 
25 Meyer Levin, “The child behind the secret door [Review of Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl]” New York 
Times (June 15, 1952): BR 1. 
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perhaps the concentration camps have kept a tight hold on our 
imaginations…[because] we see them as a small-scale trial run for nuclear war.26 
   
Alvarez’ shift from comparative calculations to the images of Auschwitz is important here—
from the abstract, unthinkable, enormous numbers to the “animal squalor,” the crematorium, and 
the “rasping iron trolleys.”  The analogy between the concentration camp and the effects of 
nuclear destruction is not merely or even primarily one based on comparative death tolls, but on 
a shared visual vocabulary of annihilation.  More than 20 years later, nuclear physicist I.I. Rabi 
would rely exclusively on imagistic association: “And now we have the nations lined up, like 
those prisoners at Auschwitz, going into the ovens, and waiting for the ovens to be perfected, 
made more efficient.”27  It is with these images of extermination, in addition to the haunting 
reports from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that postwar America imagined nuclear annihilation.    
 These imagistic associations emphasize an apocalypse initiated by human and 
technological agency, after which there is no redemption.  This is entirely consistent with the 
picture of the nuclear age in many scholarly treatments of apocalypticism.28  The possibility of a 
nuclear apocalypse seems fundamentally different than the ends of the world envisioned in the 
past.  These older apocalyptic visions are part of a religious cosmology in which “man is acted 
upon by a higher power who has his reasons, who destroys for spiritual purposes (such as 
achieving the ‘Kingdom of God’).  That is a far cry from man’s destruction of himself with his 
                                                
26 A. Alvarez, “The Concentration Camps,” The Atlantic Monthly (December 1962): 70.  The fact that Alvarez 
makes this connection in the early 1960s is perhaps not surprising.  This was the period in which the Nazi genocide 
and nuclear annihilation were linked by a shared referent.  While the word ‘holocaust’ was only starting to become 
the primary referent for the Nazi genocide in the early 1960s, it was a common referent for nuclear annihilation.  
See: Jon Petrie, “The secular word HOLOCAUST: scholarly myths, history, and 20th century meanings,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 2, no. 1 (2000): 43-50.  
27 I.I. Rabi, as quoted in Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Markusen, The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and 
Nuclear Threat (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 9.  
28 For a notable exception that deals explicitly with religious and theological visions of nuclear apocalypse, see: Paul 
Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 115-151. 
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own tools, and to no purpose.”29  With the advent of nuclear weapons, humans became the 
agents of the apocalyptic drama.30  Nuclear technology was also invested with agency of its own, 
powers that exceeded our capacities for understanding and control.  Consider, for example, the 
popular notion from the 1950s that there were “doomsday buttons” in both the White House and 
the Kremlin.  The world could be brought to an end as easily as turning on a television set or a 
dishwasher.  This notion of a push-button apocalypse “reinforced feelings of helplessness and 
apocalyptic inevitability.  Once the button was pushed, nothing could be done to stop the process 
because the technology was…overwhelmingly sophisticated and beyond one’s understanding 
and control.”31  It is this sense of helplessness, inevitability, and technological agency that is so 
effectively parodied and critiqued in Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove (1964).  And, unlike the 
God of the Judeo-Christian apocalypse, nuclear weapons would not usher in a redemptive new 
world.  The human species, along with its material and intellectual achievements, would simply 
be extinguished.         
This standard account of nuclear apocalypticism captures some important shifts in the 
collective imaginary.  However, it overstates the contrast between nuclear apocalypticism and 
the more overtly religious movements to which Machiavelli and Hobbes, for instance, were 
responding.  As we have seen in the two previous chapters, apocalyptic agency is rarely left 
entirely to God.  Both Savonarola and the more radical apocalypticists of the English Civil War 
                                                
29 Robert J. Lifton, “The Image of ‘the End of the World’: A Psychohistorical View” in Visions of Apocalypse: End 
or Rebirth?, ed. Saul Friedländer, Gerald Holton, Leo Marx, and Eugene Skolnikoff (New York: Holmes and Meier, 
1985), 164. 
30 Daniel Wojcik acknowledges, quite rightly, that there are ample examples of apocalypses driven by human 
agency in 19th century literature (e.g. Mary Shelley’s The Last Man) and political ideas (e.g. strands of Marxism).  
He concludes, however, that “these nineteenth- and early twentieth-century visions of worldly destruction and 
transformation were usually optimistic in their evaluation of apocalypse, viewing it not as the end of the world but 
the beginning of the transformation of society.”  He contrasts this with postwar visions that were “increasingly 
pessimistic, stressing cataclysmic disaster as much as previous millenarian visions emphasized the imminent arrival 
or a redemptive era.”  See: Daniel Wojcik, The End of the World as We Know It: Faith, Fatalism, and Apocalypse in 
America (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 97-8.  I shall have more to say on this characterization of 
postwar apocalypticism below.   
31 Wojcik, 103. 
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carved out substantial space for human agency in their apocalyptic projects.  Even more 
importantly, this standard account of nuclear apocalypticism fundamentally ignores the 
optimistic apocalyptic narratives surrounding the development and deployment of these new 
weapons.  The explicit contrast invoked by the standard account is between a divine apocalypse 
that promises spiritual renewal and a human and technological apocalypse that brings total 
annihilation.    This contrast forces the same false choice that Leonard Cohen offers in his darkly 
apocalyptic song “The Future”: “Give me Christ or give me Hiroshima.”32  As we shall see 
below, the postwar apocalyptic imaginary often blended a fear of total annihilation with a hope 
for worldly renewal, giving us both Christ and Hiroshima. 
For example, it was with profoundly redemptive hopes that J. Robert Oppenheimer, the 
scientific director of the Manhattan Project, chose the code name for the first full-scale test of the 
atomic bomb.  General Leslie Groves, the director of the Manhattan Project, wrote to 
Oppenheimer in 1962 to ask why the physicist had coded the test “Trinity.”  Oppenheimer wrote 
back: “Why I chose the name is not clear, but I know what thoughts were in my mind.  There is a 
poem of John Donne, written just before his death which I know and love.  From it a quotation: 
‘As West and East/ In all flatt Maps—and I am one—are one,/ So death doth touch the 
Resurrection.’”33  These lines are from Donne’s “Hymne to God my God in my sicknesse” and 
they establish the theological connection between death and resurrection.34  Oppenheimer’s letter 
to Groves continues: “That still doesn’t make a Trinity, but in another, better known devotional 
                                                
32 Leonard Cohen, “The Future,” The Future, 1992, Columbia. 
33 As quoted in Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 571. 
34 John Donne biographer Robert Stubbs suggests that there may be another possible reading here.  Given that 
Oppenheimer recounted this story to Groves in 1962, “after the McCarthy witch-hunt, …he may have been using the 
reference less to explain the meaning of ‘Trinity’ than to discredit the bi-polar division of the Cold War world he 
had helped to create.  East and West were illusions of a map; if one put the chart around the globe, those extremities 
merged together into one.”  See: Robert Stubbs, John Donne: The Reformed Soul (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 
477.  I find this interpretation difficult to sustain, given that Oppenheimer goes on to cite a second Donne poem that 
cannot be so easily connected to the particular Cold War context of the early 1960s. 
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poem Donne opens, ‘Batter my heart, three person’d God’; --Beyond this, I have no clues 
whatever.”35  Like Donne’s “Hymne,” this sonnet connects destruction and redemption: “Batter 
my heart, three person’d God; for, you/ As yet but knocke, breathe, shine, and seeke to mend;/ 
That I may rise, and stand, o’erthrow mee,’and bend / Your force to breake, blowe, burn and 
make new.” 36  Here, Donne begs God to batter, bend, break, and burn him in order that he may 
be made new. This connection between destruction and redemption may have been especially 
meaningful for Oppenheimer, who sustained himself during the Manhattan Project with the hope 
that nuclear weapons could be used to overpower evil and usher in a new world without war.37 
Upon witnessing the Trinity test on July 16, 1945, he would reach for a much darker and 
non-Western theological vision.  Oppenheimer recalled the lines from the Bhagavad Gita: “If the 
radiance of a thousand suns/ Were to burst at once into the sky/ That would be like the splendor 
of the Mighty One…/ I am become Death,/ The shatterer of worlds.”38  In contrast to the 
redemptive hope of “Trinity,” his remarks here suggest an overwhelming confrontation with 
death and annihilation.   
                                                
35 As quoted in Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, 572. 
36 The sonnet continues with a combination of military and sexual imagery: “I, like an usurpt towne, to’another due,/ 
Labour to’admit you, but Oh, to no end,/ Reason your viceroy in mee, mee should defend,/  But is captiv’d, and 
proves weake or untrue./ Yet dearly’I love you,’and would be loved faine, / But am betroth’d unto your enemie:/ 
Divorce mee,’untie, or breake that knot againe,/ Take mee to you, imprison mee, for I/ Except you’enthrall mee, 
never shall be free,/ Nor ever chast, except you ravish mee.”  See: John Donne, “Holy Sonnet XIV,” in The 
Complete Prose and Selected Poetry of John Donne, ed. Charles M. Coffin (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 
264. 
37 Richard Rhodes cites Hans A. Bethe, head of the Theoretical Division at the Los Alamos Laboratory, explaining 
that Oppenheimer developed these ideas about the moral possibilities of nuclear weapons in conversations with 
Niels Bohr, who put great faith in the potential for international control.  See: Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic 
Bomb, 572.  In a communication with Robert Lifton, Oppenheimer biographer Nuel Pharr Davis said: “In talking 
with me about the name trinity Oppenheimer showed himself apologetic about the rather high-flown poetic 
derivation but not apologetic about the moral assumption.”  See: Robert Lifton, The Broken Connection: On Death 
and the Continuity of Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 370.   
38 As quoted in Lifton, The Broken Connection, 370.   
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Brigadier General Thomas Farrell drew on more explicitly Christian imagery in his 
contribution to General Groves’ official report that was sent to President Truman during the 
Potsdam Conference with Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin: 
The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, 
stupendous, and terrifying…The whole country was lighted by a searing light 
with the intensity many times that of the midday sun.  It was golden, purple, 
violet, gray and blue.  It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby 
mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be 
seen to be imagined.  It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe 
most poorly and inadequately.  Thirty seconds after the explosion came, first, the 
air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost 
immediately by the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday 
and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the 
forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty.  Words are inadequate tools for the 
job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological 
effects.  It had to be witnessed to be realized.39 
 
Farrell offers an overtly apocalyptic and sublime vision of an event so ruptural and magnificent 
that it escapes description.  It can only be witnessed.  Upon receiving this report, President 
Truman reached for images of biblical destruction: “We have discovered the most terrible bomb 
in the history of the world.  It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, 
after Noah and his fabulous Ark.”40  Winston Churchill’s reaction a few days later was even 
darker: “This atomic bomb is the Second Coming in Wrath.”41   
If anything, these darkly apocalyptic visions intensified after the United States dropped 
the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagaski on August 6 and August 9, 1945, respectively.42  
                                                
39 Thomas F. Farrell, as quoted in Leslie R. Groves, Memorandum for the Secretary of War (July 18, 1945), point 
11.  This memorandum is reproduced in Appendix P of: Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the 
Origins of the Arms Race (New York: Vintage, 1987), 308-14.  The quotation from Farrell appears on p. 312.  
40 As quoted in Herbert Mitgang, “Truman’s Newly Found Potsdam Notes Show Concerns on A-Bomb,” New York 
Times (June 2, 1980): A14. 
41 As quoted in Harvey H. Bundy, “Remembered Words,” The Atlantic (March 1957): 57.   
42 In this section of the chapter, I have chosen to focus on those views of nuclear weapons that stress their radical 
newness.  The fact that the scientists who designed the atomic bomb as well as the President who deployed it 
stressed its radical newness is significant. However, there were numerous public figures and scholars (including 
initially Morgenthau) who argued that nuclear weapons did not represent a qualitative shift away from conventional 
weapons.  In the context of the comparative death tolls during World War II, this position was not unreasonable.  
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Initially, however, the responses to the news from Japan were triumphant.  Upon hearing of the 
success of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, President Truman proclaimed: “This is the greatest 
thing in history!”43  It was a sign of the unprecedented military and technological power of the 
United States.  Yet for many, the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagaski did not call forth images 
of an all-powerful America, but of a vulnerable and exposed country awaiting its own 
annihilation.  In an August 12 piece in the New York Times, Washington correspondent James 
Reston suggested: “In that terrible flash 10,000 miles away, men here have seen not only the fate 
of Japan, but have glimpsed the future of America.”44  In a similar vein, broadcast journalist 
Edward R. Murrow worried: “Seldom, if ever, has a war ended leaving the victors with such a 
sense of uncertainty and fear, with such a realization that the future is obscure and that survival is 
not assured.”45  On the brink of Japanese surrender and at the dawn of the nuclear age, many in 
America stared into the future and saw nothing but the possibility of apocalyptic annihilation.46  
                                                                                                                                                       
The fire-bombing of Tokyo had killed at least 100,000 people, while final death tolls at Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
were 135,000 and 50,000, respectively.  The argument that nuclear weapons did not represent a qualitative shift 
from conventional weapons became much more difficult to maintain with the advent of the hydrogen bomb.       
43 President Harry S. Truman, as quoted in Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 221.   
44 James Reston, “Dawn of the Atom Era Perplexes Washington,” New York Times (August 12, 1945): E6.   
45 Edward R. Murrow, August 12, 1945 Radio Broadcast, in In Search of Light: The Broadcasts of Edward R. 
Murrow, 1938-1961, ed. Edward Bliss, Jr. (London: Macmillan, 1968), 102.   
46 Paul Boyer suggests that advocates of international control of nuclear weapons deliberately encouraged and 
exploited this response.  “Without international control of the atom, Americans were endlessly warned, the fate of 
these two cities would be theirs as well.  Highly effective as propaganda, this shorthand use of ‘Hiroshima’ and 
‘Nagaski’ as abstract cautionary devices further diminished the capacity of Americans to respond directly to the 
actual fate of two real cities.  The emotional thrust of the 1946 fear campaign was directed forward to possible future 
atomic holocausts, not backward to what had already occurred.”  See: Paul Boyer, Fallout: A Historian Reflects on 
America’s Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), 14.  
Spencer Weart argues that Hiroshima and Nagasaki presented Americans with “dangerously incomplete” images of 
nuclear annihilation.  The United States government released very few photographs of those who were wounded in 
Japan.  Rather, “the commonly seen Hiroshima pictures mostly showed vast landscapes of rubble, empty of 
victims…The destruction was usually viewed from an Olympian distance, as in the frequently published maps that 
showed with concentric circles how many square miles of a city would be pulverized.”  See: Spencer R. Weart, 
Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 236.  To some extent, however, 
images of nuclear annihilation escaped government control.  John Hersey’s Hiroshima, originally published in a 
1946 issue of the New Yorker offered the following narrative of the destruction, re-created with the help of survivor 
accounts: “He was the only person making his way into the city; he met hundreds and hundreds who were fleeing, 
and every one of them seemed to be hurt in some way.  The eyebrows of some were burned off and skin hung from 
their faces and hands.  Others, because of pain, held their arms up as if carrying something in both hands.  Some 
were vomiting as they walked.  Many were naked or in shreds of clothing.  On some undressed bodies, the burns had 
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These reactions, along with some of the initial responses to the Trinity test, seem to provide 
support for the standard reading of nuclear apocalypticism.  They suggest an apocalypse created 
by human agents who have let loose a technology that they cannot control and that holds them in 
awe.  There is no suggestion of spiritual or worldly renewal.  
Yet, for others, the dawn of the nuclear age marked the birth of a new world and 
promised a kind of earthly salvation.  William Laurence, the New York Times journalist covering 
the Manhattan Project, seems to have experienced a kind of apocalyptic conversion upon 
witnessing the Trinity test.  He compared it to what the first man might have seen “at the 
moment of Creation when God said, ‘Let there be light.’”47  Later that day, he found himself 
saying: “It was like being witness to the Second Coming of Christ!”48  This narrative of 
apocalyptic conversion is even stronger in Laurence’s description of his reactions to the May 21, 
1956 test of an airborne hydrogen bomb in the northern Pacific.  He recounts that his first 
thoughts were of the damage that such a weapon could do to “any of the world’s great cities.”  
But reassurance was almost instantaneous: “This great iridescent cloud and its mushroom top, I 
found myself thinking as I watched, is actually a protective umbrella that will forever shield 
mankind everywhere against the threat of annihilation in any atomic war.”  This phenomenal 
new weapon with over 700 times the power of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
would “continue shielding us everywhere until the time comes, as come it must, when mankind 
                                                                                                                                                       
made patterns—of undershirt straps and suspenders and, on the skin of some women (since white repelled the heat 
from the bomb and dark clothes absorbed it and conducted it to the skin), the shapes of flowers they had had on their 
kimonos.”  See: John Hersey, Hiroshima (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 39-40. 
47 William L. Laurence, Men and Atoms: The Discovery, the Uses and the Future of Atomic Energy (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1959), 118.  Laurence also wrote the following remarks in his notebook that day: “With the 
flash came a delayed roll of mighty thunder, heard, just as the flash was seen, for hundreds of miles.  The roar 
echoed and reverberated from the distant hills and the Sierra Oscuro range near by, sounding as though it came from 
some supramundane source as well as from the bowels of the earth.  The hills said yes and the mountains chimed in 
yes.  It was as if the earth had spoken and the sudden iridescent clouds and sky had joined in one affirmative answer. 
Atomic energy—yes.”  Laurence, Men and Atoms, 120.   
48 Laurence, Men and Atoms, 120.   
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will be able to beat atomic swords into plowshares, harnessing the vast power of the hydrogen in 
the world’s oceans to bring in an era of prosperity such as the world has never even dared dream 
about.”49  For Laurence, the devastation wrought by the atomic bombs dropped on Japan and the 
hydrogen bomb’s potential for unimaginable annihilation had already initiated an apocalyptic 
transformation and the dawning of a new world.  The actual deployment of these bombs in 
populated areas could not even be contemplated.  Total war was a thing of the past. 
However, others were willing to contemplate a world that might come into being after 
thermonuclear war.  From the 1950s onward, numerous articles, books, and films considered the 
possibilities of a post-apocalyptic world.  These works offered a full range of possibilities—from 
the dire to the unapologetically optimistic.50  But the dire scenarios were those that most troubled 
the United States government.  Since the end of the Second World War, policymakers had begun 
to worry that public knowledge of the devastating effects of nuclear war might make Americans 
less willing to “support national policies which might involve the risk of nuclear warfare.”51  In 
1956, the National Security Council ordered a classified study of the effects of the threat of 
nuclear annihilation on American attitudes and behavior.  A panel of social scientists completed 
a report entitled “The Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development.”  The report 
recommended a widespread program of “town hall meetings,” aimed at balancing public 
awareness of the effects of nuclear weapons with an “increased knowledge and understanding of 
both the broad aspects of national security…and the specific countermeasures that can reduce the 
                                                
49 Laurence, Men and Atoms, 197.   
50 For a discussion of some of these books and films, see Kenneth D. Rose, One Nation Underground: The Fallout 
Shelter in American Culture (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 38-77. These works provide a range of 
attitudes toward the possibilities of survival after a nuclear apocalypse, ranging from the acceptant pessimism of 
Nevil Shute’s On the Beach (1957, with a film adaptation in 1959) to an unabashed optimism and faith in the 
regenerative possibilities of a robust civil defense program in Philip Wylie’s Tomorrow! (1954).     
51 Memorandum for the President, Val Peterson (Federal Civil Defense Administration) to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
as quoted in Wm. F. Vandercook, “Making the Very Best of the Very Worst: The ‘Human Effects of Nuclear 
Weapons’ Report of 1956,” International Security 11, no. 1 (1986): 184.  
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effects of nuclear attack.”52  The report concluded by noting that nuclear war might actually 
provide survivors with an opportunity for heroism and renewal: 
The extremity of human disaster might become the opportunity for resolute 
survivors.  It is a brave thing, admittedly, to brace ourselves against the threat of 
annihilation.  It is another, and better, thing to nerve ourselves to make the very 
best of the very worst.  At this historic crossroads we would begin with 
knowledge and we would end with wisdom.  Thus to take counsel with one 
another, to the very town meeting grass roots, would be to draw inspiration from 
our forefathers and to point our children to the sources which make all American 
generations one and which raise hope for a new dynamics for the human race.  It 
is a vision, indeed, but where visions flourish nations endure.53  
  
While “The Human Effects” report was eventually shelved, it suggests a strong concern with 
tempering fears of nuclear annihilation with patriotic and apocalyptic optimism.   
Even without the implementation of the report’s “town hall” public relations program, 
some continued to see reasons for optimism in a post-apocalyptic future.  These optimists turned 
to the predictions of thinkers like Herman Kahn, a systems theorist at the RAND Corporation, 
who argued that despite the hostility of a post-nuclear-war environment, survivors might still 
enjoy “relatively normal and happy lives.”  He even predicted that within a few years, the 
standard of living “would be higher than the standards prevalent in the U.S. between 1900 and 
1930.”54  These kinds of optimistic predictions, combined with President Kennedy’s 1961 civil 
defense and fallout shelter initiative, helped fuel radical hopes.  In an October 1961 editorial, Life 
magazine argued that a shelter-building campaign “will give all Americans the hope that they, 
like their forebears, can some day abandon the stockades to cross whatever new mountains of 
adversity or trial may lie ahead.”55  Later that month, an article in Time magazine struck a similar 
                                                
52 “The Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development” Report, as quoted in Vandercook, “Making the Very 
Best,” 193.   
53 “The Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development” Report, as quoted in Vandercook, “Making the Very 
Best,” 193. 
54 Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Avon, 1962), 91.   
55 “Let’s Prepare…Shelters,” Life (October 13, 1961): 4. 
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note: “Only two days after the thermonuclear attack, many adults might start emerging from the 
protection of their shelters for brief periods…[W]ith trousers tucked into sock tops and sleeves 
tied around wrists, with hats, mufflers, gloves and boots, the shelter dweller could venture forth 
to start ensuring his today and building for his tomorrow.”56  These images of emergence from 
the cramped “womb” of the fallout shelter suggest a rebirth and an opportunity for a uniquely 
American exercise of courage—a kind of post-apocalyptic pioneer spirit.57  What the “Human 
Effects” and these more popular images attempt to elicit is not just the hope that Americans 
could survive a nuclear attack.  Rather, they go beyond nuclear optimists like Kahn and present 
an enticing image of a clean slate and an opportunity to create the world anew and engender “a 
new dynamics of the human race.”  This is the vision of creative renewal through destruction for 
which the standard story of nuclear apocalypticism fails to account.  
In sum, then, the postwar apocalyptic imaginary was comprised of a constellation of 
images and narratives drawn from the most troubling events of the twentieth century.  From the 
apocalyptic narratives underpinning Nazism, through the lived apocalypse of the Holocaust, to 
the combination of dread and hope of the nuclear age, the postwar imaginary resists any easy 
characterizations.  What is clear, however, is the hold that both the terrifying violence and the 
radical hopes of the Judeo-Christian apocalypse had over the modern ‘secular’ imagination.  
 
Apocalypse ‘Under an Empty Sky’ 
 In what follows, I situate Morgenthau’s postwar work in the context of this apocalyptic 
imaginary.  Having left Germany for Switzerland in 1932, Morgenthau immigrated to the United 
                                                
56 “Civil Defense: The Sheltered Life,” Time, October 20, 1961, accessed March 13, 2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,872787-9,00.html 
57 The September 15, 1961 issue of Life included a picture of a teenaged girl relaxing in a distinctly womb-like 
fallout shelter, enjoying a bottle of Coca-Cola and chatting on the telephone (p. 107). 
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States the following year.  After teaching briefly at Brooklyn College and the University of 
Kansas City, he accepted an appointment at the University of Chicago in 1943 and remained 
there for almost thirty years.  His time at Chicago overlapped with that of both Leo Strauss and 
Hannah Arendt, both of whom Morgenthau acknowledged as influential to his own thought.  It 
was during his early years at Chicago that Morgenthau completed three of his most influential 
books—Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (1948), Politics Among Nations (1948), and In 
Defense of the National Interest (1951).  Together, these books helped to secure Morgenthau’s 
status as a “founding father” of the study of International Relations in the United States.58  His 
work, particularly the immensely influential Politics Among Nations, and the political realist 
school of which he was a formative member, set the terms of debate in International Relations 
until the end of the 1960s.59   
In what follows, I offer a reading of Morgenthau’s thought that situates his work in the 
context of the apocalyptic imaginary of postwar America.  I argue that from the late 1940s to the 
early 1960s, he offered a vigorous critique of the apocalyptic tendencies of secularized political 
religions.  This political theological interpretation differs from the dominant portrait of 
Morgenthau’s early postwar work, and Scientific Man versus Power Politics in particular, a 
critique of rationalism and scientism.60  To be sure, there is substantial textual support for this 
                                                
58 Stanley Hoffman, Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1987), 6.   
59 John Vasquez presents preliminary small-N data (gathered from surveys from the early 1970s) to support these 
claims.  See: John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neo-Traditionalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 63-9.  
60 See, for instance: William E. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2009), 41-50; Christoph Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2001), 194-201.  For a reading of Morgenthau that emphasizes his critique of rationalism, whilst 
trying to distance his ideas from those of Schmitt, see: Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 84-104.  I am inclined to agree with 
Nicolas Guilhot when he argues that Williams overstates the differences between Morgenthau and Schmitt: “Rather 
than a matter of substantial difference, it is indeed a striking example of what Freud called ‘the narcissism of small 
differences’: for Morgenthau, cultivating his own distinctiveness was all the more necessary since his position [in 
this case, on the concept of the political] was largely identical with Schmitt’s.  In the deteriorating climate of the 
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dominant portrait.  Morgenthau’s Scientific Man reproduces, without ever citing, the narrative 
and critique that Carl Schmitt offers in his 1929 essay “The Age of Neutralizations and 
Depoliticizations.”  Following Schmitt, Morgenthau argues that liberal rationalism aims at 
nothing short of the “repudiation of politics.”  An ideological product of the ambitious hope of 
the Enlightenment, liberal rationalism denies that the “lust for power” is both an ineradicable 
feature of human nature and the root cause of conflict.  Liberalism sees the power struggles that 
define the political condition as the vestiges from the pre-modern era, embarrassments to be 
overcome by technical means.  Mass education, careful institutional design, free markets, and 
regimes of international law will form the basis for a new order in which the undesirable aspects 
of human nature have been overcome and harmony has taken the place of conflict.61 
 The interpretation that I offer below does not deny that Morgenthau’s early postwar work 
can be read as a critique of liberal rationalism.  Instead, I ask the reader to consider that 
Morgenthau might have taken more than this critique from his “hidden dialogue” with Schmitt.62  
                                                                                                                                                       
1930s, as Schmitt was on his way to becoming the Kronjurist of the Reich, minor conceptual differences acquired 
huge symbolic significance.”  See: Nicolas Guilhot, “American Katechon: When Political Theology Became 
International Relations Theory,” Constellations 17, no. 2 (2010): 252, fn. 99.  This may also offer at least a partial 
explanation for why Morgenthau fails to cite Schmitt even in those moments at which the former most relies on the 
arguments of the latter.     
61 This argument is outlined in: Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1946), 41-74.   
62 William Scheuerman classifies Morgenthau’s connection to Schmitt as a ‘hidden dialogue,’ borrowing the term 
from Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985).  
Scheuerman’s designation strikes me as entirely accurate, given that both thinkers seem to have engaged with and 
borrowed from one another’s ideas, without any overt attribution.  See: William E. Scheuerman, “Carl Schmitt and 
Hans Morgenthau: Realism and beyond,” in Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in 
International Relations, ed. Michael C. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 62-92; Carl Schmitt: The 
End of Law (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 225-52.  On the Schmitt-Morgenthau connection, see: Guilhot, 
“American Katechon,” 224-53; Chris Brown, “’The Twilight of International Morality’? Hans J. Morgenthau and 
Carl Schmitt on the end of the Jus Publicum Europaeum,” in Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans 
Morgenthau in International Relations, ed. Michael C. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 42-61; 
Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 413-509; Christoph Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual 
Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 118-9, 123-32; Hans-Karl Pichler, “The 
Godfathers of ‘Truth’: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau’s Theory of Power Politics,” Review of 
International Studies 24 (1997): 185-200; Hans J. Morgenthau, “Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography: 1904-
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Beyond his critique of rationalism, Morgenthau also offers a political theological diagnosis of the 
postwar international order that is distinctly Schmittian.  He argues the world is mired in the kind 
of explosive conflict that it has not seen since the religious wars of medieval and early modern 
Europe.  The political religions of the postwar period fight to end evil, annihilate their unjust 
enemies, and remake the world in their own images.  While the memory of the secularized 
apocalypticism of Nazism looms heavily in the background of this diagnosis, Morgenthau 
focuses his attention on the Cold War confrontation between Soviet Communism and American 
liberal internationalism, with overwhelming critical attention devoted to the latter.  At its most 
extreme, liberal internationalism sees a devastating final war for a singular “humanity” as a 
necessary prerequisite to a millennial democratic future.  This kind of apocalyptic ideology, 
combined with a return to total war and the potential for large-scale nuclear annihilation, make 
the secularized eschatologies of the twentieth century even more dangerous than their religious 
predecessors.  The postwar world, Morgenthau fears, seems headed for another total war which 
“may end in world dominion or in world destruction or in both.”63   
 This situation is the result of the almost complete dissolution of a Western intellectual 
and moral consensus that emerged at the end of the Thirty Years’ War with the Peace of 
Westphalia and the beginning of the modern state system.  In order to understand Morgenthau’s 
diagnosis of the twentieth century, one must therefore grasp the general outlines of his much 
larger macro-historical narrative.  Before outlining this narrative, however, it is worth noting that 
Morgenthau is no historian.  He proceeds in broad strokes and offers a presentation of empirical 
evidence that is at best highly selective and at worst willfully blind to established historical facts.  
                                                                                                                                                       
1932,” in Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau, eds. Kenneth Thompson and Robert J. Myers (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1984), 15-16.   
63 Hans J. Morgenthau, “World Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century,” The Review of Politics 10, no. 2 (April, 
1948), 172-3.  Parts of this essay are reproduced in chps. 20-22 of Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (2nd 
edition, 1954).  When dealing with material that appears in both texts, I will only cite the original article.       
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His goal, however, is not to offer an accurate account of the inter-state conflict from the 
medieval period to the twentieth century, but to deploy a macro-historical narrative in the service 
of a polemical diagnosis of the postwar international order.   
Morgenthau argues that in antiquity and the Middle Ages, war was total and “whole 
populations faced each other as personal enemies.”64  Participants in the religious wars from the 
Crusades through the early seventeenth century were animated by an unwavering sense of the 
justice of their cause and the need to annihilate their unjust and evil foes.  In such a situation, 
there can be no meaningful limits on either the tactics or targets of violence.  One must either 
force one’s enemies to submit to one’s own worldview or annihilate them altogether. 65 
Morgenthau’s argument here is spotty and underdeveloped.  Much of it has to be inferred from 
the comparisons he makes between religious wars and the secular crusades of the twentieth 
century.66  However, here as elsewhere, his point becomes clearer if we acknowledge the ways in 
which it selectively redeploys an argument first made by Schmitt.  Schmitt argues that the 
theological notion of a Just War turned the conflicts of the Middle Ages and the creedal wars of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries into total wars.  Instead of limiting the tactics and targets 
of violence, the doctrine of Just War encouraged each side to see the other as “unjust” and 
therefore the legitimate target of complete annihilation.67  Morgenthau appears to be making a 
similar point when he argues that in the pre-Westphalian era, “belligerents were held to be free, 
                                                
64 Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 85.   
65 This picture of warfare in Europe during the Middle Ages, along with the more detailed one that Schmitt offers, is 
an example of the kind of problematic presentation of history that I flagged above.  To be sure, there were a few 
examples of the kinds of conflicts Morgenthau describes—the slaughter of Muslims in Palestine by Crusaders 
(1095-1099, 1147-1149, 1187-1192), attacks on Jews in the Rhineland by the same Crusaders (1096), the 
Albigensian Crusade against the Cathars in southern France (1209-1229), and some episodes during the religious 
wars between the mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries.  While these incidents are significant, they hardly 
amount to an accurate general characterization of the nature of medieval warfare.  I am grateful to John Najemy 
alerting me to these examples.      
66 See, for example: Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 85-7.   
67 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, trans. G.J. Ulmen 
(New York: Telos Press, 2003), 141-2.   
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according to ethics as well as law, to kill all enemies regardless of whether or not they were 
members of the armed forces, or else to treat them in any way they saw fit.”68 
For both Morgenthau and Schmitt, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia that brought the Thirty 
Years’ War to an end marks a decisive turning point and the beginning of a new era of European 
international politics to which both thinkers look back with unapologetic nostalgia.69  By 1648, 
“sovereignty as supreme power over a certain territory was a political fact, signifying the victory 
of the territorial princes over the universal authority of Emperor and Pope, on the one hand, and 
over the particularistic aspirations of the feudal barons, on the other.”70  At this point, argues 
Morgenthau, individual citizens found that only their sovereigns could issue and enforce orders.  
                                                
68 Morgenthau’s only evidence on this point is Grotius’ catalog of war atrocities in Chapter 4, Book III of Hugo 
Grotius’ On the Law of War and Peace.  See: Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 82, 82-3.  However, this passage does help to 
explain a worry that Morgenthau shares with Schmitt: that the twentieth-century revival of the medieval doctrine of 
Just War in secular liberal garb provides the precondition for total wars of annihilation.  See: Hans J. Morgenthau, 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd edition (New York: Knopf, 1954), 343; 
Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 87, 97; Schmitt, Nomos, 259-80. 
69  Morgenthau and Schmitt’s construction of the Peace of Westphalia as an historical turning point that 
fundamentally reordered both the structural and normative foundations of international politics is now widely 
recognized as a myth that does not withstand historical scrutiny.  On historical grounds, this account makes at least 
two significant errors.  First, it imputes to the two treaties that comprise the Peace of Westphalia doctrines that are to 
be found nowhere in the documents themselves.  The treaties do not confirm the “sovereignty” or independence of 
the signatories, nor do they articulate any general principle of sovereignty.  See: Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, 
International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 260-8.  Second, 
the traditional account of the Peace of Westphalia fails to acknowledge the gradual nature of the development of the 
modern state system.  In fact, modern states of the kind envisioned in the traditional account did not even begin to 
emerge until the eighteenth century.  Before then, the European “state system” was comprised of “dynastic and other 
pre-modern communities.”  According to Benno Teschke’s detailed historical work, this situation only began to 
change when the rise of modern capitalism and British power prompted the institutional revolutions that would lead 
to what we now recognize as modern European statehood.  See: Benno Teschke, “Theorizing the Westphalian 
System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism,” European Journal of International 
Relations 8, no. 1 (2002): 6, 30-8.  In addition, state sovereignty and the associated norm of non-intervention have 
consistently been violated.  As Stephen Krasner summarizes, “Neither Westphalian nor international legal 
sovereignty has ever been a stable equilibrium from which rulers had no incentives to deviate.  Rather, Westphalian 
and international legal sovereignty are best understood as examples of organized hypocrisy.” See: Stephen D. 
Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 24.  However, 
Morgenthau’s conventional presentation of the Westphalian story was not unusual for its time.  In the same year that 
he published his own extensive treatment on sovereignty, Leo Gross released his immensely influential article “The 
Peace of Westphalia: 1648-1948,” American Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (1948): 20-41.  Here, Gross 
proclaimed that the Peace of Westphalia “represents the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new 
world” (28).  On the influence of Gross’ article in International Relations, see: Osiander, “Sovereignty, International 
Relations,” 264-6.  
70 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Problem of Sovereignty Reconsidered,” Columbia Law Review 48, no. 3 (1948): 341. 
Parts of this essay are reproduced in ch. 19 of Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (2nd edition, 1954).  When 
dealing with material that appears in both texts, I will only cite the original article.       
 211 
Sovereigns found that they could not exert authority within the territory of other states without 
first obtaining permission from their sovereign counterpart or by defeating them in war.  The 
doctrine of sovereignty elevated these facts into a legal theory.  The individual sovereign was the 
“sole source of man-made law, that is, of all positive law, but was not himself subject to it.”71  
The independence of these sovereign states was maintained by a Western tradition that “imposed 
moral and legal limitations on struggle for power on the international scene and…maintained 
order in the international community.”72  For Morgenthau, this supranational moral consensus 
was explicitly Eurocentric and aristocratic.  That is, it was a consensus among princes, 
aristocratic rulers, and high-level diplomats, who were connected with their counterparts in other 
states “through family ties, a common language (which was French), common cultural values, a 
common style of life, and common moral convictions as to what a gentleman was and was not 
allowed to do in his relations with another gentleman, whether of his own or of a foreign 
nation.”73  As sovereigns jostled for power on the international stage, they did so “as competitors 
in a game whose rules were accepted by all the other competitors.”74  In contrast to the 
participants in creedal wars, an aristocratic member of the modern state system would not even 
consider imposing his own particularistic conception of justice on others.  In fact, “the very 
                                                
71 Morgenthau, “Problem of Sovereignty,” 341.  As Nicolas Guilhot notes, Morgenthau’s point here is related to 
Schmitt’s proclamation: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”  See: Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: 
Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 
5; Guilhot, “American Katechon,” 240.   
72 Morgenthau, “World Politics,” 154. 
73 Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 88. 
74 Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 88.  Schmitt makes a similar point when he argues that the rise of the sovereign state 
made international conflict in Europe analogous in most respects to a duel.  The justice of a duel is not determined 
by assessing whether one side or another has a “just cause.”  Rather, a duel is just when “there are certain guarantees 
in the preservation of the form—the quality of the parties to the conflict as agents, in the adherence to a specific 
procedure…and, especially, in the inclusion of witnesses on equal footing…A challenge to a duel (défi) was neither 
aggression nor a crime, any more than was a declaration of war.”  See: Schmitt, Nomos, 143.  As a member of a 
German dueling fraternity during his early twenties, Morgenthau might have particularly appreciated this analogy.   
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possibility of such an aspiration never occurred to them, since they were aware only of one 
universal moral code to which they all gave unquestioning allegiance.”75  
For Morgenthau, as for Schmitt, the most important effect of this supranational moral 
consensus was that it placed limits on international conflict, effectively humanizing warfare.  
Once enemies were no longer seen as evil foes to be annihilated, war began to be seen not as “a 
contest between whole populations but only between the armies of belligerent states.”76  This 
shift in the understanding of international war gave rise to the distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants, prohibited and limited the use of particularly destructive weapons, and 
restricted “the use of war as an instrument of international politics.”77  For Morgenthau, these 
moral limitations arose gradually and came to full fruition in a series of international treaties and 
conventions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.78 The Hague Protocols and the 
Geneva Convention, for instance, attest to “the existence of a moral conscience which feels ill at 
ease in presence of violence or, at least, certain kinds of it on the international scene.”79  
Beyond the legal codification of these moral limits, Morgenthau finds further evidence of 
a supranational consensus in patterns of state behavior.  He considers the ‘hard case’ of Otto von 
                                                
75 Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 98.  For Morgenthau, this moral code is only “universal” within the European state 
system.  In fact, the expansion of the colonial frontier provided an outlet for state ambitions, thereby helping states 
to maintain the “universal moral code” among their European partners.  In fact, Morgenthau attributes the decline of 
the nineteenth-century international system, along with the normative consensus that sustained it, in part to the 
disappearance of the colonial frontier.  See: Morgenthau, “World Politics,” 164-8.  Schmitt makes a similar 
argument about the European nomos (or set of international ordering principles).  This Eurocentrism is the condition 
of possibility for their shared nostalgia. They do not have to seriously consider, for example, the extermination of 
indigenous peoples and the enslavement of Africans by Europeans and Euro-Americans that occurred during this 
period. 
76 Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 83.   
77 Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 84-5. 
78 This is one of the places where Morgenthau’s argument differs sharply from Schmitt’s.  For Schmitt, the Peace of 
Westphalia marked the rise of the modern territorial state and a secular European nomos, which served to “bracket” 
war between European states.  While Schmitt did see cultural homogeneity as an important precondition for this 
nomos, he would have resisted the idea that a universal code (particularly one codified in the international treaties of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which Schmitt sees as a symptom of the dissolution of the European 
nomos) provided the basis for the limited war of Europe’s “golden age.”  See: Brown, “The Twilight,” 51.   
79 Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 84.   
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Bismarck, whose “moves on the chessboard of international politics” in nineteenth-century 
Europe were “ruthless and immoral.”  Yet even Bismarck “rarely deviated from the basic rules of 
the game which had prevailed in the society of Christian princes of the eighteenth century.  It 
was a fraudulent and treacherous game, but there were a few things that no member of that 
aristocratic society would stoop to do.”80  Bismarck, for instance, could never have contemplated 
the possibility of annihilating Germany’s eastern and western neighbors. The fact that Hitler was 
able to imagine and deploy such a strategy is a symptom of the dissolution of the supranational 
moral consensus that had previously restrained even the most ambitious states.  In a paradoxical 
and idiosyncratic move, Morgenthau is suggesting that the naked and seemingly amoral practice 
of international politics in the nineteenth century was actually made possible by an underlying 
supranational moral consensus.  What allowed the “fraudulent and treacherous game” of 
European politics to operate was the fact that the supranational moral consensus prevented 
skirmishes and power grabs from erupting into full-scale campaigns of annihilation. 
Morgenthau attributes the unraveling of this consensus to two developments: “the 
substitution of democratic for aristocratic responsibility in foreign affairs and the substitution of 
nationalistic standards of action for universal ones.”81  The end of the nineteenth century marked 
a shift toward democratic selection of officials responsible for foreign affairs in European states.  
These officials were now “legally and morally responsible for their acts, not to a monarch, that 
is, a specific individual, but to a collectivity, that is, a parliamentary majority, or the people as a 
whole.” 82   This shift had three consequences.  First, officials were no longer recruited 
exclusively from the ranks of the aristocracy, but from a much broader cross-section of the 
population.  They could no longer be expected to share a supranational moral consensus 
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premised on codes of gentlemanly conduct.  Second, regular elections caused frequent turnover 
of government officials.  The lasting personal and cultural ties that held the supranational 
consensus together evaporated.  Finally, and most importantly, the persistent need to appeal to an 
electorate with diverse moral positions made the possibility of a supranational consensus 
impossible.  Individual voters “may have no moral convictions of a supranational character at all 
which determine their actions on election day…or, if they have such convictions, they will be 
most heterogeneous in content.” 83   In this cacophony of diverse moral commitments, 
“international morality as an effective system of restraints on international policy becomes 
impossible.”84  The consensus that had held the Westphalian European state system together was 
torn apart by democracy and pluralism. 
 The second development that Morgenthau holds responsible for the unraveling of this 
consensus—“the substitution of national standards of action for universal ones”—is, in my 
reading, less a cause than a consequence of this unraveling.  Morgenthau explains that in the 
absence of a cohesive and aristocratic international society, the community of Western states 
fragmented into a plurality of national communities with their own particular moral ideals, each 
claiming universal validity. 85   Nations became both the supreme principle of collective 
organization and the ultimate repositories of moral allegiances.86  To be sure, the nineteenth-
                                                
83 Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 92.   
84 Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 91. 
85 Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 95. 
86 Morgenthau, “World Politics,” 154.  At this point in Morgenthau’s argument, a careful reader might well ask:  
Why would individuals with the diversity and plurality of moral commitments that made a supranational consensus 
impossible in a democratic age be willing to commit themselves to the moral consensus required by nationalism?  
This is not a question to which Morgenthau provides an adequate answer.  He argues that the individual recognizes 
that he lives in an age in which universal moral standards cannot effectively restrain state action.  States flout these 
universal standards and the individual’s conscience is “ill at ease.”  Unable to give up on the idea of a universal 
ethics, “he pours, as it were, the contents of his national ethics into the now almost empty bottle of universal ethics.”  
While this argument may explain the way in which an individual comes to substitute the moral standards of his own 
nation for the universal standards of a dying supranational consensus, it does not explain how nationalism is able to 
overcome the plurality of moral commitments that had posed such difficulties for the continued viability of an 
international society.  See: Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 96.       
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century golden age to which Morgenthau looks back with unapologetic nostalgia had its fair 
share of nationalism.  However, nineteenth-century nationalism had the more limited goal of 
national liberation.87  The nation itself was “the ultimate goal of political action, the end-point of 
the political development beyond which there are other nationalisms with similar goals and 
similar justifications.”88  In contrast, the twentieth-century “nationalistic universalisms” of 
German Nazism, Soviet Communism, and American liberal internationalism see the nation as 
“but the starting-point of a universal mission whose ultimate goal reaches to the confines of the 
political world.”89  Foreign policies became sacred missions and wars became crusades waged 
“for the purpose of bringing the true political religion to the rest of the world.”90  Morgenthau’s 
characterization of the phenomenon of nationalistic universalism is striking and worth quoting at 
length: 
[Nations] oppose each other now as the standard-bearers of ethical systems, each 
of them of national origin and each of them claiming and aspiring to provide a 
supranational framework of moral standards which all the other nations ought to 
accept and within which their international policies ought to operate.  The moral 
code of one nation flings the challenge of its universal claim in the face of another 
which reciprocates in kind.  Compromise, the virtue of the old diplomacy, 
becomes the treason of the new…Thus, the stage is set for a contest among 
nations whose stakes are no longer their relative positions within a political and 
moral world accepted by all but the ability to impose upon the other contestants a 
new universal political and moral system recreated in the image of the victorious 
nation’s political and moral commitments.91 
   
The international system is no longer a chessboard on which monarchs and aristocrats seek to 
improve their relative positions.  It is an unlimited war between nationalist political religions 
with false claims to universality. 
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 What becomes clear at this point is that Morgenthau is not simply criticizing the pseudo-
religious tendencies of nationalistic universalism, but also the process of secularization that 
provides their condition of possibility.92  The supranational consensus that had created a genuine 
“society” of European states was not just moral.  It was also religious.  The rules that constrained 
Bismarck in the nineteenth century were the same ones that “had prevailed in the society of 
Christian princes of the eighteenth century.”93  The supranational consensus was composed of 
“Christian, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian elements” and the international society that this 
moral agreement created “had united the monarchs and the nobility of Christendom.”94  The 
instability of the twentieth century became permanent “as a result of the weakening of the ties of 
the [Western] tradition, especially in the form of religion.”95  The nationalist pseudo-religions of 
the twentieth century are therefore the products not only of the weakening of supranational 
ethical standards but also of secularization.96  Invoking Hobbes, Morgenthau notes: “The state 
has indeed become a ‘mortal God,’ and for an age that believes no longer in an immortal God, 
the state becomes the only God there is.”97  
                                                
92 This dimension of Morgenthau’s thought has received very little attention in the secondary literature, which tends 
to ignore the political theological features of his work.  Nicolas Guilhot’s work is a notable exception and my 
argument here borrows from the interpretation he offers in “American Katechon,” 242-3.   
93 Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 81.  Emphasis mine. 
94 Morgenthau, “Twilight,” 95, 93.  Emphasis mine. 
95 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 98.  Emphasis mine.   
96 These are the moments in Morgenthau’s argument where he comes closest to overtly endorsing Schmitt’s 
secularization thesis.  For Schmitt, the combination of the depoliticizing tendencies of the liberal state and the 
separation of the political from the religious creates the conditions of possibility for a “mass belief in an 
antireligious activism…the belief in unlimited power and the domination of man over nature, even over human 
nature; the belief in the ‘receding of natural boundaries,’ in the unlimited possibilities for change and prosperity.  
Such a belief can be called fantastic and satanic, but not simply dead, spiritless, or mechanized soullessness.”  See: 
Carl Schmitt,  “The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations” (1929), in The Concept of the Political, trans.  by 
George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 94.  However, as Guilhot explains, “Schmitt does not 
advocate a re-theologization of politics; rather, he defends the autonomy of the political, but also warns that this 
autonomy is premised on the historical constitution of a territorial order distinct from, but coexisting with, the moral 
order embodied by the ecclesial institutions of Christianity.  Should secularization proceed to the extent that the state 
no longer understands itself in relation to (and in tension with) this background and conflates its own interests with 
morality itself—as in the case of liberalism—then it would assume again religious attributes and give rise to 
dangerous political religions.”  See: Guilhot, “American Katechon,” 234.     
97 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil,” Ethics 56, no. 1 (1945): 15. 
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In the golden era of the European state system, universal religion had been tamed—
transformed from the enabling condition of wars of annihilation to part of the background 
consensus that curbed the worst excesses of power politics.  The pseudo-religions of the 
twentieth century drive the world back to wars of annihilation aimed at the eradication of evil.  
The nationalistic masses of the twentieth century meet “carrying their idols before them…each 
group convinced that it executes the mandate of history, that it does for humanity what it seems 
to do for itself, and that it fulfils a sacred mission ordained by providence, however defined.  
Little do they know that they meet under an empty sky from which the gods have departed.”98  
The destructive nationalism of the twentieth century is a symptom and product of secularization.   
 The three most powerful nationalistic universalisms of Morgenthau’s day are German 
Nazism, Soviet Communism, and American liberal internationalism.  Indeed, he dates the 
ultimate destruction of the supranational moral consensus that had prevailed since 1648 to the 
rise of the Nazis in 1933.99  For him, the secularized religious elements of Nazism were quite 
clear: “It has in Hitler its savior, in S.A., S.S., and party its sacred orders, in Mein Kampf its 
bible, in the immutable twenty-five points of the party program its catechism, in the racial 
community its mystical body.  It has its miracles and rituals, its apostles, martyrs, and saints.”100  
At its heart is an apocalyptic dualism in which “the German race is on the side of the angels, and 
the Jews and other ‘racial degenerates’ are on the side of the devil; and once the problem is 
posed in such terms, the solution presents no intellectual or physical difficulties.”101  The 
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solution is the elimination of evil through a program of mass extermination and worldwide 
conquest of apocalyptic proportions.  It is only through this transformative war that “the hidden 
will of nature and of racial destiny becomes manifest.”102  And, like the apocalyptic religions of 
the creedal wars, Nazism’s “claim to acceptance is absolute and not subject to critical doubt.”103  
Any form of dissent is “a sacrilegious revolt against the ‘voice of the blood,’ through which the 
genius of the race makes itself known.”104  Nazism’s promise of worldly salvation was proven 
false, its prophecies unfulfilled, and its bid for universality lost with Germany’s defeat in the 
Second World War.105  What is important, however, is that Morgenthau treats Nazism not as an 
aberrant or unique historical occurrence, but as a case of the broader phenomenon of an 
apocalyptic political religion whose aim is world transformation and domination.   
Nazism’s lost bid for universality left two remaining political religions whose conflicts 
would define the postwar world—Soviet Communism and American liberal internationalism.  
While Morgenthau makes occasional remarks about the pseudo-religious qualities of the 
former106, the overwhelming bulk of his critical attention is devoted to the latter.  Like religious 
eschatologies, liberal internationalism has a teleological conception of history that culminates in 
a final battle to purge the forces of evil, ushering in a new world of peace and prosperity.  
However, liberal internationalism is not apocalyptic from the outset.  It begins with a progressive 
millennial conception of history that anticipates change through gradual and peaceful 
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transformation, rather than cataclysmic violence.  It expects the slow but inevitable spread of 
democracy to all corners of the world, bringing the benefits of education and rationalism with it.  
Liberal democracy overcomes the messy antagonisms of politics by replacing them with a 
rational and efficient plan, effectively reducing the political to the technical.107  And with 
democracy, education, and reason comes peace.  Violent conflict is seen as “something 
irrational, unreasonable, an aristocratic pastime or totalitarian atavism which has no place in a 
rational world.  War is essentially a thing of the past.”108  Once reason becomes the driving force 
of international affairs, the causes of conflict disappear and any remaining disagreements can be 
settled peacefully.  Because the rationalist philosophy that underpins liberalism identifies the 
rational with the good, we should also expect to see moral progress.  The notion that there is one 
(more demanding) set of ethical standards for the individual and another (more permissive) set 
for the state will disappear.  As Woodrow Wilson proclaimed in 1917: “We are the beginning of 
an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for 
wrong shall be observed among nations…that are observed among the individual citizens of 
civilized states.”109  In short, without any violent intervention, the world will march toward a 
more democratic, peaceful, and moral future. 
Yet like other frustrated millennialist movements for whom the inevitable transformation 
of the world fails to materialize, liberal internationalists seek explanations for the inability of 
history to achieve its ends.  Faced with uneven evidence of the spread of democracy or the 
success of international legal reforms, “the internationalists take the appropriateness of the 
devices for granted and blame the facts for the failure.  ‘When the facts behave otherwise than 
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we have predicted,’ they seem to say, ‘too bad for the facts.’”110  The obstacles to liberal 
internationalist projects are not the schemes themselves or the belief in human perfectibility upon 
which they are based, but rather “lack of knowledge and understanding, obsolescent social 
institutions, or the depravity of certain isolated individuals or groups.”111  The failure to 
overcome the irrationality of war with a democratic peace is blamed on totalitarian and 
aristocratic states, or evil and criminal nations who disrupt the normalcy of “peaceful 
competition and cooperation.”112   
For Morgenthau, this turns the conflicts of the postwar era into battles of good versus 
evil.  In contrast to the “selfless and moral” foreign policies of the United States, “the foreign 
policies of other nations are by definition selfish and immoral.  Since the United States is the 
policeman of the world seeking only peace and order and the welfare of all, only evil nations can 
dare oppose it.  They are criminals when they act alone, conspirators when they act in unison.”113  
And if criminals cannot be made peaceful through education and reform, “they must be 
converted with fire and sword.”114  Liberal idealism thus falls victim to the same dangers as 
medieval Just War thinking.  The moral limits on war that were crystallized in the international 
treaties of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries become meaningless.  When confronting 
an unjust foe, “the moral duty to spare the wounded, the sick, the surrendering and unarmed 
enemy, and to respect him as a human being who was an enemy only by virtue of being found on 
the other side of the fence is superseded by the moral duty to punish and to wipe off the face of 
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the earth the professors and practitioners of evil.”115  Convinced that they have justice on their 
side, liberal internationalists will fight total wars which can only end in the annihilation or 
“unconditional surrender” of the unjust enemy. 
Given their abhorrence of war, liberal internationalists justify these battles by investing 
them with apocalyptic significance.  This is what Woodrow Wilson did when he announced to 
America and the world in 1918 that the Great War would be “the final and culminating war for 
human liberty.”  For Morgenthau, these slogans are not propaganda meant to conceal the base 
power interests of the United States.  Rather, “they are the expression of an eschatological hope 
deeply embedded in the very foundations of liberal foreign policy.”116  That hope is for a world 
transformation through a final and decisive battle against the irrational forces of evil.  The 
promise of such a battle, as well as the grounds for its moral justification, is that it is the 
necessary prerequisite for a permanent peace.  The liberal millennium is “a brave new world” in 
which states do not engage in power politics and where the concept of a national interest 
becomes meaningless in a “community of interests comprising mankind.”117  For Morgenthau, 
who conceptualizes politics as a particularly intense form of antagonism and conflict, the liberal 
millennium amounts to nothing less than “the repudiation of politics.”118  It is a dangerous 
apocalyptic fantasy that takes aim at both the desire for power that inheres in individuals and the 
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international manifestation of this desire in the pursuit of national interests.  Because these 
desires are unchanging, liberal wars can never be “last wars.”  Instead, like World War I, they 
will merely be “the forerunners and pioneers of wars more destructive and extensive than any 
liberal epoch had witnessed.”119  This possibility loomed large over the postwar world, in which 
American liberal internationalism had met its crusading foe in Soviet Communism and both had 
found in nuclear weapons the means to match their totalizing ends.  
Like Machiavelli, Morgenthau’s response to the apocalyptic political religions of his time 
is a turn to tragedy.  While this turn pervades much of his work from the 1940s and 1950s, 
Morgenthau’s clearest articulation of the tragic worldview is in the final chapter of Scientific 
Man versus Power Politics (1946).  Here, he aims to recover a “tragic sense of life” that has been 
lost in the modern era.  At the root of a tragic worldview is “the awareness of unresolvable 
discord, contradictions, and conflicts which are inherent in the nature of things and which human 
reason is powerless to solve.”120  Morgenthau’s turn to tragedy is often read as a critique of the 
scientism and rationalism that underpins the liberal tradition.121  There is certainly ample textual 
evidence to support this interpretation.  However, it does not exhaust the possibilities of 
Morgenthau’s tragic worldview.  In the foregoing analysis, I have drawn out the political-
theological dimensions of Morgenthau’s portrait of a crusading liberalism.    I suggest here that 
his turn to tragedy offers a response and alternative to liberal internationalism’s apocalyptic 
imaginary.   
Against the teleology of the liberal millennial and apocalyptic narratives, Morgenthau 
offers a tragic and cyclical conception of time.  The fortunes of states and men rise and decline in 
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an “everlasting and ever undecided struggle” with no hope for a settled end to political 
conflict.122  Here, Morgenthau could have looked to classical Greek tragic narratives or to the 
rich German revival of tragedy in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber, among 
others.123  He does not.  Instead, he draws on the Christian pre-rationalist tradition of Duns 
Scotus, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Martin Luther, all of whom acknowledge that “the 
sinfulness of man is…not an accidental disturbance of the order of the world sure to be overcome 
by a gradual development toward the good but…an inescapable necessity which gives meaning 
to the existence of man and which only an act of grace and salvation is able to overcome.”124  
Morgenthau’s appeal to a language of sin and salvation is taken by some interpreters to be a 
means of concealing the German origins of his ideas for an American audience only beginning to 
recover from World War II.125  However, the deployment of this Christian pre-rationalist 
tradition allows Morgenthau to make an important anti-apocalyptic move.  He asserts: “There is 
no progress toward the good, noticeable from year to year, but undecided conflict which sees 
today good, tomorrow evil, prevail; and only at the end of time, immeasurably removed from the 
here and now of our earthly life, the ultimate triumph of the forces of goodness and light will be 
assured.”126  Morgenthau borrows from the conservative eschatology of Augustine and locates 
the apocalyptic triumph of good over evil in an unforeseeable future.  When and if it ever 
happens, this triumph will come in the form of a divine act, not as the product of human agency.  
In the secular world of the here and now, history offers no hope for a final and settled end to 
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conflict.  The best one can hope for is to be “passed by for a time by the stream of events” in a 
tragic drama played out again and again.127 
Morgenthau argues that any human project that aims to create a final and just peace 
ignores the tragic limits to political action.  The effects of our actions always escape our 
intentions.  There are three reasons for this.  First, we are all caught between our higher moral 
and spiritual aspirations, on the one hand, and our animal drive to dominate, on the other.  As a 
result, man “is forever condemned to experience the contrast between the longings of his mind 
and his actual condition as his personal, eminently human tragedy.”128  While the age of science 
offers the promise of engineering “a new man whose powers equal his aspirations and who 
masters human destiny as he masters a machine,” this promise soon reveals itself to be nothing 
more than “the old hybris…in the new vestments of a scientific age.”129  We are condemned to 
an eternal agonism between our higher aspirations and our lower drives.  As a result, we will 
often be unable to recognize our moral intentions in our political actions.  Second, even if we can 
temporarily master our urge to dominate others, we are unable to control and anticipate the 
worldly effects of our deeds.  Once performed, an action collides with other actions and 
provokes responses, leading to consequences that we could never have foreseen and have only a 
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limited capacity to control.  These collisions “deflect the action from its intended goal and create 
evil results of our intentions.”130   
Third, our best intentions may be corrupted even before they are translated into actions.  
The world confronts us with tragic choices between equally legitimate ends.  The necessity of 
making a choice means that our actions are never wholly good.  In pursuing one moral end, we 
inevitably abandon another. Morgenthau confronts us with the familiar example of the conflict 
between our religious and secular duties: “While trying to render to Caesar what is Caesar’s and 
to God what is God’s, we will at best strike a precarious balance which will ever waver between 
both, never completely satisfying either.”131  These kinds of conflicts are particularly pronounced 
in politics, where the connections of the self to others through action multiply.  For Morgenthau, 
as for Machiavelli, the best statesmen are those who recognize these tragic conflicts and still 
manage to act:  
To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act 
nevertheless, is moral courage.  To choose among several expedient actions the 
least evil one is moral judgment.  In the combination of political wisdom, moral 
courage, and moral judgment, man reconciles his political nature with his moral 
destiny.  That this conciliation is nothing more than a modus vivendi, uneasy, 
precarious, and even paradoxical, can disappoint only those who prefer to gloss 
over and to distort the tragic contradictions of human existence with the soothing 
logic of specious concord.132 
        
These precarious and temporary conciliations are the best that we can hope for in a tragic world.  
The expectation of a final overcoming of this modus vivendi is a dangerous illusion premised on 
the desire to escape from the moral conflict and struggle of the political condition.   
 
                                                
130 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 189.   
131 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 190.   
132 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 203.  Machiavelli makes a similar point about expediency and moral judgment at 
least three times.  See: Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), ch. 21, 91; Machiavelli, Discourses, I.6, 22; I.38, 81-2. 
 226 
Nuclear Death 
 While this tragic worldview offers an alternative and response to the apocalyptic political 
religions vying for global dominion, it provides few intellectual or imaginative strategies for 
confronting the radical novelty of the nuclear age and the very real threat of an all-out nuclear 
war.  Morgenthau’s writings from the 1950s are marked by a struggle to come to terms with this 
novel threat.  In the early 1960s, however, Morgenthau takes a decisive turn away from a tragic 
perspective and toward a Hobbesian strategy of fighting apocalypse with apocalypse.  His 
remarkable 1961 essay “Death in the Nuclear Age” offers a terrifying account of an apocalypse 
without redemption or renewal.  This essay, along with some of Morgenthau’s other later work, 
marks a definitive shift away from a tragic worldview and toward a reformative attempt to 
imagine the apocalypse in order to prevent it.   
 During the late 1940s and 1950s, Morgenthau struggled to grasp the radical novelty of 
nuclear weapons, his position developing and changing with advances in nuclear capabilities.  In 
1948, he casts nuclear weapons as merely the latest stage in the mechanization of warfare.  
Nuclear weapons represent a development that is similar in kind, through far greater in 
magnitude, to the invention of the machine gun.133  Nevertheless, it is a development that, along 
with the crusading political religions of the twentieth century, has made total war possible.134  As 
he outlines in Politics Among Nations, the obvious solution to this problem is a world state that 
can extract loyalty from humanity as a whole, provide the “citizens” of the world with some 
measure of justice, and establish a “monopoly of organized violence.”135  The mistake of 
previous advocates of international government had been to assume that such an institution could 
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be imposed from above.  Just as a national state emerges from the bottom-up demands of a 
society, a world state would first require a world society. As Campbell Craig neatly summarizes: 
“for a world state to emerge, a world society would have to form, with enough power and 
influence to: a) persuade majorities of the world’s national populations to transfer their loyalties 
from their own state to a world entity; b) ensure somehow that the citizens of the world state can 
expect justice from it; and c) then compel all of the world’s states to turn over their arms to a 
new world entity.”136   
Unfortunately, there is no escaping the fact that most people still invest their highest 
loyalties in the nation-state. Occasional bursts of international humanitarian assistance aside, 
there is little evidence of the kind of supranational society required to create a world state.  Thus, 
Morgenthau concludes: “There is no shirking the conclusion that international peace cannot be 
permanent without a world state, and that a world state cannot be established under the present 
moral, social, and political conditions of the world.”  The tragedy, he goes on, is that “in no 
period of modern history was civilization in more need of permanent peace and, hence, of a 
world state, and that in no period of modern history were the moral, social, and political 
conditions of the world less favorable for the establishment of a world state.”137  Morgenthau’s 
solution is to cast the creation of a world community as a long-term goal, the first step toward 
which is the mitigation and minimization of the sources of conflict.    He therefore concludes 
Politics Among Nations with a nostalgic plea for a return to the traditions and practice of 
nineteenth-century European diplomacy.138  This solution rests uneasily with the analysis in the 
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rest of this work.  In a world marked by the erosion of the supranational consensus that made 
nineteenth-century diplomacy possible, a return to the past is impossible.139  In the shadow of the 
atomic bomb, Morgenthau’s prescriptions seemed to assume a world that no longer existed. 
During the 1950s, Morgenthau acknowledged the novelty of nuclear weapons, while still 
clinging to conventional solutions.  For him, the successful Soviet test of an atomic bomb in 
1949 was “an event of the greatest importance.  In comparison with it, all the great issues of the 
postwar period fade into insignificance.”140  His response to this frightening news was a demand 
for massive and rapid American rearmament and almost unqualified support for the development 
of the hydrogen bomb.141  Morgenthau responded with similar alarm in the aftermath of the 1957 
Soviet satellite launches, urging both a conventional weapons build-up and the direction of the 
“total resources of the nation toward achieving an operational ICBM at the earliest possible 
moment.”142  In response to the novel problems posed by nuclear weapons, Morgenthau still 
seemed to be responding with rather conventional pleas for the restoration of the balance of 
power between the United States and the Soviet Union.   
Yet lurking behind these prescriptions was a growing suspicion that conventional 
responses would not be sufficient.  For instance, while he acknowledges that nuclear deterrence 
could be “a force for peace, however precarious,”143 Morgenthau worries that the psychology of 
deterrence is dangerously complex and vulnerable to disastrous miscalculations.144  Similarly, 
while he urges the United States to prepare for and be willing to fight a limited nuclear war, he 
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worries that the success of such a war rests on leaders with an almost super-human capacity to 
determine “just the right atomic dosage” required to avoid defeat without provoking “all-out 
atomic retaliation.”145   Only by the end of the decade did these doubts develop into a complete 
and unwavering conception of the novelty of nuclear era.  He concludes: 
[The] rational relationship between the means of violence and the ends of foreign 
policy has been destroyed by the availability of nuclear power as a means to 
achieve those ends.  For the possibility of universal destruction obliterates the 
means-end relationship itself by threatening the nations and their ends with total 
destruction.  No such radical qualitative transformation of the structure of 
international relations has ever occurred in history.146 
 
Nuclear weapons had not only changed the practice of warfare, but had initiated an 
unprecedented transformation of international politics.147 
 It is hardly surprising that Morgenthau took more than a decade to fully acknowledge the 
radical novelty of a nuclear era.  The tragic worldview that he had advocated in the late 1940s 
and 1950s as a polemical weapon against apocalyptic political religions resisted any claims of 
radical novelty.  Against an apocalyptic teleology which expects a ruptural and decisive break 
with human history, the tragic worldview insists on a cyclical conception of time in which the 
same conflicts repeat themselves again and again.  For Morgenthau, the inescapability of our 
tragic situation was guaranteed by two static constants of human nature—the lust for power and 
the will to dominate.148  These drives condemn us to a world of unresolvable discord whose 
patterns are so regular that they can be treated as unchanging laws.149  The benefit of a tragic 
worldview is that we can turn to the past for guidance, as the fundamental conflicts of our age 
will always have historical analogs.  However, the problem with a tragic worldview is not only 
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that it makes us suspicious of claims to radical novelty, but also leaves us without any 
intellectual or normative tools to confront that novelty.  This is a problem that Morgenthau’s 
University of Chicago colleague Hannah Arendt had already diagnosed with regard to twentieth-
century totalitarianism.  We have a tendency, she explains, to equate “totalitarian government 
with some well-known evil of the past, such as aggression, tyranny, conspiracy.”  This is 
understandable.  If the evils of the present were also the evils of the past, we can look to the past 
for political wisdom. The problem is that “the wisdom of the past…dies, so to speak, in our 
hands as soon as we try to apply it honestly to the central political experiences of our own time.  
Everything we know of totalitarianism demonstrates a horrible originality which no farfetched 
historical parallels can alleviate.”150  This is also the dilemma that Morgenthau confronts when 
his tragic worldview collides with the radical novelty of nuclear weapons.  Tragedy had been a 
valuable antidote for a “civilization that likes to see novelty in history where there is none.”  
However, it was ill-suited for a world which seemed “to perceive but dimly the genuine novelty 
with which nuclear power confronts it.”151 
 In his remarkable essay, “Death in a Nuclear Age” (1961), Morgenthau adopts a new 
strategy.  Harnessing the darkest fears of annihilation against the radical hope of renewal through 
nuclear destruction, he calls upon his readers to imagine the apocalypse in order to prevent it.  
Both the lyrical style of the essay and its existential preoccupations mark a definitive break from 
his previous writings.152  He takes aim at what he sees as a dangerous complacency toward the 
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prospect of a nuclear war.  His most obvious target, and one whom he engages directly in other 
writings of this period, is RAND strategist Herman Kahn.153  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
Kahn argued that a nuclear war would differ only in magnitude, but not in kind, from the wars of 
the past.  The United States could survive a nuclear war and its remaining inhabitants could even 
resume something like a normal life.154  As noted above, on the basis of predictions like these, 
some went further, seeing nuclear destruction as an opportunity for courage and heroism or, in 
the words of the 1956 report on “The Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development,” a 
chance to “make the very best of the very worst.” Popular publications like Time and Life 
magazines offered hopeful images of families emerging from their fallout shelters ready to create 
the world anew.  For Morgenthau, these are desperate delusions.  Implicating both himself and 
his readers, he warns: “In spite of what some of us know in our reason, we continue to think and 
act as though the possibility of nuclear death portended only a quantitative extension of the mass 
destruction of the past and not a qualitative transformation of the meaning of our existence.”155   
Morgenthau’s essay attempts to wrench readers out of this dangerous complacency by 
offering a bleak account of a nuclear apocalypse without worldly redemption or renewal.  The 
prospect of nuclear annihilation has radically altered man’s understanding of himself within time 
by denying him any hope of immortality.  Death, Morgenthau explains, “is the great scandal in 
the experience of man.”  It negates everything that “man experiences as specifically human in his 
existence: the consciousness of himself and of his world, the remembrance of things past and the 
anticipation of things to come, a creativeness in thought and action which aspires to, and 
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approximates, the eternal.”156  Man preserves his humanity by transcending death.  Historically, 
he has done this in three ways: he has denied the reality of death through a faith in human 
immortality, he has sought mastery over death through suicide or heroic sacrifice, and he has 
conquered death by achieving worldly immortality through his deeds and works.  The secular 
modern age has deprived us of the first strategy, while the looming possibility of nuclear death 
has made the other two absurd.          
Many religious believers transcend death through a belief in the immortality of the 
person.  They may assume “that the finiteness of man’s biological existence is but apparent and 
that his body will live on in another world.”157  Alternatively, they may insist that our 
specifically human attributes will survive the worldly destruction of our bodies and be preserved 
in another realm whose shape we can but dimly grasp.  Morgenthau argues that religious 
immortality is no longer available to us in a secular age.  And perhaps this is not something that 
we should lament.  If we still had the comfort of religious belief, we could await nuclear death 
with calm acceptance.  Perhaps we could even muster some enthusiasm as we “look forward to 
the day of the great slaughter as a day on which the preparatory and vain life on this earth would 
come to an end for most of us and the true, eternal life in another world begin.”158  Morgenthau’s 
insistence that this strategy is no longer available to modern man seems to ignore the persistence 
of religious belief in the secular age.  One can only guess at the reasons for his insistence.  
Perhaps it is a rather blunt rhetorical move aimed at quickly dispensing with the possibility of 
confronting nuclear death with a sense of hopeful anticipation.  Or, maybe Morgenthau is 
making a more nuanced point about the effects of secularization.  Of course, there remain 
substantial portions of humanity that do have recourse to beliefs about the immortality of the 
                                                
156 Morgenthau, “Death,” 19. 
157 Morgenthau, “Death,” 20. 
158 Morgenthau, “Death,” 24. 
 233 
body or soul.  They can still look forward to nuclear destruction as the cataclysmic prerequisite 
for an eternal life in a new world.  However, the doubt and skepticism that define the modern age 
mean that this strategy is, at best, one that can be privately contemplated by the individual 
believer.  It cannot form the basis of a collective and public attempt to grapple with the meaning 
of death in a nuclear era. 
Without a faith in immortality, modern secular man is left with two alternatives, both of 
which are rendered absurd in the face of nuclear annihilation.  First, he can attempt to master 
death by choosing to end his life through suicide or sacrifice.  The latter choice gives him the 
best chance of being remembered for posterity.  The hero who sacrifices himself for a cause 
gives his death and his life a larger meaning.  However, this meaning depends on the existence of 
a culture or civilization that will live on to interpret and remember this courageous sacrifice.159  
Drawing on examples from Greek mythology, Morgenthau reasons: “Patroclus dies to be 
avenged by Achilles.  Hector dies to be mourned by Priam.  Yet if Patroclus, Hector, and all 
those who could remember them were killed simultaneously, what would become of the meaning 
of Patroclus’ and Hector’s deaths?”160  The mass death that would result from the deployment of 
a thermonuclear weapon would deprive the individual hero of a surviving culture that could 
understand and honor his sacrifice.  Even if some manage to survive a nuclear war, individual 
deaths would lose any heroic significance:     
There is meaning in Leonidas falling at Thermopylae, in Socrates drinking the 
cup of hemlock, in Jesus nailed to the cross.  There can be no meaning in the 
slaughter of the innocent, the murder of six million Jews, the prospective nuclear 
destruction of, say fifty million Americans and an equal number of Russians.  
There is, then, a radical difference in meaning between a man risking death by an 
act of will and fifty million people simultaneously reduced—by somebody 
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switching a key thousands of miles away—to radioactive ashes, indistinguishable 
from the ashes of their houses, books, and animals.161 
 
Like others writing in the postwar era, Morgenthau finds in the Nazi genocide the closest parallel 
to the prospect of nuclear annihilation.    When death tolls are measured in the millions, lives and 
deaths have no meaning.  The sheer numbers rob the dead of the possibility of worldly 
immortality through heroic sacrifice.  What is remembered, if there is anyone left to remember, 
is “the quantity of the killed—six million, twenty million, fifty million—not the quality of one 
man’s death as over and against another’s.”162  Thus, the heroic individual is both physically 
obliterated by being reduced to radioactive ashes and historically annihilated by being denied the 
hope of posterity. 
  The second way in which modern secular man transcends death is by leaving behind the 
works of his will and his hands as evidence of his existence.  He lives on through his children. 
He creates monuments, leaving behind “ an inheritance of visible things not to be consumed but 
to be preserved as tangible mementos of past generations…’Roma eterna,’ ‘the Reich of a 
thousand years’ are but the most ambitious attempts to perpetuate man and his deeds.  The tree 
he has planted, the house that he has built, have been given a life likely to last longer than his 
own.”163  Perhaps most importantly, man produces works of the imagination—books, poetry, 
art—which are lasting testaments to a distinctly human capacity for creativity.  When he creates, 
man participates in “an unbroken chain emerging from the past and reaching into the future, 
which is made of the same stuff his mind is made of and, hence, is capable of participating in, 
and perpetuating, his mind’s creation.”164  Nuclear war would eliminate both the physical 
products of man’s creativity and the culture and civilization that guarantee his worldly 
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immortality.  For as Morgenthau explains elsewhere, even if we were to accept the optimistic 
assessments that a thermonuclear attack would “only” kill 50 to 100 million Americans, it is 
foolishly optimistic to believe that civilization could withstand this kind of shock.165  Survivors 
would be reduced to the status of barbarians, deprived of the physical and imaginative artifacts 
through which the living honor and remember the dead. 
Here, Morgenthau’s essay takes its most decisive turn, as it rhetorically performs the 
apocalyptic annihilation whose enormity his contemporaries have systematically failed to grasp:     
Nuclear destruction is mass destruction, both of persons and of things.  It signifies 
the simultaneous destruction of tens of millions of people, of whole families, 
generations, and societies, of all things that they have inherited and created.  It 
signifies total destruction of whole societies by killing their members, destroying 
their visible achievements, and therefore reducing the survivors to barbarism.  
Thus nuclear destruction destroys the meaning of death by depriving it of its 
individuality.  It destroys the meaning of immortality by making both society and 
history impossible.  It destroys the meaning of life by throwing life back upon 
itself.166 
 
Like Hobbes in his description of the state of nature, Morgenthau calls forth all the markers of 
civilization and posterity—families, generations, visible achievements—only to rhetorically 
annihilate them.   In so doing, he offers the reader an apocalypse in which the suffering and death 
                                                
165 Hans J. Morgenthau (with Sidney Hook, H. Stuart Hughes, and C.P. Snow), “Western Values and Total War,” 
Commentary 32 (October 1961): 281. 
166 Morgenthau, “Death,” 22.  There are distinct echoes of Arendt’s arguments about the nature of worldly 
immortality: “The task and potential greatness of mortals lie in their ability to produce things—works and deeds and 
words—which would deserve to be and, at least to a degree, are at home in everlastingness, so that through them 
mortals could find their place in a cosmos where everything is immortal except themselves.”  And later: “Without 
this transcendence into a potentially earthly immortality, no politics, strictly speaking, no common world and no 
public realm, is possible.  For unlike the common good as Christianity understood it—the salvation of one’s soul as 
a concern common to all—the common world is what we enter when we are born and what we leave behind when 
we die.  It transcends our lifespan into past and future alike; it was there before we came and will outlast our brief 
sojourn in it.  It is what we have in common not only with those who live with us, but also with those who were here 
before and with those who will come after us.”  See: Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998 [1958]), 19, 55.  This is precisely the kind of worldly immortality that nuclear destruction 
makes impossible, according to Morgenthau.  While he does not cite Arendt in this passage, we know that 
Morgenthau held her work, and The Human Condition in particular, in high esteem.  When asked to name the ten 
books that had had the greatest intellectual influence on him, Morgenthau included The Human Condition, alongside 
works by Plato, Aristotle, Publius, and Nietzsche.  See: Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, 113. 
   
 236 
of millions are deprived of meaning.  Those who survive are not an elect, but a shattered remnant 
reduced to barbarism.  Against the looming prospect of a nuclear apocalypse, Morgenthau stages 
a rhetorical apocalypse to shake his readers from their “thoughtless optimism.”167  In short, he 
fights apocalypse with apocalypse, calling upon his readers to imagine nuclear annihilation in 
order to prevent it.         
 Such prevention could be achieved in the long term only with an appropriate institutional 
solution.  Since the late 1940’s, Morgenthau had recognized that the only reliable safeguard 
against total annihilation was a world state with a monopoly on nuclear violence: “It is only 
when nations have surrendered the means of destruction which modern technology has put in 
their hands to a higher authority—when they have given up their sovereignty—that international 
peace can be made as secure as domestic peace.”168  Yet such a state was not possible in the 
absence of a world society.  The unity of mankind would have to precede the creation of a world 
state.  In a world marked by crusading political religions and the absence of any supranational 
moral consensus, this kind of unity seemed like a dim and futile hope.  By the 1960s, however, 
Morgenthau had begun to recognize in the prospect of nuclear annihilation not just a novel 
threat, but also a novel possibility.  It presents us with nothing less than an opportunity to effect a 
fundamental transformation of humanity.  An inchoate “awareness of the unity of mankind,” 
long submerged by the political religions of crusading nationalisms, has been sharpened by the 
common fear of nuclear death.169  Our longing to give some political and institutional form to 
this unity has been greatly strengthened in the nuclear age “by the desire, innate in all men, for 
self-preservation.”  This desire could now be harnessed, in a way that had previously been 
impossible, to abolish “international relations itself through the merger of all national 
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sovereignties into one world state which would have a monopoly of the most destructive 
instruments of violence.”170   
However, Morgenthau’s essay on nuclear death betrays some doubt about whether we 
can rely on this innate desire to emerge on its own as a political force.  Clinging to the hope of 
secular immortality, we fail to grasp the enormity of the nuclear threat.  Hobbes had faced a 
similar dilemma. While he suggested that the fear of earthly death is our most basic and reliable 
fear, he worried that it may ultimately be overpowered by the terror of eternal damnation.  Our 
fear of death cannot be relied upon as a natural force.  It must be actively cultivated.  Hobbes did 
this, at least in part, by neutralizing the threat of eternal torment and by offering an apocalyptic 
account of the breakdown of political order.  Morgenthau, I suggest, might be attempting a 
similar rhetorical endeavor as he strips his readers of the comforts of secular immortality and 
leaves them with a terrifying account of nuclear annihilation that facilitates the cultivation of a 
salutary fear.  He envisions a radical transformation of human nature.171  No longer would 
humans be driven by our pursuit of power or our will to dominate.  In the shadow of nuclear 
apocalypse, self-preservation would become our guiding motivation and the basis for a project of 
permanent peace.  Thus prepared, perhaps his audience will be more willing to accept our 
common humanity and to contemplate the possibility of a world state. 
 This is where the irony of Morgenthau’s position becomes clear.  In attempting to combat 
dangerously hopeful scenarios of nuclear apocalypse, he succumbs to the millennial fantasy of a 
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world state able to guarantee permanent peace.  Yet Morgenthau could never clearly specify 
what such a world state would look like.  Its contours remain fundamentally unimaginable.  He is 
willing to accept, with Hobbes, that “society has no substitute for the power of the Leviathan 
whose very presence, towering above contending groups, keeps their conflicts within peaceful 
bounds.”172  However, he cannot bring himself to accept the possibility of a global equivalent to 
the Hobbesian sovereign, a universal tyranny capable of terrorizing an “unwilling humanity” into 
perpetual peace.  He declares that “such a world state would be a totalitarian monster resting on 
feet of clay, the very thought of which startles the imagination.”173   
Throughout the 1960s, he toys with various alternatives that all fall short of a world state 
with a monopoly on violence.  He considers the possibility of an American-led “free association” 
of liberal democratic states that would exercise supranational control over nuclear weapons, a 
concerted effort by the United Nations “to point the world in the direction of replacing national 
sovereignty with supranational decisions and institutions,” and a system of joint Soviet and 
American sovereignty over the world.174  All of these solutions fall short of the “New Leviathan” 
that would be required to guarantee permanent peace and human survival in a nuclear world.175  
Morgenthau’s inability to imagine the contours of the world state strikes some of his critics an 
intellectual failing—a fundamental theoretical incoherence or an unwillingness to fully abandon 
a narrow realism that was dangerously unsuited to a nuclear world.176  I might suggest instead 
that it is the vestiges of a tragic realism, with its insistence that projects of permanent peace are 
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the most dangerous forms of political escapism, that prevents him from surrendering completely 
to the millennial fantasy of a world without conflict. 
 
Conclusion  
 In this chapter, I have argued that Morgenthau’s political realism was shaped by the 
postwar apocalyptic imaginary.  In his writings from the late 1940s and 1950s, he was centrally 
preoccupied with the violent potential of a world divided by crusading political religions who 
had found in nuclear weapons the means to match their totalizing ends.  The bulk of his critical 
attention is directed at liberal internationalism, at the roots of which he sees an apocalyptic hope 
for a final and decisive war that will usher in an age of permanent peace.  Like Machiavelli, 
Morgenthau turns to a tragic worldview that insists on the inescapability of conflict and the 
limits to transformative political action.  However, this tragic turn left Morgenthau ill-equipped 
to confront the radical novelty of nuclear weapons.  By the early 1960s, he had taken a dramatic 
turn away from a tragic worldview and toward a Hobbesian strategy of fighting apocalypse with 
apocalypse.  Depriving us of any hope for secular redemption in the wake of nuclear 
annihilation, he asks us to imagine the apocalypse in order to prevent it.  In so doing, 
Morgenthau hopes that we may be able to effect the kind of profound human transformation 
required to accept a world state. 
 This argument has several implications for Morgenthau’s identification as a political 
realist.  First, as was the case with Machiavelli and Hobbes, this reading suggests that 
Morgenthau’s thought was deeply contextual.  Yet his realism does not develop simply from a 
clear-eyed analysis of material facts on the ground but also from a struggle about how to imagine 
and interpret the significance of those events.  Features of the postwar apocalyptic imaginary 
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seem to haunt his work. The eschatological underpinnings of Nazism loom in the background of 
his worries about the apocalyptic basis of liberal internationalism, while the mass exterminations 
of the Holocaust provide the only possible analog for the unimaginable prospect of nuclear 
annihilation.  Second, the interpretation I have offered here points to the deeply normative core 
of Morgenthau’s realism.  In his tragic phase, he rejects liberal schemes for permanent peace not 
primarily on the basis of an assessment of their empirical possibility, but of a profoundly 
normative evaluation of their inevitable dangers.  In his apocalyptic phase, he calls for nothing 
short of a fundamental transformation of human nature.  Instead of accepting men as they are, he 
offers a terrifying vision aimed at transforming them into what they should be.  Finally, this 
reading questions whether the tragic realism that had defined Morgenthau’s early writings may 
be ill-equipped to confront radically novel threats to human survival.  Captivated by the prospect 
of nuclear annihilation, Morgenthau abandoned a tragic worldview and embraced the rhetorical 
potential of the apocalyptic imaginary.  In so doing, he flirted with the very kind of utopian 
project he had once condemned as a “repudiation of politics.”  The concluding chapter of the 
dissertation will suggest that Morgenthau’s abandonment of tragedy was perhaps too hasty and 
that there are valuable normative resources within the tradition of tragic realism for responding 
to contemporary hopes and fears about the end of the world.  
 
 
  241 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION: ON THE ART OF LIVING THROUGH CATASTROPHE 
 In the foregoing chapters, I have attempted to demonstrate that Machiavelli, Hobbes, and 
Morgenthau’s engagements with apocalyptic fears and hopes shaped the works of these 
canonical political realists.  In making this claim, however, I am not endorsing the conventional 
argument that political realism always emerges as a reaction to or critique of some kind of 
utopianism.  Instead, I have argued that the ways in which these thinkers respond to 
apocalypticism go far beyond mere reaction or criticism.  Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau 
all acknowledge the appeal of the apocalyptic imaginary whilst also struggling to negotiate its 
dangers.  Despite their firm realist opposition to perfectionist political projects, all three thinkers 
at some point succumb to the apocalyptic imaginary’s radical utopianism.  However, I do not 
think that this finding should lead us to question the identification of these thinkers as realists so 
much as it should force us to acknowledge the difficulty of maintaining a thorough-going 
realism.  All of these thinkers wrestle with the challenge of political realism in apocalyptic 
times—that is, how to instruct their audiences “in the art of living through an age of catastrophe” 
without apocalyptically surrendering to it.1      
 
The Apocalyptic Imaginary Revisited 
 Part of the challenge of the apocalyptic imaginary resides in the fact that the very features 
that make it politically seductive are also those that render it radically unstable.  First, the 
apocalyptic imaginary is hostile to established forms of power.  In Chapter 2, I considered the 
                                                
1 When Henri Marrou characterizes the value of St. Augustine’s teaching for modern readers, he writes that the 
medieval theologian “instructs us by his example in the art of living through an age of catastrophe.”  See: Henri 
Marrou, St. Augustine and his Influence Through the Ages, trans. Patrick Hepburne-Scott (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1957).  I think that this is also a good characterization of the normative project of political realism, 
particularly in the cases of the three thinkers covered in this dissertation.     
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way in which this hostility manifests itself in the books of Daniel and Revelation, the textual loci 
of the apocalyptic imaginary.  Drawing on the symbolic resources of Near Eastern mythology, 
both books cast sovereign power as a sea beast, a chaos monster that God must slay in order to 
make his sovereignty once again manifest on earth. The appeal of such a message in the face of 
real or perceived persecution is understandable.  It confirms a suspicion that the political world is 
radically out of joint.  For those who remain complacent and complicit with sovereign power, the 
message defamiliarizes this power by casting it in a new and terrifying light.  As I explored in 
Chapter 4, this radical critique of sovereign power was deployed to tremendous effect during the 
English Civil War.  Puritan populist and Parliamentarian forces identified the Laudian Church 
and Charles I with Antichrist and the Beast of Revelation, casting established ecclesiastical and 
royal power as deeply alien and antithetical to God’s sovereignty.  The danger of this way of 
imagining one’s enemy is, of course, that it obliterates moral limits on the use of force.  As 
Stephen Marshall advised in a speech before Parliament in 1642: “If this work be to avenge 
God’s church against Babylon, he is a blessed man that takes and dashes the little ones against 
the stones.”2  Anyone seen as an ally of the monstrous forces of chaos becomes a target for 
divinely sanctioned annihilation. 
 Second, the apocalyptic imaginary brings narrative coherence to events that seem 
radically contingent.  The books of Daniel and Revelation made the experiences of persecution 
and trauma under Hellenic and Roman rule meaningful.  The suffering of believers was 
transformed from an experience of inexplicable evil to the necessary birth pangs of a new world.  
As I discussed in Chapter 3, the Florentine apocalyptic imaginary, especially in its Savonarolan 
form, also imposed a divine order on history.  In a matter of days during November 1494, 
                                                
2 As quoted in: Paul Christianson, Reformers and Babylon: Apocalyptic Visions from the Reformation to the Eve of 
the Civil War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 185.   
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Florence witnessed the crumbling of the Medici regime and the invasion of Charles VIII’s 
forces.  These were terrifying events whose outcomes seemed radically uncertain.  In channeling 
the apocalyptic imaginary, Savonarola promised to give these events both a meaning and an end.  
He imagined Charles as a divine agent who would purge Florence of its sins and mark the 
beginning of the apocalypse described in Revelation.  Savonarola’s genius lay in his ability to 
adapt this narrative to suit changing circumstances.  When Charles and his forces left Florence 
largely undamaged, the friar interpreted this as a sign of the city’s elect status as a New 
Jerusalem.  As appealing as this narrative was during a particularly unstable and unpredictable 
period in Florence’s history, its promise of a spontaneous and peaceful transformation masked 
both the difficult work that would be involved in creating a spiritual republic and the deep 
political tensions that these labors would unleash.  Within four years of Charles’ invasion, 
Savonarola had been executed as a heretic and Florence was once again at the mercy of factional 
conflict.  Far from bringing a meaning and an end to the city’s political difficulties, the 
Savonarolan moment likely exacerbated them. 
 Third, the apocalyptic imaginary holds out the seductive promise that conflict and 
difference can be eliminated.  Daniel envisions a new order in which God gathers his people 
together to be ruled as one.  All differences of race, nationality, and language melt away.  
Similarly, John of Patmos promises that Jesus’ faithful followers will receive new clothes and 
new names.  Markers of individuality will be eliminated as the elect surrender to Jesus’ 
transformative omnipotence.  With difference and individuality abolished, “death will be no 
more; mourning and crying and pain will be no more, for the first things have passed away.”3  
Insofar as the political condition is one marked by inescapable conflict and enduring differences, 
the apocalyptic imaginary does not just promise an end to persecution but also an end to politics.  
                                                
3 Rev 21:4.   
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As I argued in Chapter 5, Hans Morgenthau diagnoses a secular variant of this hope in American 
liberal internationalism, which he argues sees a final war for humanity as the prerequisite for a 
millennial democratic future.  Underlying this seemingly laudable end, writes Morgenthau, is the 
fantasy of an escape from the ineliminable conflict of the political condition.  He suggests that 
this apocalyptic vision is at its most dangerous when the expected end fails to materialize and the 
final war becomes the forerunner “of wars more destructive and extensive than any liberal epoch 
had witnessed.”4  Whether or not Morgenthau’s worries were vastly overstated or disturbingly 
prescient will largely depend on one’s own assessment of the wars that the United States has 
waged in the name of liberty and democracy over the past sixty years. 
 
Political Realist Responses to the Apocalyptic Imaginary 
 As I attempted to demonstrate in the preceding chapters, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and 
Morgenthau respond to the appeal and dangers of the apocalyptic imaginary in two ways.  
Machiavelli and the early Morgenthau reject the apocalyptic imaginary and turn to a tragic 
worldview that, while insistent on the limits to effective political action and resistant to 
perfectionist projects, does not endorse a withdrawal from worldly pursuits.  I argue that 
Machiavelli only comes to this tragic position after having flirted with the apocalyptic imaginary 
in The Prince.  His most famous work culminates in an apocalyptic exhortation because he fails 
to fulfill the opening promise of the book—to make the variability of politics intelligible and 
subject to human control.  I find a more developed and tragic realism in The Discourses, where 
Machiavelli subjects the apocalyptic hope of worldly transformation to serious normative 
scrutiny.  This extended engagement with the apocalyptic imaginary coincides with a maturation 
of his political realism from a misconceived project of intelligibility and control in The Prince to 
                                                
4 Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 67.   
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the more modest but difficult attempt to cultivate a tragic wisdom in The Discourses.  The early 
Morgenthau responds to the secularized apocalyptic elements of liberal internationalism with a 
tragic stance that similarly insists on the inescapability of conflict and the limits to 
transformative political projects.  For Morgenthau, however, this tragic stance ultimately seems 
unable to confront the radical novelty of nuclear weapons and the threat they pose to the future 
of the world. 
 In the work of Hobbes and the late Morgenthau, I find a different response to the 
apocalyptic imaginary.  Rather than turning away from it and toward a tragic sensibility, Hobbes 
and the late Morgenthau fight apocalypse with apocalypse.  That is, they redeploy elements of 
the apocalyptic imaginary and call on their audiences to imagine the end of the world in order to 
prevent it.  Hobbes does this in two ways.  In his theological argument, he offers a de-radicalized 
Christian eschatology that affirms important parts of the narratives of Daniel and Revelation 
whilst making the apocalyptic imaginary safe for sovereign power.  In his political argument, 
Hobbes offers an apocalyptic account of the state of nature in order to legitimize the rule of an 
absolute sovereign.  His use of terrifying apocalyptic imagery and rhetoric here suggests that 
while he might prefer to persuade by appealing to reason and prudence, he is willing to do so by 
burrowing into the darker corners of the imagination.   
Morgenthau adopts a similar strategy in response to the novel threat of nuclear weapons.  
He offers a terrifying account of an apocalypse without redemption in the hope that such a vision 
may be able to effect the human transformation necessary for the creation of a world state.  In the 
case of both Hobbes and Morgenthau, this turn to the apocalyptic imaginary legitimizes 
potentially dangerous utopian projects.  For Hobbes this project is the submersion of individual 
wills into the single will of the sovereign, while for Morgenthau it is the submersion of diverse 
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states into a powerful world state.  For both thinkers, these endeavors are premised on the 
perfectionist hope for a fundamental transformation of humanity.  In short, for both Hobbes and 
Morgenthau, the redeployment of the apocalyptic imaginary coincides with the abandonment of 
key tenets of these thinkers’ political realism.   
  
The Promise and Limits of a Tragic Vision 
It has likely become plain by now that I am inclined to think that the tragic worldview is 
not only more consistent with constitutive features of the political realist position, but also that it 
assumes a more defensible normative stance than the apocalyptic imaginary.  This is indeed the 
case.  I certainly do not deny that the apocalyptic imaginary, particularly as it is articulated in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, contains positive normative resources.  At its best, it demonstrates a 
concern for the persecuted and oppressed, offering them not only hope and consolation but also a 
radical vision of a world in which established hierarchies have been abolished.  It privileges a 
concern with power and justice and provides rhetorical and imaginative resources for challenging 
enduring forms of inequality.5  At its worst, however, the apocalyptic imaginary cultivates a 
profoundly dangerous certainty—certainty about the course and goals of history, certainty about 
who and what is evil, and certainty about “our” goodness and righteousness.  In so doing, the 
apocalyptic imaginary takes aim at the features of the contemporary world that are at once most 
valued and most feared—its indeterminacy, ambiguity, and pluralism.6   
                                                
5 For readings of Revelation that emphasize these dimensions, see: Néstor Míguez, “Apocalyptic and the Economy: 
A Reading of Revelation 18 From the Experience of Economic Exclusion,” in Reading from This Place, vol. 2: 
Social Location and Biblical Interpretation in Global Perspective, eds. Francis F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995): 250-62; Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, The Book of Revelation: Justice and 
Judgment (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), esp. 181-203.   
6 Catherine Keller, God and Power: Counter-apocalyptic Journeys (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 12.   
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It was both the certainty of this imaginary and its choice of targets that many of the critics 
of the Bush Administration found so disturbing about the President’s post-9/11 apocalyptic 
rhetoric.  Bush seemed certain about the direction of history when he proclaimed: “the untamed 
fire of freedom will reach the darkest corners of our world.”7  He allowed for no moral ambiguity 
when he declared: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”8   And he evinced a 
profound faith in America’s righteousness when he described the country’s mission as the 
defense of “freedom…civilization…and universal values.”9  Yet Bush and his supporters were 
not the only ones captured by the apocalyptic imaginary.  Those most critical of the President’s 
rhetoric and the policies it was meant to defend also gravitated to the rhetorical and visual 
resources of apocalypse.  Feminist theologian Catherine Keller offers a personal account of this 
apocalyptic reply: 
Even the progressive U.S. response gets caught in the apocalyptic mirror-game.  
Chickens come home to roost: the real cause is our policy in the Middle East, 
especially Israel, or the real cause is the global economy.  While I heard myself in 
the initial shock laying these propositions on my students, and heard them 
echoing through my theological community, their indignant certainties rang 
hollow at ground zero.  I needed something more difficult and honest than the 
monocausal explanations, the warmed-over and misfitting Vietnam-era slogans, 
the I-told-you-so’s that did not…Indeed the very model of a monocausal 
explanation, with its linear predictability and its indignant certainty, echoes with 
the hoofbeats of secular apocalypse.10 
 
The “apocalyptic mirror-game” that Keller describes is a process whereby those who most want 
to resist apocalypticism are nonetheless drawn back to it by its promise of certainty and 
intelligibility.  In this diagnosis, Keller has identified what is most powerful and troubling about 
                                                
7 George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (January 20, 2005), accessed August 15, 2011, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58745#axzz1W1KOUh9B 
8 George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress (September 20, 2001), accessed August 15, 2011, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64731&st=&st1=#axzz1W1KOUh9B 
9 George W. Bush, Remarks on Arrival in Daytona Beach (January 30, 2002), accessed August 15, 2011, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73243&st=&st1=#axzz1W1KOUh9B 
10 Keller, God and Power, 12-13.   
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the apocalyptic imaginary—the profound hold it can have even over those who are trying to 
resist it. 
 Keller attempts to disrupt this mirror-game by adopting what she calls a “counter-
apocalyptic” position.    This stance resists the linear temporality, righteous certainty, and 
totalizing violence of the apocalypse while attempting to preserve the radical political traditions 
of apocalypticism that value “disclosure, rather than final closure.”11  I think that the tragic 
sensibility that I find in the work of Machiavelli and the early Morgenthau encourages an 
intellect capable of “counter-apocalypse.”  William Connolly summarizes this tragic vision in a 
way that highlights its counter-apocalyptic features.  A tragic vision, he explains, requires that 
one “doubt the providential image of time, reject the compensatory idea that humans can master 
all the forces that impinge upon life, strive to cultivate wisdom about a world that is neither 
designed for our benefit nor plastic enough to be putty in our hands, and cultivate temporal 
sensitivity to how this or that concatenation of events could issue in the worst.”12  Machiavelli 
and the early Morgenthau further demand that we do not turn away from this world that is not 
wholly our own, but rather shore up the courage required for political action when success is 
neither guaranteed nor free from the possibility of moral corruption.13  
                                                
11 Keller, God and Power, 88.   
12 William E. Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, American Style (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 121.   
13 When I invoke the possibility of moral corruption here, I am not primarily thinking of “moral deterioration or 
decay” or the abuse of a position of trust and authority for personal ends.  See: Oxford English Dictionary [online 
edition], 2011.  Rather, I am thinking of the more subtle tendency toward a kind of rationalization that chips away at 
the strength and validity of moral claims “to make them better suited to our wishes and inclinations.”  See: 
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork on the Metaphysics of morals, in Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4:405, 60.      In Kant’s account, moral corruption is more subtle 
than the dictionary definition cited above suggests.  It is often indirect, and sometimes systemic.  As Stephen 
Gardiner explains, “under such circumstances, it can, from the external perspective, be difficult to find anyone to 
blame in the usual way.  After all, those who offer bad arguments or mistaken values may act in good faith, as might 
many of those who accept their positions.”  See: Stephen M. Gardiner, The Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical 
Tragedy of Climate Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), [Kindle Edition], ch. 9, part I, sec. 2.  I 
think that a tragic realism, at I have outlined the position in this dissertation, is particularly attuned to the subtle 
dangers of moral corruption.  However, I also suspect that political realism in general is especially vulnerable to the 
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 However, while tragic realism may be the more responsible normative stance to hold in a 
complex and contingent political world, it seems ill equipped to confront apocalypticism on the 
battleground of the imagination.  In Chapter 2, I argued that one of the reasons that the 
apocalyptic imaginary continues to captivate even in contexts far different from those of the 
original audiences of Daniel and John of Patmos is that it draws upon a dense and almost 
infinitely flexible network of symbols.  Both the rhetoric and imagery of these texts open up “the 
vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration.”14  The books of Daniel and Revelation at once 
invite endless and often contradictory interpretations whilst confounding the possibility of a 
single definitive reading.  This gives the apocalyptic imaginary an almost unparalleled capacity 
to travel through time to radically different historical contexts.  This capacity is further 
guaranteed by the fact that Revelation remains the most illustrated book of the bible, which may 
help to explain how images like the four horsemen of the apocalypse, the Whore of Babylon, and 
the Beast resonate even for audiences completely unfamiliar with the narrative details of the 
Judeo-Christian apocalypse.     
Even more importantly, however, the apocalyptic imaginary captivates.  In offering a 
terrifying vision of a cataclysmic world transformation, it represents the unrepresentable.15  
These sublime visions elicit a combination of awe and terror.  With sufficient distance—as when 
they appear in an affecting sermon, or in an ambitious painting, or on the television screen, these 
scenes are even capable of eliciting that unique kind of pleasure that accompanies the sublime.  
Edmund Burke evokes this kind of pleasurable captivation when he argues: “there is no spectacle 
we so eagerly pursue, as that of some uncommon and grievous calamity…The delight we have in 
                                                                                                                                                       
kinds of rationalizations—often in the name of prudence, necessity, or expediency—that lead to this kind of moral 
corruption.   
14 Paul De Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” Diacritics 3, no. 3 (1973): 30.   
15 Jonathan Alexander, “The Last Things: Representing the Unrepresentable,” in The Apocalypse and the Shape of 
Things to Come, ed. Frances Carey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 43-63.   
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such things, hinders us from shunning scenes of misery…and all this antecedent to any 
reasoning, by an instinct that works us to its own purposes without our concurrence.”16  This is 
the kind of apocalyptic captivation that held audiences spellbound as they listened to 
Savonarola’s fiery sermons or watched as the Trinity test bomb exploded in the New Mexico 
sky.             
 For all its normative resources, the tragic worldview cannot match this imaginative 
power.  Throughout this dissertation I have consciously referred to an apocalyptic imaginary and 
a tragic worldview, vision, or sensibility.  This is because I harbor serious doubts about the 
capacity of the tragic vision of Machiavelli and the early Morgenthau to engage the imagination, 
particularly in a way that is “antecedent to any reasoning.”  In fact, tragic realism emerges 
explicitly in response to what it takes to be a dangerous imaginative captivation.  To be sure, the 
best classical examples of tragic theatre would no doubt have engaged both the imagination and 
the reason.  Peter Euben provides one of the more robust accounts of the extraordinary ambitions 
of classical tragedy:  
[It] evoked and provoked its audience into participating in the task of 
deconstructing and reconstructing a world that was both familiar and other.  It 
awakened and enlivened the mind and heart, arousing emotions and 
reason…Showing people learning to change, tragedy helped its audience see the 
need to do the same: seeing the connection between belief and action on stage, the 
audience could recognize how its own ideas shape its beliefs and actions.  The 
characters we see on stage, searching for the right thing to say and do in difficult 
circumstances, help us interpret our own difficulties…Tragedy does not so much 
provide us with a solution as insist on the depth of the problems and the dangers 
of a ‘problem-solving’ mentality.17 
 
                                                
16 Edmund Burke, “A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful with Several 
Other Additions,” in On Taste, On the Sublime and Beautiful, Reflections on the French Revolution, Letter to a 
Noble Lord (New York: P.F. Collier and Son, 1909), 42. 
17 J. Peter Euben, The Tragedy of Political Theory: The Road Not Taken (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990), 58.   
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 Tragedy seems to lose some of its extraordinary imaginative and formative power in its 
translation from a dramatic form to a worldview or sensibility.  The mature Machiavelli and the 
early Morgenthau find in tragedy the normative resources for cultivating a counter-apocalyptic 
disposition to the world.  But for both thinkers, the achievement of this disposition is both hard-
fought and precarious.  Morgenthau abandons his tragic realism when he finds it unable to cope 
with the radical novelty of nuclear weapons.  When faced with the prospect of human 
annihilation, he seems to conclude, tragedy is not enough.  While Machiavelli’s rejection of the 
apocalyptic imaginary is more enduring, his tragic realism is haunted by the millennial hope of a 
perpetual republic free from the conflict and contingency of politics.  To the extent that one may 
characterize the normative work of political realism as cultivating the art of living through 
catastrophe, the experiences of the thinkers in this dissertation suggest that this is a practice to 
which one must repeatedly recommit without any reasonable hope of success.   
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